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Abstract 
 
The aim of the thesis is to investigate the relationship between human behaviour and 
effective security in order to develop tools and methods for supporting decision makers in 
the field of information security.  
 
A review of the literature of information security, Human Computer Interaction (HCI), and 
the economics of security reveals that role of users in delivering effective security has largely 
been neglected. Security designers working without an understanding of the limitations of 
human cognition implement systems that, by their nature, offer perverse incentives to the 
user. The result is the adoption of insecure behaviour by the users in order to cope with the 
burdens placed upon them. Despite HCI identifying the need for increased usability in 
security, much of the research in the field of HCI Security (HCISec) still focuses on 
improving the usability of the interface to security systems, rather than the underlying 
system itself. In addition, while the impact of user non-compliance on the effectiveness of 
security has been demonstrated, most security design methods still rely on technical 
measures and controls to achieve their security aims. 
 
In recent years the need to incorporate human factors into security decision making has been 
recognised but this process is not supported by appropriate tools or methodologies. The 
traditional CIA framework used to express security goals lacks the flexibility and 
granularity to support the analysis of the trade-offs that are taking place. The research gap is 
therefore not so much one of knowledge (for much of the required information does exist in 
the fields of security and HCI) but rather how to combine this knowledge to form an 
effective decision making framework. 
 
This gap is addressed by combining the fields of security and HCI with economics in order 
to provide a utility-based approach that allows the effective balancing and management of 
human factors alongside more technical measures and controls. The need to consider human 
effort as a limited resource is shown by highlighting the negative consequences of neglecting 
this axis of resource measurement. This need is expressed through the Compliance Budget 
model which treats users as perceptive actors conducting a cost/benefit analysis when faced 
with compliance decisions. Through the use of the qualitative data analysis methodology 
Grounded Theory, a set of semi-structured interviews were analysed to provide the basis for 
this model. Passwords form a running example throughout the thesis. The need to provide 
decision makers with empirical data grounded in the real world is recognised and 
addressed through a combination of data gathering techniques. A laboratory study and a 
field trial were conducted to gather performance data with two password policies. 
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In order to make optimal use of this data, a unified approach to decision making is 
necessary. Alongside this, the usefulness of systems models as tools for simulation and 
analysis is recognised. An economically motivated framework is therefore presented that 
organises and expresses security goals with the methods required to fulfil them. The role of 
the user is fully represented in this framework which is structured in such a way as to allow 
a smooth transition from data gathering to systems modelling. This unified approach to 
optimising security decision making provides key insights into the requirements for making 
more effective real-world decisions in the field of information security and is a useful 
foundation for improving current practices in this area.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 The problem and thesis scope 
 
The need to protect and secure valuable information has been understood for thousands of 
years. Julius Caesar is credited with the invention of the Caesar cipher in approximately 50 
B.C., and over the intervening centuries, various methods have been used by countries and 
organisations to maintain their secrecy. The last century has seen many rapid advances in 
communications and computation, in particular the rise of the personal computer. Since its 
introduction into workplaces, companies have become increasingly reliant on computers for 
their day-to-day functions. Across large parts of the globe, millions of employees interact 
with a computer on a daily basis in order to communicate, share information, conduct 
business transactions of all kinds and to engage in social activities. This growth has afforded 
companies many additional opportunities to do business but new risks and threats, such as 
hacking and malicious software, have risen in parallel. These threats have driven the need 
for new methods of securing the information stored and transmitted in this digital space. 
The disciplines of information security and computer security have emerged as a result. 
 
The aim of information security is to safeguard the confidentiality, integrity and availability 
of information seen as valuable to an organisation. In today’s environment this practice is 
closely and inextricably linked to the use of IT systems. While there are academic disciplines 
that research the theoretical methods of information security, the prevalence of IT systems in 
the business environment also creates a requirement for the effective management of these 
systems. The relative short history of the information and computer security disciplines 
means that often these decision makers are working without firm scientific evidence or 
methods to support and enhance their understanding of the operational environment. In 
particular, there is a knowledge gap with respect to the behaviour and motivations of the 
users of these systems. New devices and software are released on to the market every year 
and the number of individuals using them continues to grow. 
 
Nevertheless, many security decisions need to be made every day. Some are made by 
professionals, those responsible for shaping the security of entire companies. Many more are 
made by relatively untrained members of the public. These are most commonly employees 
in support of the security of the organisations they work for, or simply individuals, perhaps 
customers of the organisation, providing for their own personal security needs. The outcome 
of these decisions affects the security of us all but are they being made in an informed or 
even rational manner? Many security managers rely on their own experience and intuition 
when deciding which security option to take. In a world of reduced budgets and increased 
expectation this may no longer be enough. Without a systematic approach to security 
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decision-making managers may find it hard to justify their budget expenditure to a 
company financial officer. Worse, organisations or individuals without such expertise are 
left to make decisions based only on their own intuition and by following common ‘best 
practice’, or by following the advice of the security community and the vendors of security 
systems, who offer an ever-changing array of products. The inherent danger in this is that 
vendors are primarily motivated by product sales, rather than by delivering effective 
security, and so present themselves as experts. However they rarely have a solid empirical 
basis for describing the effectiveness of their products. Likewise, the lack of both consensus 
and a solid science of security in the research community can lead to contradictory or 
ineffective advice. Without a systematic approach to security the way is left open for 
regulatory pressures, pursuit of industry standards (which may be driven by vendors) and 
‘best practice’ to govern security decision-making. This creates an environment that is far 
from optimally secure, but one that also contains opportunities for advancement and 
progress.  
 
This is not to say that all or even most of current information security practice is in need of 
improvement. However, not all aspects of security are equally well developed. While the 
technical side of information security is relatively advanced, the so called ‘human factor’, 
and its impact on both security and productivity, is both less well understood and less 
studied. This is not because the importance of it has never been recognised. Auguste 
Kerckhoffs, one of the founding fathers of modern cryptography, wrote two journal articles 
in 1883 [45] that laid out six principles of secure communication. These principles are still 
referred to today. Of these six principles three refer to the usability of the system: 
 
Principle 3: It must be easy to communicate and remember the keys without requiring 
written notes, it must also be easy to change or modify the keys with different 
participants; 
 
Principle 5: The system must be portable, and its use must not require more than one 
person; 
 
Principle 6: Finally, regarding the circumstances in which such system is applied; it 
must be easy to use and must neither require stress of mind nor the knowledge of a 
long series of rules. 
 
Over time, despite the application of his other principles, the necessity for usability in a 
secure system has fallen by the wayside. Over the past decade, however, the role of the 
human factor in security is starting, once again, to be appreciated. Information though is 
sparse on how to make best use of this understanding. Some practitioners have begun to 
apply economic thinking to technical security, to replace traditional military-influenced 
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thought processes such as the need for a centralised ‘command and control’ approach to 
security. Security researchers who understand and model security systems in this way have 
made significant progress [10, 13]. However, the work undertaken by such practitioners still 
abstracts away the role of the user in providing security. As a result, security policies are 
written which expect unrealistic feats of cognition and levels of effort from the people who 
are supposed to follow them, i.e., employees and consumers. Despite the advances in some 
of the specific usability issues in security, practitioners struggle to manage insecure 
behaviour and do not utilise knowledge of the human factor to improve security. This is the 
core problem area which this thesis will seek to address. The approach taken will be to 
utilise a cross-disciplinary method that combines economics, information security and HCI 
(Human/Computer Interaction). This train of thought leads to the following key research 
questions: 
 
Question 1: What can we learn from economic theory that will move us toward 
solving the problems found in information security? 
 
Question 2: What promotes insecure behaviours among the users of IT systems and 
how can these behaviours be managed and minimised? 
 
Question 3: How can we maximise information security when the human factor is 
taken into account? 
 
Question 4: How can we include the human factor in a systematic approach to 
security decision making? 
 
The research presented in this thesis will primarily address a gap in the current state of the 
art – that being the provision of information on the full costs and benefits of security 
measures, in particular accounting for human factors. As such it may be useful for both 
security managers seeking to make more informed policy decisions, and for other academic 
researchers working on similar problems. It is intended to address the problems created by 
an insufficient understanding of the human factors associated with security implementation 
and management. While it may not be directly useful to many individual users, or those 
involved only in personal security, the results will yield an indirect benefit as security 
decision makers consider the wider impacts of their security policies. The purpose of 
seeking to combine HCI’s understanding of user behaviour with computer security through 
an economic framework is to furnish information security decision makers, at a higher level, 
with a more viable model of human behaviour in the context of security. This will allow 
them to take the human factor into account when making security decisions. There will be a 
range of resultant benefits (such as increased usability, less wasted effort and greater 
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flexibility in the responses of the security system) passed down to the user indirectly as 
security-systems design begins to take in to account the associated user experience. 
 
This research attempts to address the lack of metrics in security but the scale of the task 
exceeds that of a single PhD. The contribution does, however, provide a step towards this 
goal. The research presented here was conducted as part of the Trust Economics project [71, 
36] and thus forms a part of a more comprehensive effort towards the goals of that project. 
The objectives of Trust Economics were: 
 
1. A study of the economics of information security policies, protocols, and investments. Our 
perspective is one of ‘systems thinking’ and, critically, our aim is to seek to integrate the 
following three perspectives:  
a. Modelling the behaviour of the users of systems, both internal and external 
(employees and customers), in the context of security policies and protocols;  
b. Mathematical modelling of systems, organizations, and networks, including the 
security policies and protocols which govern access;  
c. Economic modelling of the costs and value of security policies and protocols  
2. Devise methodology that allows companies to make economically justified security decisions  
3. Utilise Trust Economic modelling techniques within software tools. These tools can then be 
deployed for use within real-world environments. 
 
The results presented in this thesis should be taken in the context of the Trust Economics 
project and primarily address objectives 1 a), 1 c) and 2 of the project. Additionally, some of 
the key contributions were the result of collaborations with other members of the project, 
though I played a substantial and critical part in their development. The details of this 
research, and my specific contribution to it, are explained in Section 1.4. As this research was 
undertaken as part of a wider project it comprises several strands each of which offers 
insights in complementary but differing areas of the overall goals of the Trust Economics 
project. 
 
This diversity has driven the need for this work to draw upon a variety of existing research 
fields including Information Security, Human Computer Interaction (HCI) and Economics. 
Each of these disciplines offers something to the research as a whole. 
 
1.2 The research approach 
 
The research strategy for this thesis is outlined in the diagram below. The nature of the 
problems being addressed necessitates a multi-disciplinary approach as no one field of 
expertise contains the information necessary for generating a solution. This thesis therefore 
follows three strands of research. Each of these differ in their approach to addressing the 
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same core problem - that of how to support information security decision making through 
understanding human factors - and focused on different but complementary aspects of the 
proposed solution. 
 
The first strand of research investigated the causes behind user’s unwillingness to comply 
with security policies. This involved analysing a series of interviews undertaken as part of 
the Trust Economics project, and extracting consistent themes and areas of cross over where 
participants made similar or related comments. From this analysis a theory, The Compliance 
Budget, emerged which drew upon the responses of the interview participants and 
combined them with key ideas from the field of economics. A second round of interviews, 
again conducted as part of the Trust Economics project, probed participants’ attitudes 
toward security policy, allowing the theory to be tested with new data. 
 
The second strand of research focused on gathering empirical data to support both the 
Compliance Budget, and the wider goal of the Trust Economics project to develop a more 
systematic approach to decision-making in security. The data gathering focused on 
passwords since these are a well understood security mechanism, and one that could be 
manipulated in experimental studies with relative ease. Additionally, the widespread and 
on-going use of passwords provided a real-world context for the experiments as well as a 
practical use for results found and recommendations made. 
 
The password data were gathered using two primary systems. The first was an enhanced 
key logger that recorded keystroke timings within a controllable environment that allowed 
us to design experiments with some sophistication. Participants were required to repeatedly 
enter a variety of passwords under several different experimental conditions and their 
performance was recorded and analysed. 
 
The second system was a server-based experiment management system that allowed 
participants to login and authenticate to the server when prompted by an email. Their 
authentication performance was again tracked. In contrast to the first lab-based experiment, 
the participants were required to authenticate with varying frequency over two two-week 
sessions. Facilitating remote logins also meant that the data collected were closer to the ‘in 
the wild’ performance of the participants; a point of key interest when seeking to make 
recommendations with regards to real-world policy. 
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Figure 1: Diagram outlining the primary research strands of this thesis 
 
Both the Compliance Budget and the security architecture and systems modelling strands 
depend on realistic empirical data to be of practical use to security decision makers. 
Therefore, a section on empirical data is included (see Section 5), and the results of that 
section feed back into the rest of the research. 
 
The third research strand deals with the structuring of an organisations security goals and 
procedures. The aim here was twofold: first, to support the overarching goals of the Trust 
Economics project by providing knowledge to improve systematic security decision-making; 
second, to reorganise the information already available to organisations in a way that 
facilitates systems modelling. The approach here was to construct a logical multi-layer 
hierarchy describing the elements of a security system. The framework (see Section 6) was 
split into declarative and operational layers and populated with a variety of logical data 
constructs to meet the objectives of the research. 
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1.3 Thesis overview 
 
The thesis is split into several chapters covering the three research strands outlined above.  
Chapter 2 reviews the key literature from the academic disciplines that provided the 
knowledge and methods on which this thesis builds: Computer Security and Security 
Objectives, Economics, Economics of Security and HCI. In each of the subsections, the 
relevant literature from one of these disciplines is covered with a critical commentary that 
illuminates its links to the thesis as well as to the other disciplines. The literature review 
takes a critical tone thus revealing the gaps in current knowledge that this thesis attempts to 
fill. 
 
Chapter 3 reviews relevant methodologies for conducting empirical research on security 
performance and impact, and details those that are to be used to pursue the research aims. 
Both qualitative and quantitative methods are introduced including Grounded Theory, 
semi-structured interviews, observations and logging. The pros and cons of controlled and 
uncontrolled environments are explored and the role of modelling in decision making is 
considered. 
 
Chapter 4 introduces the Compliance Budget. The supporting material for the Compliance 
Budget is laid out as background for the formation of the theory. The theory itself and its 
implications are laid out as well as some proposed applications and scenarios in which the 
Compliance Budget can be utilised. Additionally, the links between the Compliance Budget 
and subsequent publications drawing on its theme are highlighted. 
 
Chapter 5 describes the empirical data collection process. The experimental designs for both 
sets of trials are covered here. In addition, the design and development of the proprietary 
software used in the experiment, although not a primary task for this thesis, is mentioned by 
way of background. Outlines of the results of the experiment are given here, as well as a 
discussion of how the results will be used in the wider context to which they relate. An 
outline of the broader range of experiments of which these form a part is also offered. 
 
Chapter 6 covers a discussion on systems modelling and its use as a tool for systematic 
decision making. This section also brings to light the benefits of empirical data (of the sort 
gathered in Section 4) to systems modelling. 
 
Chapter 7 details the development of the multi-layer hierarchy of roles. The motivation for 
its creation is discussed here and its function is related back to previous sections. The strong 
link between the hierarchy and the use of systems modelling is also made. 
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Chapter 8 draws together the findings of each of the chapters above to provide a set of 
conclusions and outcomes to the research. 
 
1.4 A note on context and terminology 
 
Considering all the different operational contexts of information security is beyond the 
scope of the thesis. In order to avoid confusion, and to allow the reader to focus on the 
concepts being discussed rather than trying to follow a changing narrative, a single context 
will be used throughout: that of a corporate business environment. Where it is useful to 
discuss other contexts it will be made clear in the text. The following terminology will have 
the following meanings when they are used in this thesis, unless explicitly stated otherwise: 
 
Organisation: used to describe a large (but not multinational) company 
operating in a corporate business environment, the purpose of which is to 
generate revenue for the company stakeholders. This company has no 
particular requirement for secrecy in its business operations, beyond that 
needed to remain competitive in the market place. 
 
User: refers to an employee of the organisation. This employee has no specific 
management or security responsibilities and can be considered to be a general 
office worker. 
 
Primary Task: refers to the business process of the organisation, and therefore 
the user. The primary task is therefore the productive process that generates 
revenue for the company. 
 
Actor: a specific piece of terminology used to denote the instantiation of a user 
(and other roles within the organisation) in the security hierarchy described in 
detail in Section 6. 
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1.5 Primary contributions 
 
This thesis makes three main substantive contributions. For the parts where the research was 
carried out in collaboration with others, the author’s specific contribution is identified. The 
primary contributions of this work are: 
 
1. The development of a theory of user decision-making when faced with security 
compliance decisions. This theory, the Compliance Budget, describes the factors that 
a user is likely to take in to account when making a compliance decision and frames 
them in the form of an economic cost/benefit analysis. The notion of a Compliance 
Threshold is introduced, and the implications of breaching this threshold are 
discussed. This contributes to the fields of usability and security by drawing together 
research from both fields and expressing it a form that allows for an understanding 
of the user that goes beyond considering them as wilfully uncooperative or 
uneducated. By considering users as rational entities this theory prompts researchers 
to focus on the factors that contribute to insecure behaviour rather than ways to 
educate or train users to adopt better practices. 
 
This approach also offers security managers a better understanding the consequences 
of introducing security measures that burden users as part of their function. 
Techniques for the better management of user effort are discussed and advice 
suggested for the implementation of security policies that place more consideration 
on human factors. 
 
2. A contribution to the body of empirical data required to produce metrics of user 
effort, which are required to support theories such as the Compliance Budget. While 
the wider aim of the data collection was also pursued by the Trust Economics project, 
the experiments detailed in this thesis are solely the work of the author. These 
experiments focus on user performance using passwords under various policy 
conditions and use frequencies. These data offers researchers and practitioners an 
example of how different password policies affect user effort. This serves to guide 
future research in this area; since users circumvent security policies and controls that 
require too much effort (as discussed in Section 2.2.1), we need metrics for the effort 
associated with security policies and mechanisms, not just for their security. The 
thesis makes an additional, methodological contribution by demonstrating methods 
of data collection that overcome some of the biases present in laboratory 
experiments, showing how researchers can effectively gather realistic data suitable 
for informing real-world decisions and strategies. 
 
19 
 
 
3. The development of a new framework for expressing security needs and 
requirements designed to allow a systematic approach to security analysis and the 
ordering of existing data in a form more readily usable by systems modellers. 
Researchers from the fields of systems modelling and information security, looking 
to collaborate, will benefit from this framework as it allows them to structure their 
information and requirements in a mutually supportive manner. The methods used 
in constructing this framework, while at the prototype stage, will be of use to 
security managers wishing to gain a more in-depth understanding of the 
relationships and dependencies inherent in security systems. 
 
The research presented here has been published in three peer-reviewed conference papers, a 
conference workshop article and a technical report. These are listed below with details of the 
contributions I made to each. 
 
1. Modelling the Human and Technological Costs and Benefits of USB Memory 
Stick Security (WEIS 2008): This paper was published as a collaborative work as 
part of the Trust Economics paper. My contribution was the analysis of a set of 
interview data. This analysis was the precursor to that used in the Compliance 
Budget (see below) and used the same data set. The results of my analysis were used 
in this paper to develop the scenario used in the systems models and also informed 
the behaviour of the users represented by the model. As such, this paper is an early 
example of combining empirical data with systems modelling. This approach is 
extended in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
 
2. The Compliance Budget: Managing Security Behaviour in Organisations (NSPW 
2008): This work was published as a collaborative venture but was substantially my 
work. I conceived the original idea and introduced the notion of the decision as a 
cost/benefit analysis. I was also responsible for the primary analysis of the interview 
transcripts although I did not conduct the interviews. I identified and extracted 
relevant information from the interviews and inferred the behaviour of individuals 
(as represented graphically in the paper) from this information. I was also 
responsible for considering how an understanding of the Compliance Budget should 
affect the decision making of security managers. Some assistance was given in setting 
the Compliance Budget in the appropriate security context. 
 
3. Gathering Realistic Authentication Performance Data Through Field Trials 
(SOUPS 2010, Usable Security Experiment Reports Workshop): This workshop 
paper outlines the APET system, a server-based tool for gathering performance data. 
While I did not write the APET tool myself I was principally involved in designing 
its requirements and acted as the supervisor of the project in which it was developed. 
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I also oversaw its implementation and use once the system went live and ran my 
own experiment on the system. As such, I contributed materially to its development 
and operation. 
 
4. Structured Systems Economics for Security Management (WEIS 2010): This work 
was written during a six-month long industrial internship at the HP laboratories. I 
worked closely with a research partner throughout this time. I was responsible for 
the conceptual development of the framework and its components, the structuring of 
the framework and the inclusion of the OWL ontology language into the process. 
Following on from previous discussions regarding issues with the CIA objective set, I 
approached the problem methodically and set out to construct a conceptual 
framework that allowed expression of such security goals as a natural outcome of 
considering the requirements of the system. Assistance was received with formal 
logical expression of the concepts and the formalisation of the framework’s 
relationship to systems modelling. The development and use of the running example 
used in the paper, that of baggage handling at an airport, was contributed to equally 
by myself and my research partner. 
 
5. Systematic Decision Making in Security Management Modelling Password Use 
and Support (HP Labs Technical Report 2011, now accepted as a paper at the 
QASA workshop, 2012): This technical report was a second outcome from my 
internship at HP Laboratories. I took overall responsibility for collating the various 
sections of the report and writing the overall structure. In terms of the content I was 
responsible for designing the conceptual model and the scenario and structure of the 
systems model (though not its writing or execution). I also worked with David Pym 
to decide the content of the utility equations and with Simon Arnell to produce the 
results and analysis. 
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2. Background 
 
Achieving information security is a large problem that crosses into many different areas of 
society. Most people regularly undertake security tasks, which do not necessarily involve 
advanced technology or take place in a westernised society. Security can be a tribal farmer 
ensuring his herd is protected from wild animals, a New York businessman ensuring that 
his wallet is tucked into a secure pocket and his car is locked, or a border guard maintaining 
the integrity of a national boundary. The protection of important assets is something that we 
are all concerned with. Information security deals with the security of data and, as more and 
more of the interactions of our society are handled digitally, many traditional security 
problems have become information security problems. For example, as banks move from 
branch banking to online banking the nature of their security requirements, and those of 
their customers, are changing. Now we have to be concerned with the risks of online 
banking and the security of our email accounts. Additionally, we are now burdened with a 
variety of new tasks such as remembering a wide variety of passwords. We must also learn 
to use an increasing number of technological devices and systems in contexts ranging from 
shopping for food to ordering a new passport. 
 
The pervasiveness of technology means that information security now extends far beyond 
the remit of security and IT professionals. Gone are the days when only specialists were 
involved in delivering information security. Now, virtually everyone is a component in an 
information security system, whether they are an employee of organisations that provide 
security, or a consumer of the services offered. This means that individuals with a huge 
range of technical competencies are engaging with information security on a daily basis. In 
addition, systems are increasingly composed of actors with divergent interests. In an airport, 
for example, national and border security shares space with commercial flight operators, 
retail business in the airport terminals, and the security and passenger verification 
procedures of the airlines themselves. While all are concerned with the security of the 
aircraft using the terminal, the attention paid to profit and commercial opportunities varies 
widely between these stakeholders. Airlines know that passengers will choose other carriers 
if they feel the boarding process is too onerous or frustrating, yet they must follow certain 
procedures in order to meet regulatory standards. Even in this tightly-controlled security 
environment there is tension between business and security needs; in more relaxed 
corporate environments, with less obvious security requirements, this tension can be even 
higher. Where such divergent interests interact, incentives are becoming as important to 
dependability as technical design. Security failures are caused at least as often by bad 
incentives as by bad design [7]. Varian [73] observed that less money was being spent on 
anti-virus software than might be expected. At that time, viruses were enabling Denial of 
Service attacks rather than corrupting individual hard drives so consumers had little 
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incentive to spend $20 on anti-virus software to protect, for example, Microsoft’s website.  
Furthermore, those individuals connecting insecure machines to the internet are not the ones 
bearing the full consequence of their actions. 
 
Information security, and its core concepts of confidentiality, integrity and availability, also 
shares space with other highly relevant topics such as privacy and secrecy. While the lack of 
standardisation of terminology (discussed further in Section 2.1.2) makes defining such 
borders difficult, they clearly overlap in some way. Anderson [6] offers us this comparison: 
 
- Secrecy is a technical term which refers to the effect of the mechanisms used to 
limit the number of principals who can access information, such as 
cryptography or computer access controls. 
- Confidentiality (as a proxy for information security) involves an obligation to 
protect some other person’s or organisation’s secrets if you know them. 
- Privacy is the ability and/or right to protect your personal information and 
extends to the ability and/or right to prevent invasions of your personal space. 
Privacy can extend to families but not to legal persons such as corporations. 
 
Information security may be deployed in an attempt to ensure any one of the above such as 
a patient’s right to privacy, the confidentiality of a bio-tech firm’s intellectual property or the 
secrecy of a military force. To add further complications, we may also need to protect 
additional information associated with the data such as who spoke to whom or when a 
record was created or accessed. This is particularly true in the case of privacy where 
anonymity is required. Sweeney [70] found that 87% of the US population can be uniquely 
identified by gender, zip code and date of birth. This showed that simply removing the 
names from a set of records does not guarantee privacy. Thelma Arnold was identified from 
an ‘anonymised’ set of search queries collected by AOL by an analysis of her search history 
[53]. Information security then can be about protecting a wide variety of assets both physical 
and digital. 
 
However, it would be a mistake to think of information security as a purely technical 
problem. With the rise of social engineering attacks, an adversary can gather valuable data 
simple by asking for it in the right way or under the right conditions. Phishing, the practice 
of falsifying websites in order to elicit secure information, has become one of the primary 
attack vectors of the last few years. This approach relies not on compromising servers 
through hacking or introducing malware into a target system but on simply asking a user 
for their information in a plausible way. As Mitnick [51] illustrates the likelihood of success 
can be increased by creating a sense of urgency or panic in the user and adopting a position 
of relative authority. No technical solution exists to defend against such an attack and we 
must look elsewhere for our security. 
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With all of these disparate goals and mechanisms, information security is no longer a 
problem of mathematics and technical solutions. Decision making in this complex 
environment creates a challenge for both individuals and organisations. To be able to 
conduct effective information security we have to be able to make the right decisions 
ourselves, and also understand the motivations behind the decision-making process of other 
stakeholders. To understand the role of perverse incentives, user vulnerabilities and other 
non-technical facets of security we must look to other fields. In recent years, economics, 
psychology and usability have all been profitably cross-linked with information security 
research. This thesis will draw upon all of these areas to tackle the information security 
problem it addresses. To do this it will be necessary to review these fields more closely, 
starting with the more traditional aspects of IT security. 
 
2.1 CIA and security objectives 
 
2.1.1 Overview 
 
The primary objectives of information security are classically categorised as confidentiality, 
integrity and availability (hereafter referred to by the acronym ‘CIA’). There are many 
varying definitions of CIA (investigated more thoroughly later in this section) although 
most of the variation is in the specifics. To begin our discussion, we take definitions of these 
words from An Introduction to Computer Security: The NIST Handbook [54]. These are: 
 
Confidentiality: A requirement that private or confidential information not be 
disclosed to unauthorized individuals. 
 
Integrity: NIST makes a distinction between data and system integrity: 
 
Data Integrity: a requirement that information and programs are changed only 
in a specified and authorized manner. 
 
System Integrity: a requirement that a system performs its intended function in 
an unimpaired manner, free from deliberate or inadvertent unauthorized 
manipulation of the system. 
 
Availability: A requirement intended to assure that systems work promptly 
and service is not denied to authorised users. 
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Most information security researchers believe that confidentiality and availability are linked 
through a relationship best categorised as a ‘trade-off’ (these are discussed in more detail in 
Section 2.3), in which as one property increases the other is necessarily decreased. 
Illustrating this through extremes; if we are concerned solely with confidentiality, then a 
valid strategy would be to bury our computers underground in a sealed concrete box with 
no network connections. The data contained on them, baring extreme circumstances, will 
remain confidential. However, it cannot be practically used either. In ensuring maximum 
confidentiality, we also reduce the availability of the data to zero. Conversely, making the 
data freely available and distributed through as many channels as possible guarantees we 
can makes best use of it wherever and whenever we please. Of course, so can anyone else 
and our information becomes public knowledge and manifestly not confidential. In between 
these two extremes exists a spectrum of states, perhaps favouring the one or the other, but 
still more balanced than our extremes. As we traverse this spectrum we will be trading-off 
confidentiality against availability at each stage with measures that improve one aspect 
cutting into the other; at least this is the current way of thinking. 
 
However, in order to consider how confidentiality and availability interact, it is necessary to 
define what is meant by these terms. The literature contains many definitions associated 
with CIA and therein lies part of the problem. These are not only not standardised, but are 
expressed at a high level of abstraction, which does little to clearly delineate the boundaries 
between the conceptual spaces each component occupies. The effect of this is to leave gaps 
in the conceptual space in which CIA sits. Indeed, it is commonplace in the literature to find 
observations that CIA does not provide an adequate basis for practical, operational 
information security. The deficiencies in the framework have led many authors to suggest 
amendments, additions or adjustments to it, commonly adding such concepts as 
‘authentication’, ‘non-repudiation’ and ‘control’. One of the more developed examples of 
amendments to CIA is the ‘Parkerian Hexad’, created by Donn Parker, who in his account of 
security concepts [57] described the CIA framework as “necessary but incomplete for modern 
use”. To CIA he adds possession, authenticity and utility, defined by him as follows: 
 
Possession is the control over information, specifically preventing physical 
contact with data and preventing copying or unauthorized use of intellectual 
property. 
Authenticity is the correspondence to intended meaning e.g. avoiding fraud or 
nonsensical data entries. 
Utility is the usefulness of the information for specific purposes and aims to 
prevent against both conversion of the data to a less useful form and 
impenetrable coding of the information. 
 
25 
 
 
Parker loosely aligns possession with confidentiality, authenticity with integrity and utility 
with availability. With the addition of these new concepts, we can say that some 
improvements have been made to the CIA framework, but the Parkerian Hexad is by no 
means complete. Indeed, it introduces some new complications and errors. With the new 
concepts come more connections and relationships that must be examined. Within CIA there 
are three relationships, C-A, C-A and I-A. The Parkerian Hexad has fifteen, greatly 
increasing the complexity of our task. In addition, the Hexad brings in an example of a 
category error, something that plagues many attempts to improve on CIA. We will return to 
category errors shortly, for now let us focus on the issue with adding more concepts and 
relationships to CIA. Recall that our interest in it stems from wanting to understand the 
trade-offs between the various concepts. 
 
While adding additional concepts to CIA can help us solve certain specific problems it does 
little to move us toward our real goal: a more systematic approach to understanding the 
relationships between security objectives. Indeed, by adding in more concepts, the situation 
becomes more, rather than less, confusing. To be able to understand trade-offs we need clear 
and concise definitions of the items we are examining. Even here we are thwarted as 
definitions of the core CIA concepts (let alone the wide range of possible additions) vary 
from author to author. 
 
2.1.2 Definitions 
 
Let us look at some additional definitions of CIA drawn from the literature. 
 
Confidentiality: 
 
- Protecting sensitive information from unauthorised disclosure or intelligible 
interception. [21]. 
- Is the concealment of information of resources.[14] 
- Ensuring that information is accessible only to those authorised to have access. [40]. 
- The security goal that generates the requirement for protection from the intentional 
or accidental attempts to perform unauthorised data reads. Confidentiality covers 
data in storage, during processing, and in transit. [68]. 
 
Integrity: 
 
- Safeguarding the accuracy and completeness of information and computer software 
[21]. 
- The security goal that generates the requirement for protection against either 
intentional or accidental attempts to violate data integrity (the property that data has 
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when it has not been altered in an unauthorised manner) or system integrity (the 
quality that a system has when it performs its intended function in an unimpaired 
manner, free from unauthorised manipulation [68]. 
- Refers to the trustworthiness of data or resources, and it is usually phrased in terms 
of preventing improper or unauthorized change.[14] 
 
Availability: 
 
- The degree to which a system, subsystem, or equipment is operable and in a 
committable state at the start of a mission, when the mission is called for at an 
unknown, i.e., a random, time. Simply put, availability is the proportion of time a 
system is in a functioning condition [79]. 
- Refers to the ability to use the information or resource desired.[14] 
- Ensuring that information and vital services are available to users when required. 
[21]. 
- The security goal that generates the requirement for protection against 
 Intentional or accidental attempts to (1) perform unauthorized deletion of data 
or (2) otherwise cause a denial of service or data 
 Unauthorized use of system resources [68].  
 
There are differences here that substantially increase the levels of confusion surrounding 
these concepts. Let us turn to integrity, which NIST in their handbook say “has been, and 
continues to be, the subject of much debate among computer security experts”. Bishop [14] states 
that integrity is concerned with the trustworthiness of the data, while Flechais [21] regards it 
as focusing on safeguarding accuracy and completeness. The differences in these definitions 
are sufficient to change the role of security in each case. Consider the following scenario: a 
fully authorised member of our organisation enters some information into the shared 
organisational network. No un-authorised users have gained access to the network and so 
we can trust that everything on there is as our colleagues meant it to be. However, due to 
some error the information isn’t technically accurate. Bishop may consider that the integrity 
of the information has remained intact as no unwanted person has modified our data or 
inserted false data into the network; it remains trustworthy. Flechais, on the other hand, 
introduces accuracy into his definition of integrity thus making errors of this sort potentially 
the responsibility of the security department. The NIST definitions position CIA squarely as 
security goals and are highly data-focused. The NIST definition of availability also addresses 
unauthorised use of system resources. This is a different way of stating the objective. Rather 
than ensuring that resources are available, it aims to stop malicious users tying up resources. 
This definition does not, however, place problems such as insufficient provisioning under 
the aegis of the ‘availability’ objective. 
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Considering the question of definitions, and the meaning of CIA, is not just idle semantics. 
Kumar et al. [48] demonstrate, through rigorous modelling, the strategic need to consider 
confidentiality and availability differently. They point out that the countermeasures 
required to secure against availability losses are different to those needed to secure against 
confidentiality losses. Protection from availability losses can come in the form of firewalls 
and anti-virus software that guard against worms and malicious code, the agents of Denial 
of Service attacks. Cryptographic software and technologies such as virtual private networks 
are required to protect against the loss of confidential data. In addition, the costs associated 
with availability losses are not the same as those for confidentiality losses. When talking in 
general terms, the use of confidentiality and availability will suffice, but in order to develop a 
systematic account of a security system and its requirements such terms need to be 
rigorously defined, or an alternative approach found. 
 
This variation in terms means that CIA as a framework is only suitable for discussing 
security in the most general terms. As the basis for a systematic approach to security with a 
view to making operational judgements it is entirely unsuitable. In attempting to move CIA 
toward a more functionally complete state many authors make category errors (see Section 
2.1.3), rendering their additions more confusing than helpful. Clearly then, a new approach 
is needed to understanding trade-offs in security decision making. 
 
2.1.3 Category Errors 
 
A category error is a semantic or ontological error by which a thing is placed into a class in 
which is does not belong [80]. Bishop’s definition of integrity illustrates this concept for us. 
From the excerpt given in Section 2.1.2 above the text goes on to state, “Integrity includes data 
integrity (the content of the information) and origin integrity (the source of the data, often called 
authentication).” Here we have a definition that includes both a property the data have (they 
are integral) and the means by which such a property may be ensured (some form of 
authentication). Now it may be the case that one of these is in the correct class but 
necessarily the other must not be as we cannot reasonably combine declarative and 
operational notions in the same definition. Declarative and operational must be treated 
differently and their combination here creates confusion when trying to understand what 
‘integrity’ means a security objective. 
 
Turning this same mode of thought toward Parker’s Hexad, we find ‘utility’ included in 
among the security concepts. Utility is by definition an economic concept which, although it 
may be usefully applied in a security concept (and this thesis will argue for just that), does 
not belong in the same category as CIA. 
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2.1.4 Information security in practice 
 
Despite these differing definitions, the primary focus of security professionals is still to 
protect assets valuable to the organisations for which they work. The decisions that are 
made and the policies that are put in place serve this purpose and, if considered in isolation, 
are often excellent technical solutions. Guided by the principals of CIA (in whatever 
particular form they adopt) technical solutions are deployed that offer functional security. 
The problem here is that the recommendations and advice offered by information security 
specialists too often only serves the purpose of security and neglects the context in which the 
measures will be implemented and the users that interact with the system. 
 
Passwords are used through this thesis both as an example and a focus of the research. They 
also serve here to illustrate this point. Security practitioners and IT organisations encourage 
us to choose secure passwords and offer us advice to helps us achieve that aim. The 
following guidelines are taken from Microsoft’s Safety and Security Centre website [50]: 
 
- “Whenever possible, use eight characters or more.” 
- “Don't use the same password for everything. Cybercriminals steal passwords on 
websites with very little security, and then they try to use that same password and 
user name in more secure environments, such as banking websites.” 
- “Change your passwords often. Set an automatic reminder for yourself to change 
your passwords on your email, banking, and credit card websites about every three 
months.” 
- “The greater the variety of characters in your password, the better. However, 
password hacking software automatically checks for common letter-to-symbol 
conversions, such as changing ‘and’ to ‘&’ or ‘to’ to ‘2’.” 
- “Use the entire keyboard, not just the letters and characters you use or see most 
often.” 
 
The suggestions, “change passwords often”, “don’t use the same password for everything” and “use 
eight characters or more” are commonly repeated, in one form or another, by IT services that 
require passwords to be generated. However, the motivations behind such advice are often 
technical or based on out-dated concepts. The threats that a password conforming to the 
standards outlined above protects against, such as cracking and dictionary attacks, are not 
the predominant threats they once were and a lengthy and complicated password will not 
protect against a phishing attack. 
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The ability of information security professionals to protect against such threats is not in 
question. What is, however, is whether or not such measures are always the appropriate 
ones to take? In Section 2.2 I will introduce research from the field of HCI that conflicts with 
the above advice. This conflict between the advice offered by HCI and security, and the 
current lack of methods for resolving that conflict, lies at the core of the motivation and need 
for this research. 
 
2.1.5 CIA and security objectives chapter summary 
 
At the start of this research I began to examine the assumption that confidentiality and 
availability are connected by a trade-off relationship. The focus of my thought was on the 
following two questions: 
 
1. Does increasing confidentiality automatically and necessarily reduce availability? 
2. Are there are other similar relationships e.g. between confidentiality and integrity in 
the CIA framework? 
 
Several difficulties immediately became apparent when approaching these questions. 
Initially the problem is with the definitions associated with CIA contained in the current 
literature. Additionally, as discussed above, CIA is an incomplete framework for expressing 
all possible security objectives. Let us consider a thought exercise to illustrate this point. Our 
organisation has suffered a data theft; a hacker has broken into our file system and extracted 
a copy of our most sensitive data. The hacker has not examined the data himself but is 
threatening to sell them to the highest bidder. In the aftermath, our security experts turn to 
the CIA framework to try to understand what has gone wrong. However, an interesting 
situation is revealed, reported as follows: 
 
- Confidentiality has not been breached as the information remains secret; no-one 
outside of the organisation has read it. 
- Integrity has not been breached as the information remains unchanged. 
- Availability has not been breached as a copy of the information remains on our 
network and can be used and accessed at any time. 
 
Clearly, a breach in security has occurred but the CIA framework is not sufficient to enable 
us to identify it. From this discussion it is possible to draw two main conclusions: 
 
- CIA is an incomplete framework unsuitable for examining trade-offs in security 
decision making. 
- Previous attempts to amend or add to the CIA framework have added rather than 
reduced confusion through category errors or inconsistencies in definitions. 
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These two conclusions each generated their own strand of research in this thesis. First, trade-
offs were examined at a different level of abstraction. Rather than considering them at the 
level suggested by broad objectives, such as CIA, we consider the decision-making process 
of an individual user and the trade-offs they make when faced with security choices. This 
approach is covered in Sections 4 and 5 which provide the basis for a more bottom-up 
approach to tackling the question of trade-offs in security. In particular, I will return to the 
theme of the conflicting needs of security and HCI and approaches to a resolution. 
 
Secondly, a hierarchical framework is created to express the components of a security 
system in an ontological fashion. This framework consciously separates the declarative and 
operational components of the system to avoid category errors; rather than attempting to 
trade-off between CIA directly, this allows trade-offs to be made between subcomponents in 
the system, the results of which reveal the system designers preferences within the CIA 
framework indirectly. This work is covered in Section 6. 
 
2.2 HCI, productivity and security 
 
2.2.1 Usability 
 
Technological progress has long been considered one of the primary means of increasing 
productivity. The widespread adoption of the personal computer as a tool for business 
should therefore have led to spectacular advancements in individual effectiveness in the 
workplace. This, however, did not always turn out to be the case. The field of Human 
Computer Interaction (HCI) grew out of the need to understand why computers were not 
increasing worker efficiency in the service and manufacturing sectors by anything like the 
amount necessary to cover the cost of the adoption of the technology. Landauer [32] 
suggests that poor software or application design is at the root of the problem, because it is 
too often evaluated along technical lines (how fast or efficiently the application performs 
calculations for example), rather than to see how well it actually supports the individual’s 
task and the business process. Several studies by Nielsen and Landauer in the mid 1990’s 
showed that, even after just one cycle of empirical user-based evaluation and re-design, 
efficiency gains of 50% can be expected. The cost/benefit ratio of such an exercise can reach 
upward of 200:1 [34]. The problem then is not that it is impossible to design software that 
improves the efficiency of its users, but that such user-centric processes are not being 
utilised effectively in the software development process. 
 
The requirement for systems to be usable was identified as early as 1983 by Norman [55], 
along with the need for systems to be designed with the user’s mental models in mind. 
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Norman discusses the need for systems to be based on a coherent conceptual model and that 
this model is taught to the user. He gives three criteria that this model must have in order 
for the user to be able to effectively utilise the system: 
 
- Learnability 
- Functionality 
- Usability 
 
He goes on to say: 
 
“What good is a conceptual model that is too difficult to learn? Or a model that has 
little functionality, failing to correspond to the system image or failing to predict or 
explain the important aspects of the target system? Or what of a conceptual model 
that cannot easily be used, given the properties of the human information processing 
structure with its limited short-term memory and limited ability to do 
computations?” 
 
Yet these failures are still present at the heart of many systems today, and HCI research has 
not always managed to address these concerns and improve system design and functionality 
as we shall see throughout this section. 
 
The recognition of software usability as a problem has not been confined to the HCI 
community, or those producing commercial, business-orientated products. In 1999, Whitten 
and Tygar [78] evaluated the email encryption programme PGP 5.0 from a usability 
perspective. At the time PGP 5.0 was considered to have a relatively good user interface for 
a security application as it was the first version of PGP to ship with a graphical user 
interface, rather than the command line of previous versions. However, of the 12 
participants in the study, only 4 managed to successfully send an encrypted email using 
PGP 5.0 in the 90 minutes allowed, and only 3 participants were able to decrypt an email in 
less than 10 minutes. Additionally, and perhaps more worrying from a security perspective, 
the majority of those who had failed to encrypt their email thought they had succeeded in 
the encryption task. The paper defines a system as usable for security if the people who use 
it: 
 
- Are reliably made aware of the security tasks they need to perform 
- Are able to figure out how to successfully perform those tasks 
- Don’t make dangerous errors 
- Are sufficiently comfortable with the interface to continue using it 
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Following these guidelines the researchers concluded that “PGP 5.0 is not usable enough to 
provide effective security for most computer users.” A key problem identified in the study was 
that the visual metaphors used by the software in its interface did not correspond well to the 
mental metaphors the participants drew on. For example, even though signatures are 
created using keys in the protocol, the button to sign an email shows an image of a quill pen. 
This does relate to the act of writing a signature in general but is unrelated to the specific 
actions required in PGP – that of using a private key to generate a signature. This supports 
Norman’s observations on usability. 
 
 While this study used a relatively small number of participants, which reduces the 
generalisability of the results (a common problem with lab-based usability studies), the 
experimental protocol did allow them a substantial amount of time in which to send the 
email, far in excess of what would be considered appropriate in the modern workplace. This 
adds weight to the conclusion that the system, as it was then, was unusable for practical 
purposes. 
 
Sheng et al. returned to the topic of email encryption with a study in 2006 that evaluated 
PGP 9.0 [65]. Although only six participants took part – again too small to draw general 
conclusions from – it is worrying that none of them managed to successfully encrypt an 
email. The main problem was that “no indication was given during message composition as to 
whether or not the outgoing date would be encrypted or signed”. No significant progress had been 
made in the usability design of PGP in the intervening seven years. 
 
A lack of usability has implications beyond that of efficiency. In their 1999 paper ‘Users are 
not the enemy’ Adams and Sasse [1] reported a study that looked into password use in two 
organisations. Rather than looking at a security mechanism in a lab context, they conducted 
interviews with more than 20 employees in each of the 2 organisations and then designed a 
questionnaire based on problems reported in these interviews. The questionnaire involved 
139 participants, resulting in a data set of a more useful size. They set out to understand why 
employees of one of the organisations could not remember their passwords, a question 
prompted by the rising cost of provisioning help desks in that organisation. This makes the 
paper particularly relevant as examination of the security problem was pursued for 
economic reasons. The survey found that 50% of the respondents wrote their password 
down in one form or another. The main reason given for this was the requirement to use 
multiple passwords, combined with the fact that they were forced to change their password 
every month also being mentioned. In this case, users saw the password policy itself as the 
reason for their insecure behaviour. Recall from Section 2.1.4 that security practitioners 
explicitly advise that passwords not be shared between systems (creating the need for many 
passwords), and that they should be changed often. The security problem, that of employees 
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not being able to recall their passwords, was created by the practices and procedures 
suggested by the security community. 
 
By shifting the responsibility for generating passwords from an automated service to the 
users, but not offering feedback on their choices, the security team allowed individuals to 
create their own rules for password creation that were often anything but secure. The 
cognitive demands exceeded users’ capabilities; finding it impossible to comply, they 
created workarounds and security suffered as a result (this is discussed in more detail in 
Section 2.4.3). The security department noticed the user behaviour (workarounds), and 
formed the impression that users were ‘inherently insecure’, while users felt that the security 
mechanisms were a laborious and unnecessary overhead, and just designed to make their 
life difficult. 
 
While this paper was the first to really gather concrete data on the real-world behaviour of 
users, it failed to communicate its findings to either the community or the users in a way 
that could affect change. Their task, in this sense, was more than challenging as the problem 
lies in the security domain and the analysis of the problem is to be found in the field of HCI. 
Adams and Sasse’s work was a key step in bringing this tension to light, although, due to 
the lack of collaboration between the disciplines of HCI and security, little progress has since 
been made to resolve this inherent tension. 
 
While the paper recognises that user behaviour is the product of a complex set of factors, 
and cannot be changed by simply threats of punishment, it did not to expose these factors. 
The problems resulting from security mechanisms being incompatible with work practices 
are properly expressed for the first time in this paper, but it did not provide solutions on 
which the security department or users could act. As such, its message went mostly unheard 
for over a decade. 
 
Sasse and Weirich returned to this area in 2001 [77] and made progress in identifying the 
factors that influence user behaviour. Their study again involved gathering real-world data, 
this time through an interview process. With only 17 participants, the study was relatively 
small, but had a fairly heterogeneous set of participants: system administrators, research 
students and employees of a technology company. Through an exploratory interview 
process they found that most participants’ internal mental view rendered them indifferent to 
attempts to persuade them to be more secure. Not only did the participants have a low fear 
of security threats, dismissing potential attackers as little more than technically smart kids 
rather than actual criminals, but participants also felt that they were not likely targets. This 
lack of fear makes it difficult to persuade them to see security as a priority. The study also 
discovered that security-conscious participants had a negative self-image, while there was a 
positive image of trust associated with people who shared passwords freely. These mental 
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constructs make enforcing security through fear-based strictures almost impossible and, 
while the more usable choice is to be insecure, this behaviour will continue to dominate. Not 
all the paper’s recommendations are realistic and their effectiveness is not analysed here. 
However, the fact that his paper considers passwords (and by extension security 
mechanisms more generally) as part of a sociotechnical system, rather than just a technical 
one, is its main strength. It focuses on how to persuade users to be secure rather than force 
them through fear. This user-centric view supports the idea that security can be improved 
through working with the user rather than trying to control their behaviour. 
 
Weirich’s doctoral thesis [76] continues this line of research. He developed, through the 
analysis of interview data, a model of user choice in which users select their behaviours 
from a subset of all possible password-related behaviours allowed by the situation. This 
subset of available behaviours is defined by the actions the user is aware of and able to 
perform. As discussed above, many policies create demands that are outside the capabilities 
of human cognition, meaning that it may not be possible for a user to select a behaviour that 
is secure as there are nonesuch allowed by the situation. Weirich’s model of user choice 
states that having made an estimate of the required security level of the system the user will 
choose either: 
 
a) the behaviour that provides the required security level (or comes as close as 
possible) and incurs the lowest user cost and/or the highest user benefit. 
OR 
b) a behaviour that provides a lower level of security, but also a lower user cost 
and/or a higher user benefit. 
 
This model of choice is closely linked to the economic notions of utility and cost/benefit 
analysis that are explained further in Section 2.3 and form one of the themes of this research. 
Weirich’s research did not explicitly link security, usability and economics, as this thesis 
does, but his insights provide a strong foundation for the need to recognise the relevance of 
user choice and the factors that contribute to it. 
 
Even with the increased understanding of user behaviour and motivation offered by the 
research presented in this section, the problem of managing user behaviour remains an open 
one. Theresa Jones, a security manager at Dow Chemical is quoted by Johnson and Goetz 
[43] as saying, “My biggest challenge is changing behaviour. If I could change the behaviour of our 
Dow workforce, then I think I’ve solved the problem”. 
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2.2.2 Problems with usability methodologies 
 
The question remains why a more user-centric approach, as recommended by HCI 
researchers and practitioners, has not been applied to produce more usable security. 
Passwords, in particular, were identified as a problem area over a decade ago and 
researchers have developed a number of alternative, allegedly more usable, alternatives. 
However, but users still have to struggle with passwords today [22]. Part of the problem lies 
in the methods commonly used in usability studies, as can be illustrated through the history 
of Passfaces, a graphical authentication system. 
 
Passfaces was studied by Valentine in 1998 [72] and the results seem to suggest it would be a 
viable replacement for passwords. Passfaces is a knowledge-based authentication system 
like passwords, but reduces the memory load by offering cued recall and recognition in the 
place of password’s requirement for unaided recall. Users are show a series of four 3-x-3 
grids containing headshots of people. To enrol users select one face from each grid and this 
sequence then allows them to log in. Valentine tested this system with 77 staff and students 
from Goldsmith College with participants being prompted to log in either every working 
day for two weeks, one week after enrolment or one month after enrolment. Users that 
logged in every day demonstrated 99.98% successful recall, and ever after a break of a 
month 84% of participants were able to successfully log in on. This is much higher than 
passwords which had only a 77% success rate after two weeks according to Zviran and Haga 
[82]. Valentine followed up this study in 1999 [73] when he contacted the participants after 
five months had elapsed and asked them to try again. An impressive 72% of those he 
contacted were able to log in after three attempts using Passfaces. 
 
While this may seem to be an unqualified success Passfaces, was never widely adopted. In 
an attempt to find out why, Brostoff and Sasse conducted their own study into Passfaces in 
2000 [15]. They point out that, in Valentine’s Passfaces study, the system was used in 
isolation and participants were prompted to log in by the experimenter rather than being 
observed in the context of their normal activities. In addition, the password study they 
compared their results to was run with different participants over a different time-frame, 
which casts doubt on the viability of the comparison. Brostoff and Sasse conducted a within-
subjects field trial over a period of three months with 34 student participants. The trial 
involved using both passwords and Passfaces to access a university system used for 
completing and submitting coursework assignments. In this way, the participants engaged 
with the task in its usual context (the first time this ‘real-world’ approach was taken in a 
usability study) and when they needed to use the system rather than when prompted to by 
an experimenter. The experiments tracked failed login attempts, and the reasons that logins 
failed. In keeping with Valentine’s findings, students authenticating with Passfaces 
produced fewer errors. However, an analysis of use showed that students used the system 
36 
 
 
with Passfaces a third of the amount of the system with passwords. They also delayed an 
average of 4 days longer when handing in coursework. This is due to the fact that Passfaces 
log-in process took longer and felt more cumbersome. So, while Valentine’s work showed 
that Passfaces were more memorable, it failed to demonstrate that they were more usable. 
This study also demonstrates the importance of the primary task to the user. Passfaces made 
executing the primary task – handing in coursework through the web portal – more onerous 
and so it was used far less. 
 
The relationship between the primary task and security is expressed by Weirich and Sasse 
[77], who states that 
 
“In most cases, authentication to a system is an enabling task, which means it 
creates an overhead for the user, who is using that system as a tool to achieve a 
primary, real-world task. It is predictable that most users will cut comers to reduce 
that extra load given a chance, unless they are motivated to make the effort to behave 
in a security-conscious fashion.” 
 
Where this enabling task requires more effort than is necessary, the motivation to take short 
cuts will only be higher. 
 
This conclusion is supported by Everitt et al. [19], whose 2009 study also moved away from 
the unrealistic assessment of single authentication credentials and examined the frequency 
of access to graphical passwords, and the interference resulting from utilising multiple 
graphical passwords. They recruited 110 participants who, as in Brostoff and Sasse, used 
Passfaces to control access to an online resource. Experimental conditions included using the 
same password throughout the study and the use of 4 different passwords through the five-
week study period. The results of the study showed that participants using 4 different 
Passfaces passwords were 10 times more likely to completely fail to authenticate than those 
using a single Passface password once per week. In that most users make use of significantly 
more passwords than that each week, this study highlights a key problem with graphical 
passwords. This study is well designed, effectively choosing experimental conditions to 
explore interference, and with its large number of participants makes a strong case in 
support of Brostoff and Sasse. 
 
These two studies demonstrate the need to conduct field trials which take place in the real 
task context to verify findings when research the usability of new systems. The group size of 
this study was too low to investigate some factors, such as whether requests for reminders 
differed between mechanisms, and the homogenous nature of the participants does not 
encourage generalisation of the result to more business-like environments. 
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2.2.3 Aligning security and productivity 
 
Based on its older parent discipline, ergonomics, HCI has essentially two routes to 
improving performance on tasks undertaken within a system consisting of both technology 
and humans: fitting the task to the human, or fitting the human to the task. In the first 
approach, the tools (and in this context this often means software) used in the task are 
adjusted to more naturally fit with capabilities of the human operators, and the demands of 
the production processes they support. The alternative approach attempts to train or 
educate the user to effectively make use of the tools they are given. HCI considers that this 
second approach should be reserved for when it is not possible to design tools that fit 
human capabilities and processes (because the technology required does not exist, or is not 
affordable). A weakness of many usable security studies is that they look at the mechanisms 
in isolation without task context. Tests are also run under unrealistic conditions (such as 
enrolling and testing in same session), and do not consider the implications for security. 
These oversights create issues when aligning productivity with security, by creating 
pressure on the users of these systems. 
 
A major weakness in current security research, as identified above, is that in most cases the 
role of the user is ignored, marginalised, or only ineffectually considered in simplistic terms. 
Security applications then would seem to be a natural focus for the HCI community, with its 
mandate for improving the usability of applications and the performance of human-
technology systems. Many security implementations are presented to the user through 
software. However, the linking of HCI and security (HCIsec) has not been as productive as 
the above research might lead us to hope. This is because many HCISec researchers default 
to taking to the second approach and focus on educating or training users to be able to use 
security mechanisms more efficiently, or follow security advice more effectively. Despite 
studies such as ‘Users are not the Enemy’ [1] the prevailing trend in HCI research (as indicated 
by the output of major conferences such as SOUPS and CHI) has been on fitting the user to 
the security process rather than designing security solutions that fit human capabilities and 
the needs of primary processes. 
 
This trend exists in spite of previous research indicating that users are not fully to blame for 
their undesirable behaviours. Sasse et al. [61] recognised that user behaviour is a common 
cause of security failure, and that a key reason for this behaviour was security mechanisms 
placing demands on the user that exceed the natural limitations of human cognition. The 
paper highlights the fact the cognitive demands created by passwords and the policies 
proscribing how they should be used create impossible demands for human memory. 
Memory capacity is limited and decays over time, making items that are both regularly used 
and meaningful much easier to recall than those that are not. This makes frequency of use a 
highly relevant topic, and one that is again often ignored by usability studies. 
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Similar items also compete with each other, disrupting recall. It is interesting to compare 
these attributes with the common security advice for passwords which suggests that 
passwords should not be meaningful, should be not shared (requiring that many similar 
items by used), and should be changed often, thus cyclically removing the benefits of 
regular use. This results in a high level of recall failure, especially for systems that see only 
light use. Additionally, not aligning security with productivity – and instead leaving users 
to cope with conflicting security and production tasks – security managers are further 
compounding the problem. The paper argues that the solution to such issues will not come 
through blaming users, and that any attempts at education must take in to account the 
mind-set of the users targeted. They base their findings on a series of studies at British 
Telecom that included a questionnaire process in which 144 employees were asked to report 
the causes that led to password resets and their number of passwords at work, an analysis of 
six months of password reset logs, 17 in-depth interviews on password use on reasons for 
not following password policy, and an experiment involving a logging in to a web-based 
system. The study was the first of its kind to systematically study a population of real users. 
In line with the traditional HCI approach, the authors argue that educating users is not the 
way to deal with performance problems caused by demands that are incompatible with 
workings of human memory. A change in system design must be considered instead. This 
conclusion is reinforced by a discussion of the mismatch between password policies and the 
goals of users. Authentication is an enabling task that allows a more fundamental task to be 
completed, yet it requires a level of focus and accuracy more suitable for a primary task. 
This reinforces the view of security as being a burden and erodes security culture over time. 
 
The paper also identifies areas of the user mind-set where user education could be effective - 
such as the belief that ordinary users are unlikely targets for attacks. The impact of socially 
accepted insecurity and informal work practises are also addressed. If education 
programmes are to take effect they first require a motivated workforce and should target 
such areas. While the recommendations this work makes are based on a solid real-world 
study they were not followed by the HCI community as a whole. 
 
2007 saw the release of ‘anti-phishing Phil’, and online game that “teaches users good habits to 
help them avoid phishing attacks” [66]. While the aim is sound the underlying principle falls 
into the same trap as other approaches covered in section 2.3 – that being to consider user 
effort an unlimited resource. The attitude that motivates such research as the development 
of anti-phishing Phil is that users would be following security advice such as parsing URL’s 
properly if only they were equipped with the correct knowledge. This goes hand in hand 
with the assumption that users have the time and effort to spare to both undertake the 
training and parse the URL’s correctly. As we will see in the following sections this 
assumption is at odds with a more economically-based approach. 
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At the same time, other researchers were beginning to realise that educating users was not a 
viable solution. Working from an economic standpoint, Honeyman et al. [35] investigated 
the development of software improvements and fixes. They found that reliability and 
security errors were indistinguishable to a novice user. They also considered the cost of 
changing users from novices to experts and found it to be prohibitive stating that 
 
“due to the high cost of information acquisition, users find it too costly to (i) 
determine which manufacturer’s software component has caused a system failure and 
(ii) whether the system failure was caused by a reliability or security failure.” 
 
Using an economic analysis designed to maximise profits they conclude that educating users 
is not a sound strategy from a business point of view. 
 
2.2.4 A rational rejection of security 
 
A new paradigm in security was thus starting to emerge. Researchers such as Microsoft’s 
Cormac Herley picked up on the notion of rational users and in 2009 he published a paper 
[34] that posited that users rejecting security advice was not in fact a result of a lack of 
education or motivation but a predictable and rational response to the advice itself. Users 
are at many points presented with advice, guides and mandates as to how to protect 
themselves and their hardware. This paper examines the advice given about password 
creation, security certificates and phishing and in each case concludes that the money that 
would be spent (converted from time spent via a salary calculation) on security if the advice 
was followed accurately would be orders of magnitude greater than the expected losses that 
these measures seek to address. Thus, Herley argues, user tendencies to ignore, bypass or 
shortcut security procedures and advice is a reflection of misplaced and inappropriate 
security, rather than an indication that users are lazy and insufficiently educated. 
 
Once we begin to examine security from this perspective it is not difficult to find  instances 
where the systems in place have clearly been designed without regard to user behaviour, 
particularly in the field of passwords. Herley, in collaboration with Florencio, followed up 
his work with a study in 2010 of password policies of various online services [23]. He found 
that there was no correlation between the value of the assets being protected and the 
required strength of the password. There was also no correlation between the strength of the 
policy and the level of risk, or the number of reported security breaches. Instead services 
that were optional to the users, for example consumer services such as online retailers, had 
weaker policies than those for which users had no choice but to use, such as government 
services. They suggested the reason for this was that only those services with a guaranteed 
user base – ones where there was no alternative to the service – could afford to burden their 
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users with rigid policies. The vast majority of breaches reported in this study were a result of 
some other technical error. This demonstrates that in many cases user effort is being spent in 
a wasteful and unnecessary fashion. 
 
2.2.5 Security and HCI today 
 
So what has changed in the ten or more years since the HCI community has been pointing 
out issues with usability and recommending alternative solutions? Inglesant and Sasse 
presented in 2010 [39] a study which re-examined password practices in the workplace. 32 
participants in a variety of job roles in two organisations kept password diaries for a week 
and were interviewed at the end to discuss the details. The results were all too familiar. The 
participants showed a willingness to be secure but the restrictions of the policies of the 
organisations they worked for, and the lack of alignment with their working practises led 
them to adopt insecure behaviours as coping mechanisms. Users felt burdened in particular 
by the need to constantly change their passwords forcing them to generate new passwords 
that were both strong and differed significantly from previous ones. In the organisation that 
required regular passwords changes over half the participants reported that they wrote the 
password down as an aid to memory – despite all the research to the contrary policies are 
still being set that place an excessive cognitive burden on the user. 
 
It is clear that HCI cannot address the problem of usable security on its own. Undermined 
by misleading experimental results, and too focused on the problem of ease of use over 
functionality and applicability, HCI can offer only a partial solution to the problem. It also 
struggles to communicate to the security community the relevant information it does 
contain. Critically, the information produced by the HCI community does not in practice 
assist security managers to improve decision making by considering factors such 
productivity and usability. It has shown that significant problems exist, and explained some 
of the human factors associated with those problems, but has not offered a way of 
generating solutions that balance these issues with information security requirements. Too 
often, the choice appears to be usability OR security. The challenge then is to take the 
relevant knowledge from HCI and utilise it as part of a more unified approach that can 
deliver a productive form of information security that supports the business process without 
unnecessarily burdening the user. This statement of course implicitly acknowledges the 
need to necessarily burden the user, not remove all effort from them. 
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2.2.6 HCI, productivity and security chapter summary 
 
The research gap that this thesis addresses is not simply a lack of knowledge. As this section 
shows there is a substantial body of literature that effectively examines the usability issues 
associated with security mechanisms by considering their use in context. Likewise, the 
security community has a strong understanding of the policies and technical mechanisms 
security managers can utilise to mitigate information security risks. As we have seen with 
passwords these two communities offer conflicting advice on how to approach information 
security. The central problem is then one of decision making. When is it optimal to pursue a 
technical solution? When should policies be relaxed in order to reduce the burden placed on 
the user? A new approach is needed to allow security managers to effectively make 
decisions by drawing on the existing knowledge in the fields of both security and HCI. 
Recent research has focused on combining economics with security in order to support 
decision making. In Sections 2.3 and 2.4 I will introduce the concepts of economics, and the 
economics of information security, and the many benefits such an approach can yield in 
terms of a systematic analysis of security policy and procedure. 
 
2.3 Economics 
 
A full review of economics is outside the scope of this thesis, however, as a discipline it 
contains several key concepts that are of use to us as security professionals. Section 2.1.1 
introduced to us the notion of utility in the discussion on the Parkerian Hexad. A fuller 
discussion of the growing field of research relating security and economics will be given in 
section 2.3. This section will concern itself solely with giving an overview of the economic 
concepts used throughout this work. 
 
Economics has two major branches [12]: 
 
- Macroeconomics emphasises interactions in the economy as a whole. It deliberately 
simplifies the individual building blocks of the analysis in order to retain a 
manageable analysis of the complete interaction of the economy. 
- Microeconomics offers a detail treatment of individual decisions about particular 
commodities. 
 
Microeconomics also deals specifically with limited resource scenarios giving it a strong 
parallel with the environment in which security managers make their decisions. Thus it is 
the field of microeconomics that we will largely be focusing on. Within this field there are 
four areas of particular interest to us. These are trade-offs, utility, indifference curves and 
cost/benefit analysis. Each of these will be covered in its own section below. 
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2.3.1 Trade-offs 
 
A trade-off occurs when increasing the amount of one good available decreases the amount 
of another. In economics trade-offs are more usually referred to as opportunity costs. An 
opportunity cost is the quantity of other goods that must be sacrificed to get another unit of 
the desired good [12]. While in a well-functioning economy the monetary cost and 
opportunity cost of a good will be closely linked this is not always the case [9]. The 
opportunity cost can be considered the true cost of a good as it looks past the simple 
monetary value of an item. Let us consider the cost of sending a student to University. 
Establishing the monetary cost would simply involve adding up all the bills and tuition fees 
they incurred over the years, but this does not tell the whole story. Calculating the 
opportunity cost would also involve estimating the money they would have earned if they 
had spent the time working instead and adding that to the total. Hence the relevant cost of 
any decision is the value of the next best alternative that the decision forces one to give up. It 
can then be said that a trade-off exists between the two alternatives as selecting one ensures 
that the other must be given up. If this relationship does not exist then the options should 
not impact each other’s opportunity costs. Likewise it cannot be said that a trade-off exists 
between them. 
 
In the field of information security such trade-offs exists in conceptual areas (as we have 
seen with confidentiality and availability) as well as in the decisions that have to be made at 
various stages of implementation. For example, (given a fixed budget) electing to employ 
more security guards in an airport will decrease the amount of automated equipment 
available to be used in the security process. Thus it can be said that a trade-off exists 
between manned and automated security stations. The trade-off between usability and 
security will also be explored in the course of this research. 
 
2.3.2 Utility 
 
Utility refers to the overall level of satisfaction an entity has as a result of consuming goods 
and services. It is assumed that a consumer will spend their resources in order to maximise 
their utility. While utility itself cannot be directly measured it is possible to construct a 
viable theory of consumer choice by framing the value of a purchase in terms of a second 
good. While it is not possibly to derive the exact utility a consumer gains from watching a 
film it is possible to ask them what they would give up in return for the movie ticket. This 
can either be done in purely monetary terms or with reference to other commodities. The 
totally utility of a good is the largest sum of money that the consumer will voluntarily give 
up in exchange for the good. However, we could also ask our consumer how many tickets to 
the theatre they would give up in order to obtain a cinema ticket. This then begins to give us 
an idea of their purchasing preferences. If they prefer plays to films they will be reluctant to 
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swap theatre tickets for the cinema ticket. However, if they are not a fan of plays but cannot 
wait to see the latest Darren Aranofsky film then they will happily exchange several theatre 
tickets for a ticket to the cinema. 
 
As well as utility theory being based on the assumption that consumers will wish to 
maximise their utility it also includes the idea that the more of a good a consumer has the 
less utility is gained from the acquisition of further items of that good. The increase in utility 
the consumer gains by adding one more of a good to their purchases is called the marginal 
utility of that good. 
 
When making trade-off decisions, a consumer will certainly consider the utility they will 
gain from each option. However, the changing value of the marginal utility of goods means 
that the rate at which options of goods are traded-off is not a constant value. To understand 
this we need to look at indifference curves. 
 
2.3.3 Indifference Curves 
 
Indifference curves are a way of representing consumer tastes. They show all the 
consumption options that yield a certain utility (see Figure 2 below). Thus at all points along 
the curve consumer utility is a constant. The shape of the curves are dictated by the nature of 
trade-offs and diminishing marginal returns. The lines must slope downward because 
otherwise the consumer would be able to select more of one or both goods and be better off. 
Additionally, the flattening of the curve as it moves to the right (and in fact the increased 
verticality of the line at the left) is a result of marginal utility and shows that additional items 
of good at high levels of that good are worth less. 
 
Indifference curves are generated by asking a consumer to choose between various bundles 
of goods. Continuing with our example we might ask our consumer whether he would 
prefer to have two cinema tickets or five theatre tickets. All points where the consumer 
values the two options equally and is indifferent to the choice placed before them can be 
added to the indifference curve. 
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Figure 2: Sample indifference curve showing consumer preference between theatre and cinema tickets 
 
Indifference curves reveal the rate at which consumers are prepared to trade-off between the 
goods in question. Transporting this into a security context allows us through a similar 
process to make explicit the security objectives of an organisation by examining the security 
measures they implement. The aim would be to expose the rate at which they would, for 
example, trade availability for confidentiality at various levels of each. However, to 
construct such a table in a security context we need to be able to talk accurately about what 
it is we are offering in these combinations. This requirement is addressed by the security 
hierarchy outlined in Chapter 6 which takes an ontological approach to developing security 
systems. 
 
2.3.4 Cost/Benefit Analysis 
 
A cost/benefit analysis (CBA) is simply a method of rationally making an economic decision. 
The process involves assessing the total costs and benefits inherent in one or more courses of 
action and deciding which to pursue. The more costs and benefits that are factored in to the 
decision the more accurate the final decision will be. For this reason when making a CBA 
appreciating the opportunity costs and trade-offs is highly relevant. The CBA process also 
highlights the importance of perspective when considering decision making as the decision 
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making entity can only factor in costs and benefits it is aware of. When making security 
decisions an organisation must therefore make the effort to be as fully informed as possible. 
Unfortunately, many organisations currently fail to account for the hidden costs associated 
with user behaviour when setting security policies, not realising that it detrimentally affects 
their performance. This research will reveal some of these costs and their potential impacts, 
thus increasing the effectiveness of security decision making. 
 
2.4 Economics of security 
 
2.4.1 Early beginnings 
 
The economics of security is a recent but growing field of research. Pioneers in the field such 
as Gordon and Loeb [27], and Anderson [7] saw the potential of combining the two 
disciplines. Their primary reason was to bring the rational analysis of economics into the 
field of security to facilitate a financial analysis of security systems. No security manager has 
an unlimited budget (or often even a large one), so it is advantageous to be able to optimally 
deploy security measures within this budget. To do that an understanding of the costs and 
benefits involved is necessary. Additionally, the theories and principles of economics have 
been validated through many years of application and refinement. By drawing parallels 
between economics and security we can utilise proven theories with confidence when 
making security decisions. 
 
The difficulty with this approach, however, is that economics deals exclusively with 
financial concepts; loans, interest rates and the acquisition and expenditure of capital. 
Critically these are measureable and easily quantified pieces of information. Security 
decisions, on the other hand, are not so clear cut, dealing as they do with intangible and 
difficult to quantify concepts. Information security seeks to protect assets whose material 
value can be very hard to calculate, such as the reputation of a company, or the potential 
value of a new piece of intellectual property. A financial trader who loses client data 
through a security breach will not be trusted, by both existing and potential clients, and will 
find it hard to engage new ones. Quantifying such a reputation loss is difficult at best. On 
top of this effective security means that breach events do not happen. Again how can we 
place a value on that which never happened? So with so little certainty available is not a 
fool’s errand to attempt to apply economic theories to the field of security? 
 
Despite these difficulties, in their book Managing Cybersecurity Resources [27] Gordon and 
Loeb argue that economic theories can and should be applied to security management. They 
discuss cost/benefit analysis and various financial decision making tools, such as Net 
Present Value (NPV) and Internal Rate of Return (IRR). The latter is of special interest 
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because the calculated result is compared against the organisations cost of capital to 
determine whether a purchase should be made. Cost of capital is the risk adjusted projected 
return on the capital investment. One of the major obstacles to applying economic theory to 
security is that it is difficult to calculate the benefits gained by introducing security 
measures. This is because the only way to gather data on the cost of the security breaches 
you hope to prevent is draw it from similar organisations that have had security failures. 
Many organisations do not report security failures, and those that do often downplay their 
severity. However, if we can factor some measure of risk into the decision-making process 
then we can make up for some of this data shortfall by using measures of risk which are 
more readily available. This cost of capital value can be scaled to take into account 
particularly high risk projects or where the cost savings are highly uncertain. Not only can 
we take steps to enable us to make at least good estimates of such quantities but we must 
also consider what our ultimate goal here is. We can avoid some of the uncertainty by 
tracking breach attempts and estimating the financial loss if they had occurred. Likewise we 
can review our business process and make an informed estimate of the likely loss of revenue 
through a reduction in our professional reputation. Most important though is to consider 
why we are interested in using economics in the first place. 
 
2.4.2 A more systematic approach 
 
In the past information security managers have often been recruited from the military or law 
enforcement. They relied heavily on their own judgement and experience to make security 
decisions and had less need than today to justify such decisions. However, things have 
changed in the last few years in two key ways: 
 
1. The requirement to justify budget spending has increased in most organisations and 
intuition and personal judgement are rarely considered to be suitable evidence in a 
corporate context. 
2. Not all organisations have access to a dedicated security manager, yet with the 
increase in cybercrime all organisations must deploy security measures in some form 
or another. 
 
These two points highlight the need for a way of judging the effectiveness of security 
spending that does not solely rely on the expertise of an individual. Regurgitating ‘best 
practise’ without recourse to some system to measure the success of such practises is 
unlikely to provide many organisations with the security they need to safely operate within 
the modern threat environment. In short, a rational metric is needed to support systematic 
decision making. 
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With this in mind we can see that knowledge and tools that move security practice away 
from personal judgement and toward a systematic framework for decision making can be 
considered an improvement. Thus fully accurate financial figures are not necessary 
(although they remain desirable) and well informed estimates can still offer an improvement 
to the decision making process. Obviously with more accurate figures more effective 
decisions will be made, but less accurate figures do not undermine the usefulness of the 
methodology. 
 
Some of the earlier works to analyse the link between security and economics did so in an 
attempt to find explanations for observed security behaviours that seemed to go against the 
perceived wisdom of the time. It is a common view that increasing the number of technical 
measures or the strictness of a policy results in better security. In 2001 Anderson [4] voiced a 
contrary view: security problems are at least as much the fault of perverse incentives and 
can often be explained clearly and convincingly through the language of microeconomics. 
For example, even though US banks spend less money on security to prevent fraud they 
spend it more effectively than European banks [3]. This is largely due a difference in 
liability. In the US banks are required to prove the customer wrong if they dispute a 
transaction. In Europe the burden of proof lies with the customer, an almost impossible task 
for them. As a result banks in Britain, Norway and the Netherlands became careless 
resulting in an epidemic of fraud [3]. The security behaviour of customers, attackers and the 
banks was influenced not by the technical systems in place but by the regulatory system 
surrounding them. 
 
The negative impact of technical controls was also highlighted in Section 2.2.1. The 
requirement for a high number of passwords and frequent password changes at British 
Telecom resulted in the need for a costly IT helpdesk to cope with the volume of resets. 
Framing this problem in economic terms would have allowed them understand the costs of 
their policy and make a more effective set of decisions as a result. 
 
In 2002 the Workshop on Economics of Information Security was held for the first time. Its 
call for papers stated that “the confluence between information security and economics is of 
growing importance.” In that year Bruce Schneier [64] echoed Anderson and used economic 
thinking to explain why organisations and software vendors do not spend a lot of money on 
security, saying that “the costs are significant: time, expense, reduced functionality, frustrated end 
users. The costs of ignoring security and getting hacked are small.” Anderson [5] added to his 
review of bank security indicating that despite issuing warnings against online use of credit 
cards in the 1990’s they “can see the transaction charges greatly exceed the fraud … and prefer to 
spend their energies quietly lobbying to have the risks of electronic fraud passed on to others.” 
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Gordon and Loeb also made the case for the need to take an economic approach to security 
in 2002 [25]. They point out that while there is a large body of work that focuses on the 
function and deployment of the technical defences utilised by the information security 
profession there existed little research to assist practitioners in deriving the optimum 
amount to invest in security. Without this information security is weakened, either through 
the deployment of insufficient security, or through too much, leading to overburdened 
users. The consequence of this latter situation has been discussed in Section 2.2.1. 
 
These early insights showed that organisations practising security were not motivated by 
security for its own sake but rather by economic incentives to keep their costs down and 
their profits up. Where these incentives were not aligned with providing security (even 
when it would seem sensible to do so) the organisations were happy to minimise their 
security implementations. 
 
2.4.3 Decision making and modelling 
 
While this early research worked looked to economics to explain the behaviour of 
organisations practising information security later research began to look at ways of using 
economics techniques to improve security decision making. The motivation for this was a 
perceived lack of models and data to support security professionals. In 2002 Gordon and 
Loeb [26] investigated optimal levels of security investment. They tackled the question of 
whether or not an upper limit for security investments existed. In their paper they suggest 
that if such a level exists it would be approximately 36% of the expected loss. This value was 
based on a model of a firm contemplating the provision of additional security. The use of 
models to probe questions of security is an increasing trend in the field. Gordon and Loeb’s 
findings were challenged in 2006 by Willemson [81] who demonstrated that it was possible 
to construct examples in which the required level of investment was as much as 50% of the 
expected loss. They also showed that by relaxing some of the original paper’s requirements 
(such as making it possible to completely eliminate a threat through investment, something 
Gordon and Loeb did not allow) examples requiring investment of almost 100% of the 
expected loss were possible. The values manipulated in these models, such as investment 
levels, vulnerability and breaches, link financial input with a security outcome, bringing the 
two disciplines closer together. 
 
Crucially, however, Willemson notes that “There is a definite lack of general, reliable and rigorous 
models one could use in order to make such decisions.” So while the previous research has 
demonstrated the theoretical usefulness of such models they are not yet in a state where 
they can be used to support real-world decision making as “in order to obtain any real results 
some concrete function must be plugged in.” The production of data to allow the creation of 
such concrete functions is still a key task to tackle in this field. 
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Also in 2006, Cavusoglu et al. [17] looked at the economics of security patch management 
and came to a similar conclusion. Their paper showed that it is not always wise (deploying 
untested patches can open new vulnerabilities even as some are closed) or possible (150 
vulnerabilities and fixes are released each week) to deploy every patch as it is released. 
Additionally, the downtime associated with patch deployment is expensive so a patching 
strategy is needed to optimise the process. The paper states that “quantitative models are 
needed to help firms determine the optimal patch management strategy.” They go on to model the 
patching process for a single firm and piece of software. Damage is incurred through 
delayed patch release from the vendor or delayed patch deployment by the client. Patching 
has a fixed cost due to downtime. They then use game theory to determine the socially 
optimum (i.e. best for both the vendor and client) patching strategy. They conclude that this 
optimum strategy involves synchronising release and update cycles. The paper also 
discusses using cost sharing and liability to promote this synchronisation, concluding that 
vendors should share either the burden or the damage but not both in order to reach the 
social optimum. This work reinforces the earlier comments of Anderson and demonstrates 
that legislation not just technology can promote strong security. It also demonstrates the 
usefulness of well-grounded models for supporting security decision making. 
 
Ioannidis et al. [41] also explore patch deployment through modelling, looking at the 
optimal patching strategies for two example types of organisation, which they characterise 
as military and financial. Interestingly they distinguish between these organisations by way 
of their confidentiality and availability preferences. This links back to the discussion 
presented in Section 2.1.2. They conclude that the optimal frequency for patch 
implementation is dependent on the attributes of the system that are preferred by the 
system’s information security managers. Their results reflect the need to take in to account 
the security objectives of an organisation, and that optimal security decision making will 
therefore be situation dependent. They also state that “Operationalising our approach will 
require more detailed models that more closely reflect the nature of specific organisations.” This 
highlights the research gap which the security hierarchy presented in Chapter 6 addresses, 
as well as the need to include the user in such models, without which the nature of an 
organisation cannot be closely reflected. 
 
An increasing number of models employing economic approaches were by now being 
produced in the field, such as Hausken’s work [30] on attacking and defending complex 
networks. Investment strategies are again considered here and utility measures are included 
as part of the evaluation metric. The Compliance Budget [10] is relevant to this theme and its 
contribution is discussed in full in Chapter 4. 
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When creating any model it is necessary to introduce abstractions and generalisations into 
the system to reasonably constrain the task. It is often the case in this field that the threat 
environment is abstracted away into a set of probability distributions controlling how often 
various attacks take place. However, if the attacker is modelled in more detail some 
interesting results can result. Huang at al. [37] did just that when considering security 
investment in the case of simultaneous attacks. The threat environment in this work is more 
developed than most and includes both distributed and directed attacks. They also consider 
investment in the context of both the vulnerability and value of the asset in question. They 
discover a minimum threshold of vulnerability below which they advise no investment at 
all. This is interesting because it is strongly counter-intuitive for the optimal security to be 
no security at all, yet – when considering the deployment of limited resources through an 
economic lens – Huang et al. prove that this is the case. 
 
A second key point of interest in this paper is that they also consider how an organisation 
should shift their investment to defend against distributed or targeted attacks as the 
available budget changes. Specifically, they find that at low budget levels firms are better off 
protecting against either directed or distributed attacks but not both. Allocation shifts very 
fast at low budget levels too because a small portion of a low budget is ineffective at 
preventing attacks. This implies a threshold or ‘critical mass of investment’ below which it is 
not prudent to invest. The power of such models to locate and make explicit such thresholds 
is one of their strongest features. If as a decision maker we are aware of conditions under 
which investment is either worthless or particularly valuable we can maximise the gain from 
our resources and move towards a more efficient security solution. 
 
More recent work by Baldwin et al. [24] has demonstrated the power of economically-
framed systems models to change how security professionals make decisions. They combine 
a case study with their work on modelling to achieve these results. 12 security professionals 
were involved in the study. They were presented with a problem involving making 
improvements to the vulnerability and threat management for client infrastructure in a 
fictitious organisation. 4 decision options were presented and the participants were split in 
to 2 groups. Only one of these groups was guided to use the economic methodology, which 
was based on utility, and the systems model. This group produced justifications for their 
decisions that focused more on factors such as cost and productivity than the group that did 
not use the decision support tools. The study concludes that “by externally representing 
alternative aspects of the problem and trade-offs between different factors our method can thus 
support decision making.” This paper represents a significant step forward in validating the 
use of economics of security and systems models as valuable methods for optimising 
security decision making. 
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2.4.4 Users: the missing link 
 
So far, we have identified research that has demonstrated the use of economic modelling in 
security in supporting decision making. The requirement for solid data to ground the 
models has been noted, as well as an awareness of the fact that more detailed models yield 
superior predictions (albeit at the cost of increased complexity and difficulty). However, 
there is a key area that until recently was not well represented within the field of the 
economics of information security; that of user behaviour. While some papers do make 
reference to users it is most often in passing, and without the time and effort applied to 
either the attacker or the technological side of security. Kumar et al. [47] include users in 
their measures of cost, saying “there are monetary costs of implementing both policy-based and 
product-based security countermeasures. In addition, firms need to consider the impact of such 
measures on end users.” While this demonstrates an awareness of the problem they go on to 
assume that “a higher security level is achieved by stacking together security countermeasures.” 
This assumption does not take into account the effect on user productivity of having to cope 
with all these security systems and is based on the dangerous and misleading notion that 
user effort is inexhaustible – the issue of usability is not considered at all. Farahman et al. 
[20] also discuss the impacts of a computer breach stating that “The dollar losses will depend on 
the type of computer affected and its relative losses. Security breaches pose various types of losses: (1) 
lost productivity (2) lost revenue, (3) clean-up costs and (4) financial performance impact, to name a 
few.” These loss categories were used by Herath and Herath [33], however, the loss of 
productivity in their model is still based solely on computer breaches. Lost productivity due 
to users being unable to fulfil their primary task is not considered, let alone the usability 
impact of task interruption. The significance of the primary task was discussed in Section 
2.2.2 and is well documented in HCI literature. Its absence here highlights the need to 
integrate knowledge from these fields in order to make progress within the problem area. 
They do, however, attempt to cost more fully the types of losses due to breaches by 
considering the type of computer affected (web server, administrator’s computer etc.). This 
is analogous to considering the actual role of the user involved in a security incident. This 
viewpoint is distinctly technical, however, and once more fails to fully consider the impact 
on the different users behind the machines. If a high-profile account is compromised and the 
information it contains deleted, or otherwise rendered inaccessible, not only is the data lost 
but so is the time of the user that produced it. As their time is likely to be valued at a higher 
rate than average (as reflected by their salary) this leads to an increased cost in terms of the 
time they will need to spend resolving the problem. Failing to consider the user leads to 
consistently underestimating the financial cost of breaches. 
 
Johnson and Dynes [44] found that “many of the large recent security breaches were not technical 
break-ins, but rather inadvertent disclosures.” The implication here is that users are not 
following security procedures properly, or that there aren’t the right procedures in place. 
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Either way the security is compromised not due to malicious intent but due to absent 
minded or distracted users. In a previous paper Johnson noted that “it is often not clear what 
security initiatives offer firms the greatest improvement” [42]. This highlights both the lack of 
understanding available to security professionals on the role of the user in security and also 
the need for systematic metrics to evaluate the implementation choices available. Combining 
economics and security has proved effective in advancing our ability to evaluate the current 
state of affairs, but clearly there are still large gaps in the state of the art where decision 
making for the future is concerned. In particular the economics of security has failed to 
adequately include the human factor in security. This aspect will be covered further in 
Section 2.4. 
 
This omission of the user is a trend that can be found in other works in the field, such as 
Chen at al. [18]. They support and extend the key contributions of the field with research 
that provides a system that links managerial decision making with technical 
implementations. The goal is to allow effective economic analysis through estimating 
security benefits. Their thinking supports the notion that increased systematic decision 
making support for security managers is necessary. They point out that without statistical 
data and tools security managers are left making decisions based on experience and 
judgement alone. However, they do leave the gap in that their system does not include a 
notion of user effort rendering their analysis incomplete and again highlighting the need for 
research in this area. 
 
The application of economic concepts to information security has yielded many useful new 
results. In particular, this mode of analysis has revealed the perverse incentives responsible 
for many unwanted security behaviours. Additionally, the usefulness of models in 
understanding the possible outcomes of policy decisions has been demonstrated in many 
works. However, there are significant gaps that limit the usefulness of these results. These 
are: 
 
- The lack of credible data on which to base the models being created. 
- The abstraction, marginalisation or ignoring of the user when considering the costs 
and impacts of security 
 
As the costs and benefits of different user behaviours have not been effectively considered in 
this field, the first point applies strongly to future attempts to model or quantify user data. 
Despite the strengths inherent in the field of economics of information security without 
models that include a notion of the user well-grounded in empirical data the full potential of 
the discipline will not be realised. 
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A similar line of reasoning has been developed by Pallas [56]. Like the research presented in 
this thesis his approach is based on the belief that a greater understanding of information 
security can be developed on the basis of established concepts from the field of economics. 
He identifies two strands which combine to create effective information security: 
 
- Co-ordination – the identification of the optimal state of member behaviour. 
- Motivation – the enforcement of the co-ordination outcome. 
 
Where Pallas’ contribution stands out is in his placing of the organisation members rather 
than technologies at the forefront of his model. It is important to note that the optimal state 
for information security is derived from the behaviour of these members, not from the 
technologies or systems implemented by the organisation. This approach ties in strongly 
with our findings that security and productivity (See section 2.2) are inextricably linked with 
user effort. 
 
Pallas also discusses the ‘meta-measures’ that influence human behaviour. He lists these 
measures as architectural means, formal rule and informal rules. He points out that architectural 
means, such as access control mechanisms, can only be circumvented by dedicated effort 
and their strictness leaves little room for trade-offs. By contrast formal and informal rules, 
being more flexible, are subject to trade-offs with other processes and can be ignored or 
bypassed. His key insight with respect to these rules is to consider the costs and motivations 
associated with them. Pallas informs us that while architectural means can be expensive to 
initially set up and have a moderate cost associated with them their rigidity means that they 
automatically enforce their rules and have no case-by-case cost. On the other hand formal 
and informal rules are enforced in a distributed fashion by the community the rules exist in 
and are dependent on information to be effective. That is to say if the chance of detection 
when breaking the rule is low, and/or the harshness of the sanction is not sufficiently high 
then the rules will be ineffective at enforcement. Given this it would seem that formal and 
informal rules are a poor choice for enforcement. Pallas explains that due to information 
asymmetries between the organisation and that arose with the advent of the personal 
computer (it became unrealistic for the centrally organised organisation to monitor the 
computing activities of all its personnel once such activities moved away from a mainframe) 
the use of such rules is actually an efficient delegation of the decision making process to 
those with more information about the activities – the users themselves. This work again 
highlights that the problem is one of decision making and ensuring that the correct 
information is available to those making decisions. 
 
Economically speaking, architectural means also appear more expensive as they have high 
initial costs compared to the implementation of rules. This also contributes to the increasing 
use of rules for enforcement. However, as Pallas points out, the ultimate cost of enforcement 
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(due to needing to be enforced on a case-by-case basis and requiring larger investment to 
change the community culture if adjustments are required) is higher with formal and 
informal rules compared to architectural means. His discussion in this area also reinforces 
the need to fully cost the impact of decision making by considering costs that extend beyond 
the purely financial. 
 
While Pallas does support the major themes of this research his is, by its own description, an 
“abstract and theory-founded” model. Linking such models to empirical data is a key 
contribution of this research. 
 
2.5 Background: Chapter summary 
 
The relationship between economics and security has allowed security professionals to gain 
many new insights into their discipline. It has offered a new perspective on evaluating and 
planning security. It has also revealed some unwanted results of security measures brought 
about by perverse incentives. However, the research focus of the economics of security is 
still largely on the costs and benefits of technical measures. Budgets are still largely 
considered in purely financial terms, and the role of user behaviour in security systems is 
largely seen as a hindrance to be overcome – preferably by ensuring compliance with 
existing policies. A recent trend in research that adds a more psychological approach to the 
mix of economics and security is yielding some interesting and valuable results. However, 
despite having identified that system design rarely takes the needs and capabilities of the 
user into sufficient account HCI and HCIsec is too focused on improving the user’s interface 
with the system. While the underlying system remains unchanged this has the effect of 
trying to fit the user to the system. This is the picture revealed by a comprehensive review of 
the existing literature and is summarised in Figure 3 below. 
 
This research contributes to, and extends, this recent trend of addressing system design 
directly. As stated above what is lacking in the state of the art is not necessarily the 
knowledge to do this. Each of the three fields covered above, information security, HCI and 
economics, contains valuable information for a security decision make, but in isolation they 
all offer an incomplete picture that struggles to achieve the goal of usable security. 
Information security experts know how to identify which assets the system should protect 
and the appropriate technical controls to do so. However, they lack knowledge of how these 
controls impact users and therefore how to ensure minimal disruption of the user’s primary 
task. HCI researchers understand that the reasons for users’ failures are not due to 
carelessness or idleness but because the demands of the systems are beyond human 
cognitive capabilities. However, they cannot link this to the systemic requirements and so 
are limited to making superficial changes i.e. through UI design. Economic theory and the 
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economics of security effectively models the incentives that drive decision making but does 
not know how to account for the role of the user. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Concept diagram for design priorities with respect to users and the technological systems 
they use 
 
The programme for this research is therefore to address the problem of how to effectively 
combine the expertise of these areas in order to develop a systematic approach that allows 
increasingly optimal decision making. The overall approach is to use economic analysis to 
understand the optimal trade-off between the needs of the user and the technical security 
requirements of the system and this concept is pursued in the following sections. 
  
Traditional design path: educate, adjust or 
enforce users to conform to the technological 
system. 
Recent research trend: design systems with 
user requirements and limitations in mind. This 
applies to equally to software, hardware or 
policy design. 
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3. Methodology 
 
The research disciplines of HCI, Security and Economics conduct experimental studies in 
different ways, using a variety of methodologies that support their aims. In research, data is 
collected to provide evidence to help decide research questions. As such, the research 
questions should determine both the type of data required, and the most suitable method for 
collecting them. Experimental design involves making choices between measurement and 
observation and the use of a controlled environment or gathering directly from the field. 
One must also consider the purpose of the data; if it is to be used to analyse functionality or 
usability, or support decision making through modelling and simulation. HCI evaluations, 
for example, can be summative or formative. In summative evaluations performance data is 
sufficient, as it will tell you which of two mechanisms is superior. A formative evaluation 
may seek to understand the reasons why a mechanism is not working, and how a solution 
may be generated. Here additional, explanatory, data would be required. These 
considerations will be discussed in this section. As this thesis is concerned with the 
collection of data on the usability, cost and organisational performance of security 
mechanisms, a review of those methodologies is necessary.  
 
3.1 Laboratory experiments 
 
Laboratory experiments form a significant fraction of the data gathering processes found in 
the HCI and HCIsec communities. Laboratory experiments allow the researcher to maintain 
control over all the variables present in the experiment. Experimental conditions can be 
enforced through manipulating experimental variables and monitoring control variables. 
These experiments commonly take place in a laboratory or similar environment, such as in 
[66], or are experimenter-led, as in Valentine’s Passface study [72]. This means that the 
events that take place are scripted by the experimenter and, typically, participants are 
required to follow their instructions closely. The frequency and content of the experimental 
stimuli encountered by participants are determined by the needs of the experiment, rather 
than by the usual motivations of the users. 
 
Practically speaking, controlled experiments require a significant commitment of time from 
both the participants and the experimenter, as both must be in the same location and 
actively involved in the task. The participant will often have to travel to reach the 
experimental location as well. These restrictions necessarily limit the experiment in a 
number of ways: 
 
1. The number of participants is usually low, as each must be attended in person by the 
experimenter. 
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2. The duration of the experiment is limited – while participants may be willing to 
return to the experiment for a follow-up session it is unrealistic to expect this to 
happen over a period of weeks or months. 
3. The recruitment process is usually local, resulting in a homogenous participant 
population. 
 
These characteristics are demonstrated in the experiments reviewed in Section 2.2, in which 
there are usually fewer than 40 participants, and these are often drawn from the student 
population of the university at which the experiment is being run. This hampers the 
generalisability of the experimental results. 
 
The advantage of controlled experiments is that they offer the experimenter the chance to 
orchestrate more closely the events of the experiment, and to interact in more detail with the 
participant. The data collected is typically quantitative and objective, for example whether 
or not a password was entered correctly, and can be analysed using statistical methods and 
tests. This makes controlled experiments a good choice when seeking to test performance on 
a task, where the factors that affect performance can be excluded or controlled. Often, 
however, the results of such experiments are generalised to predict real-world behaviours, 
and this can be a mistake. The small numbers of participants with heterogeneous 
backgrounds, and the artificial nature of the tasks (absence of a primary task, or any real 
security risk), mean that these results do not provide a suitable data set from which to 
generalise. 
 
In this thesis, a laboratory experiment was chosen to examine performance with two 
different password policies. Although this work intends to support real-world decision 
making, and laboratory experiments can yield data that is disconnected from this 
operational context, such an experiment was necessary in this case. I was able to 
systematically alter the policy criteria and provide a stable environment, without which 
meaningful comparison would be difficult. The aim was to identify which elements of 
passwords construction caused users most effort. The experimental design and results for 
this study can be found in section 5.2. 
 
3.2 Field Studies 
 
Field studies allow the experimenter access to more naturalistic sources of data. However, 
there are many more variables outside of the experimenter’s control potentially leading to a 
degree of noise in the data. Uncontrolled, in this sense, does not mean random. Unlike a 
laboratory, where outside influences are minimised, the experimenter accepts the presence 
of external factors in order to gather data in a more realistic context. In such studies the 
experimenter does not necessarily have to sit with each participant, making it easier to 
58 
 
 
involve a large number of participants. While experimenter intervention can take place, the 
events about which data is collected are not entirely orchestrated by the experimenter; their 
frequency, content and context are more informed by the usual activities of the participants. 
A software beta test is an example of a field trial in which the experimenter (in this case the 
designer of the software) can make modifications to the experimental environment (such as 
releasing a new build of the software) but the manner in which the testers interact with the 
software is left open. In some cases the participants in a field trial may not be aware the trial 
is taking place, such as when the provider of an online service like Google introduces new 
features and tracks user response. The collection of such data logs is usually done by a 
software or machine agent and can be reviewed at a later date. Information such as the 
number of password resets requested by the employees of an organisation can be accurately 
gathered through an automated logging process. Herley’s study of web password habits [22] 
is based on the analysis of data gathered through automatic reporting, rather than through 
interaction with any specific users. Very large data sets can be gathered in this way from a 
potentially global population. Herley’s large-scale study of web passwords collected data 
from 544960 clients via an optional component of the Windows Live toolbar. The 
automisation of data collection in this way extends the possible size of the data set far 
beyond anything that requires experimenter involvement. The downside of this type of trial 
is that explanatory data is absent, the why of user behaviour or intention is missing. Such 
explanatory data is critical to this research and so a trial of this sort would not be suitable.  
 
An online survey is an example of field trial which does gather explanatory data. Such 
surveys need to be designed such that participants find it difficult to try to record the 
‘correct’ answer, rather than responding truthfully. There is no way for the experimenter to 
guarantee the participants in such studies are responding accurately, or truthfully, but the 
potential rewards of gathering either much larger data sets, and/or more realistic data, can 
make such approaches worthwhile. Sasse and Inglesant used a ‘password diary’ method in 
their 2010 study on password habits [38]. These were filled in every day for a week by the 
participants, a level of engagement that would be virtually impossible in a laboratory 
engagement. This approach is also interesting because it collects data that is both 
quantitative and subjective, as only events that the participants recognise and remember to 
record will be included. Adams and Sasse [1] also used a survey methodology in their 
research and were able to recruit 139 participants, far more than would be feasible with a 
laboratory-based approach. A more recent, and as yet unpublished, survey I constructed for 
a recent project had over 1600 responses further illustrating the possible gains with this 
method. 
 
Field studies are also more conducive to the running of experiments that involve repeated 
measurements, where data gathering is required over multiple days, or experimental 
sessions. This is rarely feasible in the case of laboratory experiments, in which the 
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participants must return to a specific location for each session. Field studies can run for 
days, or weeks, with far less intrusion into the daily routine of both participants and 
experimenters. In order to complement the laboratory experiment that I used to examine 
password performance, with respect to different policies, a server-based field study was 
used to test password performance over time and with different frequencies of use. 
Participants interacted with the server from their normal work context, making this data 
more directly grounded in the real world. I selected this method in order to develop a 
rounded picture of password performance that would be more useful in informing security 
decision making than a laboratory study conducted in isolation. The experimental design for 
this study can be found in Section 5.3. 
 
While certain research questions can be answered solely with quantitative data, there is 
often relevant information that cannot be accurately measured. User perceptions and 
attitudes are a particularly germane example. In order to gather such information a 
qualitative approach is required. Although time-intensive, semi-structured interviews allow 
the experimenter to probe deeper into user motivations and thought processes. Subjective 
data such as this is highly necessary when examining decision making, as it is an 
individual’s perception of their environment that they will rely on, rather than some more 
objective measure. Von Helverson et al. [31] reported that “subjective but not objective effort 
has an effect on judgement formation”. Thus subjective measures must be included, if an 
accurate model of user behaviour and decision making is to be developed. A semi-
structured interview does not have a set question order but rather attempts to guide the 
participant into discussing the desired topics by using open ended questions. This method 
can be used as a primary source of data gathering, as in Sasse and Weirich, or as a follow-up 
to a more controlled study. Structured Interviews were used as the basis of significant 
portions of this work in order to answer research question 2, “What promotes insecure 
behaviour among users”. The motivations behind the adoption of insecure behaviour cannot 
be determined through remote observation or measurement. In order to answer this 
research question it was necessary to examine why users were following these behaviours, 
not just to observe that the behaviours were taking place and make assumptions as to the 
causes. As such, the structured interviews allowed me to gain access to the perspective of 
the users, a critical step in developing a unified view of the factors that a security decision 
maker must take in to account. 
 
3.3 Data analysis and representation 
 
It is not only important to collect the appropriate type of data to answer a research 
questions, but also to choose an appropriate method to analyse the data. Different methods 
are used to quantitative or qualitative, subjective or objective data. 
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Quantitative data is amenable to numerical analysis and so statistical methods are 
commonly used to analyse this form of data. Statistical tests can identify trends in the data, 
and the likely significance of these trends. Significance in this sense is a measure of how 
likely the observed event was to have occurred by chance as opposed to being the result of 
some causal effect. This value is particularly dependent on the sample size of the 
population. 
 
The most common form of qualitative data is verbal data – transcripts from interviews or 
free-form answers collected in online surveys. The latter comes ready for analysis, whereas 
recorded interviews need to be transcribed first, which can be a time-consuming effort. Such 
data can be analysed in a quasi-numerical fashion, for instance by counting the number of 
participants mentioning a technology, problem or concept. However, to tease out deeper 
layers, such as the causes for reported behaviours, in-depth analysis methods are needed. 
 
Grounded Theory [69] is a qualitative data analysis method widely used in social sciences, 
which allows identification of salient concepts and relationships between them. Over the 
past ten years, this method has been successfully applied to model user perceptions and 
attitudes in Human-Computer Interaction. Adams & Sasse [1] used this approach to identify 
factors that affect employees’ perceptions of corporate security policies. Weirich & Sasse [77] 
used it to model employee decision-making around compliance with password security 
policies. In Grounded Theory, the data collected is marked with codes that indicate similar 
concepts. These can then be grouped into categories from which theories can be developed. 
In particular, Grounded Theory seeks to identify, through a process known as Axial Coding, 
why a particular event is occurring and how it is responded to. This is achieved by 
identifying various conditions that relate to these events. These can be: 
 
1. Causal conditions: these directly influence the event. 
2. Intervening conditions: which alter the impact of causal conditions. Unexpected 
events fall in to this category. 
3. Contextual conditions: which are the products of causal events mitigated by 
intervening conditions. 
 
Subsequently, the actions taken by individuals as a result of these conditions are identified, 
followed by the consequences of those actions. Grounded Theory was used in this thesis to 
analyses data gathered in interviews, and was instrumental in the formation of the 
Compliance Budget theory (see Chapter 4). 
 
Various tools exist for representing category data, such as that generated by Grounded 
Theory analysis. Such representations are useful for sharing semantic data in a structured 
fashion through the creation of an ontology, which describes the concepts and relationships 
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relevant to a domain. The OWL 2 Web Ontology Language [52] is an open source ontology 
language that provides ontologies that include classes, properties, individuals and data 
values. Its open source nature makes it an available choice for use and the categories it 
contains serve equally well for representing Grounded Theory categories and the 
components of a systems model (see Section 3.5). These properties make it a suitable fit for 
use in this thesis. Additionally, there exists an open source editor, Protégé [67], which 
provides a usable interface for the construction of ontologies. These tools were used in 
section 6.4 to express the components of the security hierarchy developed in Section 6. 
 
3.4 Modelling 
 
The field of economics relies on the modelling of systems in order to determine the potential 
outcomes of a course of action. While no systems modelling has been undertaken as part of 
this thesis, neither the motivation for, nor the impact of, the research presented here can be 
understood fully without an understanding of systems modelling and its potential 
applications in the field of information security. 
 
Systems modelling is a general term that is used across several disciplines (most commonly 
in the fields of business and information technology) to describe a process in which a system 
is represented, using some formal notation, (often mathematical but may be graphical or 
purely conceptual) in order to facilitate analysis or design.  
 
Systems models are comprised of three principal components, processes, resources and 
locations. These can be defined as follows: 
 
- Processes are the activities that occur in order to deliver the primary service of the 
system. In this context, the services delivered are security operations. Typically many 
such processes will execute, either simultaneously or sequentially, in order for the 
service to be delivered. 
- Resources are the infrastructure of the system; the logical and/or physical entities that 
enable, and are manipulated by, processes in order to achieve their intended 
purpose. 
- Locations are places in which events can take place within the model. Each resource 
must have a location and processes may require certain resources at certain locations 
to function. These locations tend to be highly distributed (logically and/or physically) 
and are linked by directed connections. 
 
Each component of the system under analysis will be represented in the model as one of 
these types of conceptual objects. A fourth category, Environment, can be added to this. 
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Systems exist within external environments, from which events are incident upon the 
system’s boundaries. Typically, the environment is insufficiently understood, and too 
complex, to be represented in the same explicit form as the system itself. 
 
Of particular interest to this work is the use of such models as the basis for executable 
simulations. Various factors that affect the behaviour of the system are parameterised and, 
through adjusting these parameters, a range of behaviours can be observed through the 
simulation. This allows decision makers to predict the impact of decisions before they are 
made and thus select optimal strategies. Simulation modelling can be a powerful tool for 
reasoning about complex systems and exploring the decisions made within them. This has 
already been recognised within the information security community by work such as 
Beresnevichiene et al. [13]. This work recognises that “the state of the art lacks a systematic 
methodology to support security investment decision making.” The paper presents an approach 
that combines utility evaluation with mathematical systems modelling, a combination that 
has the potential to generate useful results with respect to managing trade-offs. Indeed, the 
study validated through a process of interviewing and collaborating with security experts, 
who perceived the process to be objective and rigorous. The model used in the case study 
represented the activities of IT staff responding to support-job requests. However, the 
behaviour of the IT staff was based on assumptions guided by the experience of the 
managers. This reflects the lack of available empirical knowledge regarding human 
behaviour available in the modelling community and therefore a research gap in the state of 
the art. The commercial possibilities have also been recognised by cutting edge technology 
companies such as HP, who now offer a Security Analytics service. This service uses model 
construction and exploration as a key component in supporting decision making. 
Supporting information security decision making through systematic methodologies is very 
much at the heart of the motivation behind this work and so it was natural to shape it with 
an eye on systems modelling. Additional work by Baldwin at al. [24] in this area added 
weight to these early findings and reported that, “the system modelling tool was valued as a 
decision aid” by the security professionals that participated in their study. 
 
The involvement with systems models was present from the very beginning of this research, 
as well as the Trust Economics project. Understanding that a current weakness in the 
application of systems modelling was the lack of empirical data underpinning the models 
the Trust Economics project sought to address this. One of the results was a paper that 
reported on a model of the use of USB sticks, to which I contributed an analysis of 
interviews conducted within an information technology company and a financial services 
organisation. This same analysis went on to form the basis for the Compliance Budget. 
Understanding the need for better metrics in systems modelling was also a driver for the 
work presented in Section 6. The predictive power of such models is dependent on the 
quality of the data used to tune them. The principle of garbage in, garbage out is commonly 
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invoked in the fields of computer science, as well as in other fields such as engineering and 
information processing. It expresses the idea that bad inputs result in bad outputs, barring 
some specific design intervention [49]. Problems of type occur when the incorrect type of 
input is used. Problems of quality are the result of inputs of the correct type but which contain 
some defect. It is the second type of problem that can be avoided through improving the 
validity of the empirical data used in the systems model. As a consequence, decisions 
predicated on the results of the model can be made with more confidence. 
 
The usefulness of such models is also linked to the level of abstraction from reality required 
to implement them. Certain assumptions must be made in the case of any systems model for 
it to be bounded and executed, within a reasonable time frame and budget. However, these 
assumptions must be chosen with care, likewise the transfer functions that govern the 
behaviour of the model. 
 
Understanding the benefit of incorporating real-world data into a systems model does not 
always make that process straightforward. This problem becomes increasingly difficult 
when human factors are considered. Chapter 4 will demonstrate the need for a clear 
representation of the user in security planning and decision making, but this problem is 
typically abstracted away from in the more technical world of modelling. While this makes 
the creation of the model easier, it is not a viable long term solution if models are to remain a 
functional part of a new security paradigm, one that places an increased emphasis on the 
significance of the individual user. In order to address these issues I was motivated to 
consider new approaches to organising, and representing, information about security 
objectives and processes; approaches that would both facilitate systems modelling and 
incorporate a representation of the user alongside other, more technical, components of such 
systems. Chapter 6 details the exploration of this challenge. 
 
3.5 A linked approach 
 
There is a dichotomy at the heart of data collection that taps in to one of the key problems 
with progressing security decision-making. In order to be able to inform real-world 
decisions, data must be collected in conditions that are as close as possible to those found in 
the context in which the decisions are being made. However, in replicating this 
environment, or observing it directly, the experimenter runs the risk of gathering data in 
which any observed effects may be attributable to factors other than the ones of interest to 
the experimenter. 
 
While HCI researchers favour controlled experiments, security practitioners prefer logging 
and economists rely on modelling and simulation, none of these methodologies on their own 
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offer the required tools to support efficient decision making. Just as theories and concepts 
from all three areas are needed, so it is with methods of data collection. Sasse and Brostoff 
demonstrated in 2000 [15] that field trials are necessary to understand the functionality and 
not just the usability of a security mechanism. The HCI literature review outlined the need 
for a user-centric conceptual model at the heart of security planning, and that requires 
qualitative data gathering methods such as interviews. Systems models are highly data 
dependent if they are to be usefully predictive and thus, where they seek to incorporate 
users, require collaboration with psychology and HCI. 
 
In chapter 5this thesis lays out a range of approaches that attempt to overcome the inherent 
problems with both laboratory experiments and field studies, by combining the effective 
parts of both. Additionally, the use to which such data can be used to support decision 
making is discussed throughout. The focus is always on grounding any theory or model 
with a valid empirical data set. If a more systematic approach to security is be achieved, this 
combination of various data types, and their alignment with the appropriate conceptual 
models, is a mandatory prerequisite. 
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4. The Compliance Budget 
 
4.1 Introduction and research background 
 
The literature review, conducted in Section 2, concluded that information security 
mechanisms that negatively impact their users can create security weaknesses, or generate 
additional costs for the organisation they are trying to protect. While this problem has been 
recognised for over a decade there has been no tangible progress in reducing or minimising 
these negative impacts and moving toward a more usable state of security. 
 
A key aim of this chapter is to propose a model that allows security managers to understand 
how the implementation of a security control leads to users adopting insecure behaviours. 
This will be done by demonstrating the link between the effort burden placed on the user by 
the security control and the user’s decision making process regarding whether or not to 
comply with it. In this way the chapter will address research question 2, repeated here for 
convenience: 
 
What promotes insecure behaviours among the users of IT systems and how can 
these behaviours be managed and minimised? 
 
Additionally, this chapter will shed light on the causes of insecure behaviour by showing 
that increasing the effort required by secondary tasks – such as security – beyond a user’s 
tolerance or capacity for such tasks will drive them to adopt workarounds. These 
workarounds, which most often involve following an ad-hoc process decided upon by the 
user, are usually insecure. By highlighting the factors that go in to the decision to not 
comply and use a workaround the chapter will provide security managers with the required 
information to manage and influence such compliance decisions. 
 
This chapter also contributes to answering research question 3: 
 
How can we maximise information security when the human factor is taken into 
account? 
 
Without the co-operation of the users of a system the security of that system cannot be 
maximised. Therefore a discussion of how to manage compliance in order to maximise 
security will also be included. A utility-based economic approach is used throughout as a 
way of framing the problem in such a way that both business and security managers can 
access and understand the issue and its solutions. 
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In order to fulfil these aims it is necessary to understand the role of the user in information 
security. The practise of information security can be seen to be the practise of minimising 
security failures in the system being protected, but it must also serve the business needs of 
the organisation – if it costs more to implement and maintain than it saves in avoided 
breaches, then it is not of functional use. Where system failures are of a technical nature the 
tools exist to understand and remedy them with relative ease. However, it is widely 
acknowledged in security research and practise that many security incidents are caused by 
human rather than technical failures. In such situations the information security community 
is far less equipped to understand and solve the problem. Expertise does, however, exist in 
the field of HCI to understand the factors that underpin human error. These errors can have 
many causes but in the case of security the two most salient are difficulty and workload. 
Even technically-minded users with good IT skills can struggle to keep up with the 
additional complexity introduced into their working day by security mechanisms. 
Improving the UI and interface to such systems does not necessarily make them more 
usable, as was demonstrated with PGP 5.0 in Section 2.2.1. A more fundamental systemic 
change is required. While some failures can be attributed to security mechanisms whose 
execution places unrealistic cognitive demands on the user, this does not tell the whole 
story. Individual users have a choice about whether or not to comply with security policies 
and a choice to not comply may be indistinguishable from a failure event, thus weakening 
the system. 
 
While the field of HCI has the knowledge to address this problem, it faces the difficulty of 
placing that knowledge within a framework that makes it relevant and available to business 
and security decision makers. Security decision makers have no systematic tools that allow 
them to incorporate information on user behaviour, limitations and requirements into their 
decision making process. This means there is a requirement for an approach that provides 
decision makers with the tools to balance the security and business processes with respect to 
the user with a view to optimising the overall utility of the organisation. Compliance is one 
area in which progress can be achieved. Non-compliance weakens a security system and 
implementing the monitoring and sanctions required to ensure compliance can be expensive 
for an organisation. However, not all instances of non-compliance are due to negligence. In 
some cases a non-compliant response is simply the logical choice due to the aforementioned 
cognitive demands of the system. It is necessary to understand the problem from a user 
perspective in order to eliminate such instances. This task is addressed in the remainder of 
this section. 
 
When an organisation adds to or amends its security policy the opinion of the user 
population is rarely solicited, even though they have to deal with the workload and other 
implications of policy changes. Having identified from the comprehensive literature review 
in Chapter 2 that the role of the user in security planning is under-represented, the first stage 
67 
 
 
in understanding the impact of changes in security policy on user populations, and so on the 
effectiveness of an organisation at achieving its primary task, has to be gathering 
information on user opinions and attitudes. This is motivated by the understanding that 
effective security cannot be achieved without the consent and co-operation of the user. It has 
been pointed out that in order to achieve their security goals CISOs and other managers 
must consider that users both have a choice about whether or not to comply with security 
policy and that this choice is influenced by the individual’s own perceptions and goals.  
 
If the direction of security research is to be altered and a trend begun toward more user-
centric design then it is first necessary to understand user’s perception of and attitudes 
toward security. In particular an understanding must be gained of the decision making 
process of users when faced with security tasks. Implicit in this desire is the assumption that 
users are making decisions and are not blindly following policy either through coercion or a 
lack of awareness of any alternative. 
 
As part of the Trust Economics project interviews were conducted with various employees 
of a major financial organisation and a technology research and development company. 
These interviews were designed to solicit user’s views on how their working day would be 
affected by a change in security policy. During the interview they were specifically asked 
about mandatory encryption of USB sticks. When these interviews were analysed an 
interesting pattern emerged. Many of the participants stated that their reaction to the change 
in policy would not be to adjust their working practises to accommodate it, rather they 
would ignore it and/or seek a workaround. This indicated a more sophisticated decision 
making process was taking place. Considering research question 2, ‘what promotes insecure 
behaviours among users?’ the Compliance Budget describes this process in a form that allows 
it to be manipulated so that compliance with policy can be increased. The result of this is a 
framework that supports security decision makers by providing them with guidelines to 
managing compliance through system design. The Compliance Budget seeks to express a 
new paradigm in understanding and managing user responses to security decision making. 
The core proposals of the Compliance Budget are: 
 
1. That understanding the economics of compliance from an individual’s point of view 
provides a better basis for influencing individual’s security behaviour 
2. That organisations should accept that the effort users are willing to spend on 
compliance with security policies is finite resource that needs to be carefully 
managed 
3. That compliance decisions can be characterised as a rational cost/benefit analysis by 
the individual of the advantages and disadvantages of compliance 
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4.2 The empirical study 
 
The empirical basis for this was model was a study run in two phases by the Trust 
Economics project to elicit factors that contribute to corporate and individual security cost 
and examine issues around understanding of and compliance with security policies. I was 
able to access this data through my association with Trust Economics, and chose to analyse 
it. 
 
In the first phase 17 in-depth interviews were conducted with security staff, employees and 
managers in two major UK companies – a financial institution and the research lab of a 
technology company. The interviewees included the chief security officers in both 
companies, and 4 security researchers or operational security staff. The remaining 10 
participants were staff working in the companies’ main-line activities – financial services or 
technology research, and one of them was a lawyer. All participants had a university degree 
and at least two years’ work experience. 
 
The second phase of interviews was conducted on a much larger scale with over 140 
participants. These were employees of a large multinational energy company who 
volunteered to take part in the study. They include members of a broad range of roles within 
the company from both the United Kingdom and the United States of America. 
 
In both phases the interviews were semi-structured, exploring  
 
- The tasks and responsibilities of interviewees,  
- Their perception of the risks facing the company,  
- Their attitudes to the company’s security polices and security measures, and  
- The perceived impact of security measures on individual’s tasks and responsibilities, 
and company productivity.  
 
While the interviews covered a range of security policies and measures, all interviewees 
were asked about their use of one specific bit of technology - USB sticks- and their 
awareness of security policies surrounding the use of these policies. My initial involvement 
with the phase 1 interview data was to support the work of Pym et al. during Trust 
Economics’ modelling of USB use. The first pass of analysis focused on identifying and 
extracting responses dealing with USBs, specifically the costs and benefits to both the 
individual and the company associated with changing the security policy to mandate USB 
encryption. It was from the Grounded Theory analysis of this data that the pattern of 
responses leading to the Compliance Budget model emerged – participants showed a 
preference for workarounds rather than compliance in the face of the proposed policy 
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change. A second round of analysis was then conducted that focused on attitudes toward 
wider security issues, particularly with respect to compliance and decision making. The 
transcripts of the interviews were reviewed in their entirety, and analysed using techniques 
from Grounded Theory (see Section 3.4). The interviews using axial coding (the first stage of 
Grounded Theory) to produce an inventory of the individual employee’s cost and benefit 
associated with security policies and mechanisms they came in contact with, and the cost 
and benefit for the organization. Data were coded by two researchers independently. An 
example of this process is given below. The following quote is taken from one of the 
interviews (A denotes the participant and B denotes the interviewer): 
 
“A: But the biggest problem I have is probably on my windows laptop because it’s Windows which is 
inherently a disaster waiting to happen. A lot of the like security stuff it’s effectively damage 
limitation on Windows. The firewall and the other thing I really hate is Symantec anti-virus are both 
there for my own good you know. 
B: Yes 
A: However, I turn off the company firewall and I use the Microsoft one instead the one sitting in 
Microsoft XP because it permits me to open the network ports I need for my application while I’m 
outside the HP firewall (UI) 
B: Yeah 
The other problem is Symantec AV. When it’s turned on our program takes an extra 20 minutes to 
build and test (UI) it takes 40 minutes. But with Symantec anti-virus turned on it takes 40 minutes. 
So that is basically tangible impact in my development time by running anti-virus stuff so right now 
I turn those things off when they annoy me.” 
 
Here a category of problem has been identified - a perceived negative impact on the user as a 
result of the company-installed virus checker and anti-virus software. The contextual 
condition is that these mechanisms limit or prevent the individual’s ability to complete his 
work by blocking required ports or doubling the time taken to test a new build of their 
software. As a result, the individual takes the action of turning off these services and using 
only the firewall built in to Windows. The consequences of this action are that the individual 
is more productive but they (and by extension the company) are more at risk from the 
threats the full firewall and virus checker would mitigate against. Further conditions, actions 
and consequences identified in other interviews are added to this category until no new 
information emerges from coding. 
 
4.3 Study results 
 
The analysis of the interviews provided many examples of both compliance and non-
compliance with security measures. When discussing their security behaviour individuals 
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frequently raised the issue of the costs and benefits of security policies. These costs and 
benefits are a complex web of perceived costs and benefits to the employee (both from a 
professional and individual point of view), and the perceived cost and benefit to the 
organisation. The individual employee’s perception of cost and benefit is, however, largely 
determined by the impact of compliance on their tasks and responsibilities; the goal of their 
primary work task dominates their perspective whereas the security goal of the organization 
is a relatively small concern by comparison. A number of different scenarios were identified 
in which individual cost/benefit decisions were traded off against compliance with security 
policies. These are described in detail in the following section.  
 
4.3.1 Example Cost/Benefit Scenarios  
 
In this section five scenarios are presented, which illustrate individuals’ cost/benefit 
perceptions of security measures. The quotes from the interviews illustrate the examples 
given. 
 
4.3.1.1 Centrally scheduled maintenance tasks, such as weekly automated virus scan  
 
Participants provided many examples of production tasks being disrupted by centrally 
scheduled maintenance tasks, such as virus checker updates, patches, and licence 
management software. The effect is either a complete interruption of the employee’s 
production tasks, or their machines being slowed down to the point where they cannot work 
effectively: 
 
P6: “when [the virus scanner] is turned on, our program takes an extra 20 minutes to build and test”.  
 
Most participants acknowledged that there was a purpose to those security measures. If they 
had the luxury of doing so, they would re-organise their work: “go for a coffee”, and resume 
when the maintenance task was completed. All participants felt it was justified to 
circumvent these security measures if they interfered with their ability to deliver their work 
on time, especially if they were up against a deadline. A minority, however, were more 
militant, feeling that no interruption of their work was justified. Each participant seemed to 
evince some awareness of the trade-off between personal and organizational good: 
 
P3: “Anything that loses time is not good for the business.”  
 
Others clearly resented the loss of control over their own machines, and their ability to 
complete their work being at the mercy of “whatever they think of next”, especially if they 
could not perceive any benefit of those updates. In one of the organisations, several 
employees had permanently opted out of the updates: 
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P11: “next thing I know I’m installing some tiresome patch that I don’t want to be installing. I used 
to circumvent that whenever I was in this building.” 
 
Employees did this either openly or covertly (some deliberately switched to an operating 
system or application software that was not centrally supported) - some with, some without, 
the knowledge of the security/IT managers. Most employees were aware that there must be 
organisational need for running these updates and that their “opting out” would undermine 
this: 
 
P16: “different IT groups all want to scan these machines so I don’t think they are too happy about 
that.”  
 
The prevailing attitude, however, was that - whatever the organisational need for these 
measures - it did not justify “stopping people from getting their work done”, and leaving several 
participants to wonder “why they cannot run these things at night?” This last example 
highlights a lack of awareness that there might also be conflicting goals at the organizational 
level, in this case the desire to reduce energy consumption versus effective security. This 
example also highlights the subjective nature of the decision making process, wherein the 
only costs and benefits taken into consideration are those directly relevant or visible to the 
decision maker. 
 
4.3.1.2 Additional authentication  
 
Several passwords need to be (re)entered, e.g. to connect to additional VPNs. At worst, 
failure to recall the correct password leads to failure to access (no availability), which in turn 
means inability to get work done. 
 
P3: “The only [problem] I can think of is if either you lose a password or forget it.” 
 
Additional passwords increase cognitive load, and worry that e systems recall password 
accurately. 
 
P10: “there are a lot of systems that need a lot of passwords and you know keeping a track of them is a 
bit of a pain.” 
 
Additional authentication hurdles cause delay in accessing systems and cause frustration at 
having to repeat a task. 
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4.3.1.3 Using encryption for data storage/transfer  
 
The policy change hypothesised in the interview scenario was mandatory use of encryption 
for all data stored on USB sticks. For some participants, the risk to availability of data they 
needed was the key concern, but many participants balanced this against the confidentiality 
risk to their organisation. From the individual’s perspective, the worst-case cost is 
permanent loss of data or lack of availability at a critical time for their tasks. The very 
possibility of losing access to data was an unacceptable cost to some participants: 
 
P12: “I just feel a lack of control because most of the time the threat is unavailability created by the 
encryption system.”  
 
The fear of the risk to availability is deep, and several participants expressed a fundamental 
unwillingness to rely on a technology they did not understand. 
 
P13: “I know very few people who run encrypted file systems on a laptop ... because they don’t trust 
the file system. They want their data to be accessible.” 
 
In this context, data does not equal data – the fear is strongest for data that individuals have 
created or generated themselves; they felt strong ownership and resented this date being 
subject to a blanket company policy. 
 
P10: “[USB encryption] would be irritating because much of the content is private.” 
 
Even if the data would not be permanently lost (e.g. because the file is still on the 
organisation’s system) there a perceived risk to availability: not being able to access the data 
when it is needed. The result could be lost business opportunity, or embarrassment (looking 
incompetent): 
 
P1: The only one I can think of would be the password on the device - I could forget it.  
I: And what would be the result?  
P1: I wouldn’t be able to do my presentation. And that would be quite embarrassing. 
 
The additional time to encrypt and decrypt data was a lesser perceived cost: 
 
P10: “there is a cost to [USB encryption] in that it wastes my time.” 
 
These perceived costs made some participants feel entitled to break the policy: 
 
P10: “if {USB encryption] was mandated I would probably work around it.” 
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While others acknowledged the risk to the organisation, and the consequences that a breach 
of confidentiality would have: 
 
P5: Well, for sure, a competitor could get hold of something and do something with it. The press could 
find out there was a breach and publicize that. And the client wouldn’t be too happy. It’s just bad at 
all levels if confidentiality were breached. [If] there was any perception of wrongdoing it taints the 
firm’s brand and the value of that is huge.” 
 
Again we see strong evidence that it is the decision maker’s knowledge that is relevant when 
considering how such policies will impact populations, not the knowledge of the security 
manager or his staff. While concerns that encryption software poses a threat to availability 
by somehow going wrong hold no water from a technical standpoint it does not mean that 
such concerns can be ignored. If this is a view that is held by the majority of the population 
being asked to use such software it will still influence their behaviour and compliance 
decisions. 
 
4.3.1.4 Restrictive firewall  
 
Firewall settings blocking access to a wide range of websites – from adult entertainment to 
social networking. In the worst case, participants reported that they could not get their work 
done, e.g. software developers could not access ports needed for running a virtual machine, 
and felt they had to break the policy: 
 
P6: “the [company] firewall doesn’t like those network ports being open. It lacks flexibility… By being 
too restrictive for my use they end up forcing people to cheat to disable things.” 
 
Other participants perceived the restrictions as more than an inconvenience – they felt it 
could damage business, and this, in turn would also affect their earnings: 
 
P5: So how do you quantify that extra cost? … [it] can range from something as dramatic as business 
we won’t win because we’re not aware of information. And those fees [we miss out on] could be 
millions of dollars over one year or two. You know, if a company went public that we just had no idea 
existed, because we couldn’t see the webpage. 
 
Participants felt they were being forced into workarounds, so they work effectively. 
  
P4: “I think people don’t try to not follow the rules just for fun. When we do it’s for a reason.”  
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4.3.1.5 Over-zealous security classifications  
 
Participants from one organisation stated that all data and documents tended to be blanket-
marked as confidential. They reported that this led to unintentional breaches of the security 
policy, e.g. when sharing data with colleagues outside the organisation, even though the 
sharing was clearly needed to get their work done: 
  
P10: “there is a kind of blanket imposition of inappropriate security restraints, sometimes on 
documents.” 
 
Not being able to share data was seen as resulting in lower productivity and freedom of 
thought/expression. 
 
4.4 Perceived costs and benefits 
 
As Weirich [76] points out, when an individual is presented with a security task, he has a 
choice of: 
 
1. Complying and performing the required behaviour (or at least try to do so), or  
2. Attempting to bypass the task.  
 
The analysis of the interviews using Grounded Theory techniques revealed that users are 
aware of the costs to their time and productivity that result from security tasks. They also 
demonstrate an understanding of the need for security and in many cases state a desire to be 
secure where possible, in some cases reporting that they felt they were being forced into 
workarounds against their natural desire to be secure by the need to work effectively. This 
makes the above choice a non-trivial one. Users are not universally drawn to either reject or 
bypass security. This suggests that the decision – to comply, or not to comply - is the result 
of an internal cost/benefit analysis, in which the individual weighs up the advantages and 
disadvantages of complying or not complying; they do not regard compliance with security 
behaviour purely as a cost: the participants in our study value security, both for themselves 
and for the organisation they work for. Their disposition is often to comply with security 
policies - up to the point at which the perceived benefit of doing so is exceeded by the 
perceived costs associated with complying. (Or the point at which anticipated cost of 
complying – i.e. worrying about forgetting a password and the consequences of forgetting it 
– is perceived to be higher than the benefits of compliance.) Examples of costs perceived by 
individuals, from an HCI perspective: 
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1. Increased physical load. These are extra steps added to production tasks, increasing 
time and effort required to execute production tasks (such as a machine being slower 
because of security updates), or new tasks added (such as additional authentication 
to enter building/log in to network, additional training to be completed for new 
security devices). 
 
2. Increased cognitive load – additional information needs to be stored and recalled on 
demand (such as a password to encrypt/decrypt data). Research in psychology and 
human-computer interaction has established that human will try to avoid increased 
cognitive load even more than increased physical load. 
 
In the interviews participants also discussed more intangible costs such as: 
 
3. Embarrassment – security measures impacting on business practises may cause the 
individual embarrassment (such as not being able to open an encrypted file for 
presentation to a customer or audience) in addition to the inability to complete the 
task. Individuals also anticipate that the perceptions formed as a result of such an 
event could have a potential long-term negative impact on their career. 
 
4. Missed opportunities – the increased time required to go through the steps of a 
security task, or the restrictions placed on data access by a security policy may mean 
a worker in a competitive environment misses an opportunity to effectively do 
business e.g. websites relevant to a deal blocked by firewall rules. As with 
embarrassment (3), individuals are concerned about the cost of long-term impact on 
their career.  
 
These costs are supported by economic notions of utility. With an economic need to 
maximise profit and productivity, both for the individual and the organisation, security 
which threatens job security by preventing users from completing their production task will 
be seen to carry a high cost. The overall satisfaction of the individual is maximised by 
following a workaround and completing their primary production task with efficiency. 
 
5. The ‘Hassle Factor’ –the perceived the cost associated with complying is often higher 
than the actual cost, because the knock-on effect on certain situational or contextual 
factors. For example, if an individual is under pressure to meet a deadline, waiting 
for a patch to install feels more onerous than if it happens over lunch or at a period of 
low activity. This cost is most apparent where the security task slows down or 
prevents the primary task 
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These costs also identified in HCI and economic literature. Previous studies (as shown in 
Section 2.2) indicated that users feel overloaded with the need to manage multiple 
passwords and are often already operating at their cognitive limits. This background context 
explains why users will seek to avoid additional cognitive load where possible. Framing this 
economically, whereby the individual seeks to maximise their personal utility, these costs 
clearly explain why non-compliance is in many cases the preferred course of action. 
Individuals that are directly motivated to be secure, i.e. those for whom security is their 
primary task, and the one from which they derive most utility, will prove to be compliant. 
However, such individuals are exceedingly rare and an individual’s utility is far more 
commonly dependent on taking satisfaction in the successful completion of their primary 
task, a good salary and being able to provide for their family. In this context the behaviours 
reported during the interviews become a rational response. At the same time, compliance 
with required security behaviour can have perceived certain benefits: 
 
1. Avoiding the consequences of a security breach. The most obvious benefit is avoiding the 
consequences of a security breach – such as losing data – which would have a 
negative impact on the individual’s task. It is important to reinforce the point being 
made here; that users do value security, up to a point, and in most cases understand 
its benefits.  
 
2. Protection from sanctions – there is no danger of being “caught” in breach of policy, and 
exposed to the sanctions stipulated by the organisation. Therefore the individual 
does not have to worry about being caught, or the sanctions. 
 
However, the degree of worry depends on the individual’s risk appetite and the likelihood 
of sanctions being applied. Adams and Sasse [1] and Weirich [76] point out that if policies 
are routinely breached, but stipulated sanctions are not applied, individuals quite 
reasonably do not expect any consequences from being caught in breach of policies. This 
highlights the need to have a policy that is both consistent and enforceable. Unrealistic 
policies that are then not enforced and left to slide are arguably less effective than a less 
restrictive policy that is realistic about what it can ask of its workforce and can enforce 
through sanctions and monitoring. 
 
4.5 The Compliance Budget model 
 
Security policies and mechanisms will not be effective without the co-operation of 
individual employees. The most obvious form of co-operation is compliance with security 
tasks. Most users will comply if this does not require any additional effort. When extra effort 
is required, individuals will weigh this extra effort against the perceived benefits for them, 
77 
 
 
in the context of their primary production tasks. It is this process of trade-off that is not well 
understood by either the HCI or Security communities. Security sees that there should be no 
need for a trade-off as security tasks are of prime importance. One security manager, when 
questioned about how users should cope with additional tasks, said “they should come in to 
work 15 minutes earlier and leave 15 minutes later.” [59] Conversely, HCI sees the improvement 
of usability and the reduction of user effort as its primary objective. As the overall utility of 
an organisation or individual is dependent on a combination of these two factors a balanced 
view is needed. Thus, this trade-off is central to the decisions surrounding compliance and 
an accounting of the factors that influence it is necessary in order to support security 
decision making. This is the objective of the Compliance Budget model. If the user’s goals 
are aligned with the organisation’s security goals, there is no conflict, as the behaviour 
required of the individual translates into perceived gain for them as well as for the 
organisation. In rare cases the security task will be equivalent to the primary task, for 
example a member of airport staff manning the X-ray machine at a baggage checkpoint, and 
so no security-specific effort will be registered by the user. Thus, security policies are likely 
to be followed – at least by most individuals, most of the time. 
 
Based on the results of Weirich [76] there will be some exceptions to this rule, because: 
 
1. Some individuals have a high propensity for risk-taking 
2. Some individuals may have other issues with the organisation, and contravene 
security policies as a way of expressing dissatisfaction or dissent. 
 
Conversely, most individuals will not be inclined to choose the behaviour required by the 
organisation if there is a conflict between the security behaviour and their own goals. In this 
case, either some part of the joint set of goals will not be met, or the individual will need to 
expend effort without gain to help the organisation’s security goals. 
 
Compliance occurs if the individual chooses the behaviour required by the organisation, 
even though it makes it harder for them to realise their goals, or even prevents them from 
reaching them altogether. In the scenario mentioned above where the security task is in 
alignment with the primary task no true compliance decision has been made as there is only 
one reasonable course of action. Compliance can be seen as a kind of organisational 
altruism. From the individual’s perspective, this is a situation of ‘pain but no gain’ (recall we 
are focusing on conflict situations where individual and organizational goals are unaligned). 
The ‘pain tolerance’ - the amount of extra effort an individual is prepared to make for no 
personal gain – is what is referred to here as the Compliance Budget. The limit of the 
Compliance Budget I have termed the Compliance Threshold; this being the point at which the 
individual no longer has the motivation to comply with official requirements. The closer an 
individual is to his Compliance Threshold the higher the cost to the organisation of 
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achieving compliance, as the perceived cost to the individual will also be higher. This is due 
to the ‘hassle factor’ – a task performed at the start of the day will seem less onerous than the 
same one executed after a series of security-related effort expenditures. In essence there is a 
cumulative cost associated with performing tasks in sequence; each new task has some 
residual level of effort from previous tasks added to it. Once the Compliance Threshold has 
been exceeded, there will be almost no way to achieve compliance except through heavy 
monitoring of individuals’ behaviour and enforcement as the workforce will be continually 
looking to avoid security tasks to make their life easier, focusing exclusively on their 
primary production goals. 
 
When an individual is faced with a compliance decision, the costs detailed in the results 
section will be weighed up by the individual (consciously or subconsciously) and measured 
against the benefits. As stated before the issue of compliance only comes into question when 
the individual is placed in a situation where there is a cost to him but no direct benefit. The 
decision to comply or not comply with a single task can be summarized with a brief 
formula. As discussed above the hassle factor is cumulative. This means that a steady erosion 
of the Compliance Budget will take place as tasks stack up, and the individual’s tolerance for 
further tasks (or repetitions of the same task) will be reduced. This must be represented in 
the formula to take into account the cumulative effect of previous tasks already performed. 
We can express this decision as: 
 
Compliance if: (current task cost x hassle factor) + total cost of previous tasks < 
Compliance Threshold 
 
In addition to the internal factors identified in section 4.2, there are external factors that 
impact both an individual’s total Compliance Budget and the rate at which it is expended. 
External factors are created by the production task performed by the individual, and the 
organisational environment. It is factors in this second category that security managers can 
use to influence individuals perceptions of cost and benefits of compliance, and their 
security behaviour. The key external factors are: 
 
1. Design  
a) The most direct way to influence cost-benefit perception is to reduce the actual 
mental and physical workload that individuals have to expend on compliance. 
  
b) Well-designed security seeks to minimize friction between security and business 
processes, and avoids putting individuals in situations where they have to 
choose between security goals and production goals. Improving the design of 
the security system will reduce the cost of each security action, meaning more 
tasks can be undertaken within the same Compliance Budget. 
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2. Awareness, Training, Education 
c) Effective training in using security measures can improve individual 
performance, which in turn reduces the cost associated with security measures. 
It can also build individuals’ competence – which is a benefit to them, and their 
confidence – which can reduce the stress and anxiety associated with using 
security mechanisms. 
 
d) Raising awareness of the risks and vulnerabilities faced by the organization 
increases the perceived benefits of compliance. 
 
3. The culture of the organization. The more security-minded an organization is, the less 
friction compliance causes. Weirich & Sasse [77] report that individuals’ security 
behaviour is strongly influenced by behavioural norms – most individuals try to “fit 
in”, rather than seek conflicts with their colleagues. Building a positive and strong 
security culture reduces friction and perceived cost of compliance 
 
4. Monitoring. The visibility of the organisation’s compliance monitoring, and 
willingness to administer advertised sanctions, will determine how likely it is an 
individual thinks they will be detected and reprimanded if they do not comply with 
policy. This will in turn feed into their decision to comply or not. 
 
5. Sanctions. Avoidance of sanction is a perceived benefit. Thus, for sanctions to be 
effective, they must be enforced, and seen to be enforced [77] used in response to a 
security failure will be factored in to the cost/benefit analysis of the individual. They 
influence the level of perceived benefit from the protection gained through 
compliance. 
 
In general, each of the external factors affects either the total Compliance Budget, or the rate 
at which it is spent. This is an important distinction to make, as there is a finite improvement 
that can be made to the total Compliance Budget available through improving awareness, 
training and culture. Beyond this limit, further attempts will be counterproductive either in 
the business sense (time spent away from work) or in terms of the Compliance Budget 
(individual costs imposed through time taken up and attention demanded away from the 
individual’s agenda). The implication here is that initial gains should be made through 
reducing the cost of each security task, and therefore slowing the rate of spending of the 
Compliance Budget. The most effective way to do this is to improve the design and 
integration of the security system. In order to do this effectively tools must be put in to place 
to allow security decision makers to systematically consider ways of making these 
80 
 
 
improvements. In particular data on how differing design and policy options affect user 
effort must be collected, and a representation of the system must be created that allows 
trade-offs between factors to be considered. These needs are addressed in Sections 5 and 6 of 
this thesis. The Compliance Budget therefore forms a key part of the motivation for the other 
sections of research. 
 
The effect of the Compliance Budget and Compliance Threshold is to place a cap on the 
effectiveness of an organisation’s security policy – the compliance limit. Once this threshold 
is reached, several outcomes can result, of varying significance. Firstly, adding in further 
security measures that require compliance from ‘overspent’ individuals are unlikely to 
improve security, unless they are heavily monitored and enforced. Secondly, in cases where 
adding a new measure breaches the Compliance Threshold,  not only will the new measure 
have no effect, but existing security measures will be become significantly less effective as 
individuals lose patience even with security tasks they were previously willing to 
undertake. 
 
4.6 Implications of the theory 
 
The results of the empirical study allow four main conclusions to be drawn: 
 
1. An individual’s Compliance Budget sets a cap on the effecitveness of security 
practices they are involved in. This is because - once the threshold is crossed - the 
individual will chose work-arounds motivated by his or her own needs, rather than 
the more altruistic process of compliance. 
 
2. The closer an individual comes to crossing the Compliance Threshold, the higher the 
organisational cost of achieving compliance will be. This cost may come in the form 
of an increased need for monitoring and sanctions, and/or a passive cost in the form 
of increased stress and reduced goodwill. 
 
3. The organisaton can influence individuals’ perception of where the threshold lies, 
and how fast that threshold is reached, through an understanding of the decision-
making and feedback cycles associated with a compliance. 
 
4. The organisation can employ economic reasoning to ensure the available budget is 
used to achieve compliance in areas where it matters most. A possible outline for 
these cycles is presented as part of this conclusion. 
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Figure 4 illustrates the effect of the Compliance Threshold on the effort required to ensure 
continuing compliance. The closer an individual is to his or her Compliance Threshold, in 
terms of effort already spent on secondary tasks, the higher the perceived cost of each task 
will be. This means that to ensure compliance, the organisation will have to expend more 
effort or resources on monitoring/sanctions etc. Once an individual is pushed passed his 
Compliance Threshold, it becomes very difficult to ensure compliance as the individual will 
be continually seeking ways to reduce the burden of compliance. The possible responses of 
the individual vary in severity and can be hard to predict, not least of all because the budget 
threshold is not a hard limit and reacts more elastically to pressure. For example, individuals 
may be willing to accept exceeding the Compliance Threshold for a short term if provided 
with sufficient motivation (increased remuneration, promise of future perks etc.).  
User effort expended on secondary tasks
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Figure 4: The effect of the Compliance Threshold on organisational effort required to achieve 
compliance. Effort rises as we approach the threshold and rises dramatically once it is crossed 
 
If the budget is exceeded for longer they may continue to undertake their current 
compliance tasks, but begin to look for ways to undermine or get back at the organization 
(this may be termed ‘spiteful compliance’). In extreme cases, the individual will effectively 
cease to comply whenever possible, and focus on his or her own goals entirely. His or her 
last resort is, of course, to simply leave the organization. 
 
In Figure 5, it can be seen how the effectiveness of the security system changes with the costs 
placed on the individual. It is important to recognise that it is perceived cost that is important. 
The individual is making decisions from a personal perspective, so it is the impression of the 
costs placed upon him that is relevant. Adding new security measures will place some 
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burden on the individuals using or encountering them. This will increase security in the 
organisation if they are used effectively and in the intended manner. However, as the 
Compliance Threshold approaches, the rate of gain of effectiveness starts to slow as the 
individual perceives a higher cost to each new task. This implies a situation of diminishing 
returns when deploying security measures. Once we cross the threshold, the individual may 
choose to remove himself from the security process, at which point the effectiveness of the 
system drops dramatically. Now not only are new measures ineffective, but previously-
performed tasks may be neglected. The level of effectiveness does not return to zero because 
in the course of normal business practice certain security measures will still be undertaken 
(such as using a password to log in to the network) even though minimal effort is being 
expended on security per se. Additionally, we are now operating in the grey area discussed 
above, where individual responses to exceeding the budget are hard to predict. The innate 
flexibility and mobility of the budget limit itself also contributes to the uncertainty.  
 
Figure 5: How perceived individual costs relate to effectiveness of security. Alternative rates of 
compliance expenditure are also shown for comparison. Once the Compliance Threshold is crossed 
security effectiveness drops sharply as altruistic behaviour is increasingly exchanged for selfish 
options 
 
The initial gradient of the lines indicates how fast the security budget is being spent in each 
scenario. The more each task costs, the faster the budget is used up and the lower the 
gradient of the line. If each task costs relatively less we spend the budget slower and the 
gradient of the line increases. We can achieve better security behaviour, and a better return 
on security, for the same level of effort. By changing the rate of spending (for example by 
reducing the cost of each task through better system design), it is possible to alter the how 
83 
 
 
effective it is possible to make the security of the system before this breakdown takes place. 
This is illustrated by the ‘lower spending rate’ line in Figure 5. When compared to the 
‘normal spending rate’ we can see that this line ascends more rapidly, reaching a higher 
level of effective security before reaching the budget threshold – we progress faster 
vertically relative to the horizontal consumption of compliance effort. 
 
Spending the budget at a faster rate by implementing security tasks that conflict with the 
business process or are poorly integrated with the daily routines of the workforce lead to a 
lower maximum level of security (we are able to implement fewer security policies before 
the threshold is reached). This is shown by the ‘faster spending rate’ line. In this scenario 
security measures are more costly to the user and so at the point that the Compliance Budget 
threshold is reached, the effective security is below that of the other more efficient spending 
rates. 
 
So how is the Compliance Budget set, and how can the rate of expenditure be influenced? In 
answering these questions we must be aware that these are not set values. They exist in a 
dynamic situation and are subject to constant change and revision. The results of previous 
compliance decisions, and the organisational environment, all contribute to the maintenance 
and expenditure rates of the Compliance Budget. This is illustrated in Figures 6 and 7. 
 
 
Figure 6: Feedback cycle for the individual. Positive compliance decisions increase the weight given 
to individual costs. Negative compliance decisions increase the weight given to individual benefits 
 
The factors that may be considered in a single decision are shown in Figure 6. In figure 7 we 
can see how the organisational environment impacts on the cost/benefit analysis performed 
by the individual through those factors. Improving system design, and creating a positive 
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security culture, will simultaneously decrease the perceived cost of security tasks, and lower 
the rate of expenditure of the Compliance Budget. On the other hand, increasing sanctions 
and monitoring will give more weight to the benefits associated with compliance. Measures 
associated with either side of this cycle increase the likelihood of a positive compliance 
decision in the future. 
 
Figure 7: How organisational factors can be used to increase the likelihood of compliance. Improving 
system design and creating a security culture decrease the perceived cost of compliance. Harsher 
sanctions and monitoring increase the perceived benefits of compliance 
 
4.7 Effective Compliance Budget management 
 
Targeting research questions 3, “How can we maximise security when human behaviour is taken 
into account?” this section examines the implications of the Compliance Budget in the context 
of making security management decisions. In that security systems are, by and large, reliant 
on user effort and co-operation to drive them, the Compliance Budget places a cap on how 
much security can be supported by a user base. Spending user effort (and therefore 
compliance) in the most efficient way possible to maximise effective security before the 
Compliance Threshold is reached is critical. Some ways to approach this are discussed here. 
 
The Compliance Budget is consumed when secondary tasks interrupt the user’s primary 
task. While other secondary tasks can also be considered, the focus of this research is solely 
on security. In order to minimise the rate of spending of the Compliance Budget security 
managers should understand that for the vast majority of their users security is a secondary 
task. As such, any security task will be seen as an additional cost, and the degree to which 
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that task interrupts, delays or prevents the user’s primary task determines how much 
perceived effort that task consumes. 
 
Clearly not all such interruptions will be avoidable and the Compliance Budget, while finite, 
is not an empty resource. Effective management therefore involves selecting where and 
when these interruptions take place, rather than seeking to remove them entirely. Examples 
from both the literature and the empirical study outlined in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 illustrated 
that compliance issues most commonly arise when security mechanisms are perceived to 
prevent the user from being productive. Again the notion of individual perception is 
important. Understanding the core concepts of the Compliance Budget will allow managers 
to anticipate the existence of ‘hotspots’ of friction where the effort that following security 
policy requires is considered excessive by users. Data gathering techniques such as the semi-
structured interviews used in the empirical study (see Section 4.3) that underlies the 
Compliance Budget can bring to light these hotspots. Once they are identified they can be 
managed. The appropriate management of these problem areas will depend on the nature of 
the hotspot in question. Let us consider some of the issues raised in Section 4.3 through the 
lens of the Compliance Budget. 
 
Section 4.3.1.1 presented interview quotes relating to centrally scheduled maintenance tasks, 
such as automated virus scans and remotely delivered patches. The prevailing opinion in 
the interviews was that such processes detrimentally interrupt the production tasks of the 
organisation. The primary complaint was that the timing of the procedure was inconvenient, 
not that the procedure was unnecessary per se. The Compliance Budget tells us that 
perceived temporal load in this case is high – employees are frustrated by the “tiresome” 
nature of the task and are concerned that “Anything that loses time is not good for the business.” 
Additionally, they are under the impression that multiple departments are running scans of 
some kind at different times, leading to inefficiencies. The goal of the security manager 
following Compliance Budget model is therefore to reduce the temporal burden of these 
managers by restructuring the way such maintenance tasks are scheduled. Removal of the 
tasks is not a requirement under the Compliance Budget. 
 
Some of the employees mentioned that they would be happy to re-organise their work to 
accommodate the required tasks if there was more flexibility. A possible solution then 
would be to require the task to be initiated within a window of 4 hours but for the exact 
timing of the task to be at the user’s discretion. If multiple maintenance tasks are required 
then bundling them together, where possible, would again minimise the amount of time a 
user loses control of their machine – another key factor in creating frustration. In this case 
the onus is on the organisation to effect change in order to remove the perception that such 
maintenance tasks are “stopping people from getting their work done.” The Compliance Budget 
facilitates management decisions that achieve this aim by identifying the factors that drive 
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this perception and removing them. In particular in this case it has allowed us to identify 
concrete systemic factors that can be addressed structurally at the organisational level. 
 
In contrast to the organisational-based solution that the Compliance Budget indicates would 
be optimal in the scenario above Section 4.3.1.3 presents a case in which a different 
management approach is required. The security control under discussion here is the use of 
encryption for data storage and transfer, specifically USB sticks. The feedback generated 
during the interviews indicates that employees feel that the perceived costs associated with 
encryption are related to a loss of availability with regards to their data. Comments such as 
“I just feel a lack of control because most of the time the threat is unavailability created by the 
encryption system,” indicate that a change in the system will not reduce the costs in the 
Compliance Budget model and therefore will not lead to a rebalanced cost/benefit 
calculation that favours compliance. From a technical standpoint there is no reason not to 
‘trust’ encryption yet this distrust exists. As such, to manage this situation through the 
Compliance Budget rather than seeking to change the system the correct route would be to 
target the user’s understanding of encryption. By targeting the distrust through education 
and training (one instance where this approach can be useful) the fear of availability loss can 
be removed and the cost/benefit equation altered in favour of compliance. Again the 
Compliance Budget allows us to understand the factors influencing the compliance decision 
and select a management strategy that works on those factors. 
 
A more complex situation is presented in Section 4.3.1.4 in which the company firewall 
blocks ports necessary for software testing. Here the lack of flexibility in the configuration of 
the firewall left the employee feeling like they were justified in disabling the firewall 
because it so clearly conflicted with their primary task. In this case the manager could decide 
to remove the ability to disable the firewall. However, this will strongly negatively impact 
the primary task of that individual leading to a high cost to their compliance budget. It also 
removes control over the user’s machine which as we saw above is a common cause of 
frustration. This has a knock-on effect on the user’s Compliance Threshold due to this 
frustration. This can be likened to a lowering of their loyalty to the organisation as the user 
sees the organisation as a source of difficulty that hinders their work instead of facilitating it. 
Factors such as loyalty to the organisation and understanding of the threat environment 
affect the total Compliance Budget available. While enforcing the firewall rules may make 
sense from a purely security perspective the Compliance Budget model indicates that this 
will reduce the individual’s Compliance Threshold as well as using up a section of the 
Compliance Budget. 
 
Good management therefore involves ensuring that where possible secondary tasks conflict 
as little as possible with the primary task, and where this is not possible to ensure 
individuals have the highest available Compliance Threshold. The goal is not to weaken 
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security but to look for decision points where currently there is an unnecessary effort burden 
placed on the user and to mitigate that burden. The requirement to engage in trade-offs lies 
at the heart of this process of review. In the case of our firewall would unblocking the ports 
required by the software test open up vulnerabilities with a greater potential risk than the 
actions the user is taking to cope with them being closed? In that they are disabling the 
firewall altogether here the trade-off, seen through the lens of the Compliance Budget, seems 
clear, that they should re-enable the company firewall and the port should be opened. This 
view is simplistic and considers only one aspect but by iterating through this process a 
better solution can be reached. The mistake would be to try to force the user to conform to 
the existing policy. Not only does this contravene HCI principles but it will reduce their 
Compliance Threshold, negatively impacting future compliance decisions. 
 
Failing to take the Compliance Budget in to account will introduce systemic vulnerabilities 
in an organisation’s security. Workarounds developed by the user will be done so without 
expert security knowledge or a particular motivation to be secure. In most cases these 
actions will not be malicious but seen as a necessity by the individual. Users will seek to 
complete their primary task in some form. If they are pushed past their Compliance 
Threshold then the activities associated with their primary task will where possible take 
place outside the boundaries of the security system – an unwanted outcome produced by 
negative incentives. One of the primary objectives of the Compliance Budget is to 
demonstrate that such outcomes are not the product of poor user education or motivation 
but are the inevitable product of the security system itself. This understanding is critical if 
more optimal security decisions are to be made. 
 
4.8 Operationalising the Compliance Budget 
 
The discussion above shows how the thinking of a security manager in the case of centrally 
scheduled maintenance tasks, encrypted storage and firewall configuration should be 
influenced by the Compliance Budget. In each case a trade-off is considered and a decision 
made that seeks to find the optimal point along the spectrum of options. While the 
Compliance Budget in its current form can highlight the factors that influence a compliance 
decision, and give insight in to which management methods may be most appropriate what 
it cannot do is aid in the specifics of a decision. That is to say its contribution to security 
management is at a relatively high level. In order to ‘operationalize’ the Compliance Budget 
as a tool for supporting the real-world decision making of security managers an extra step is 
needed. 
 
To optimise security within the Compliance Budget model managers should seek to spend 
user effort up to the Compliance Threshold as minimally and efficiently as possible. This 
should be done firstly by minimising friction with the primary process, typically by 
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choosing appropriate controls and strategies, and by implementing them in such a way as to 
avoid placing unnecessary burdens on the user (as discussed in Section 4.7). However, in 
order quantify the effort associated with each control, so that such decisions can be made, 
the Compliance Budget must be supported by empirical data. Specifically the burden placed 
on the user by various mechanisms must be examined empirically and with sufficient 
granularity that a range of policy options can be systematically compared. The volume of 
data required to fully characterise all the situations in which the Compliance Budget can be 
applied is vast; far beyond the scope of this thesis (although much of this burden can and 
should be shouldered by organisations wishing to pursues this management model). 
However, it is useful to examine the types of experiments that may be required and discuss 
how the results can be interpreted within the Compliance Budget framework. This objective 
will be addressed in Chapter 5. 
 
It is also necessary to create a representation of the system in which the compliance 
decisions are taking place. The Compliance Budget offers security decision makers a model 
for user decision making that allows them to influence the outcome of compliance decisions. 
This is done through improving security design and managing the factors that impact on the 
user’s perception of the costs and benefits associated with compliance. However, user 
behaviour is not the only component of a system. It is, as was demonstrated in the literature 
review (in particular see Section 2.4.4), a component that is both important and too often 
neglected, but it does not exist in isolation. Therefore, as well as a comprehensive data 
collection programme that addresses the need for metrics of user effort, a framework for 
representing the Compliance Budget model for human behaviour alongside technical 
considerations is also essential for systematic decision making. This framework should allow 
decision makers to consider the trade-offs between the business and security processes, and 
examine how policy changes will impact user behaviour. Chapter 6 presents an example of 
such a framework and thus represents a possible method for positioning the Compliance 
Budget alongside more traditional tools such as systems modelling. 
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5. Data Collection 
 
In chapter 4 introduced the idea was introduced that user effort is a limited resource in the 
form of the Compliance Budget model, and that – to best serve the utility of his organisation 
– a security manager needs to manage this resource. This process involves making trade-offs 
at the policy level between various security mechanisms to ensure a good balance between 
the level of security mandated by the security policy of the organisation, and the burden that 
the policy places onto the organisation’s employees. A policy that overburdens users will 
undermine security as they will adopt workarounds to cope with the pressure. It is 
necessary for security managers to consider how the requirements of the policy incentivise 
user behaviour and make the necessary trade-offs to ensure that users are not pushed into 
insecure behaviour, all the while meeting the security needs of the organisation. This is not 
an easy task however, and to understand and evaluate these trade-offs, security managers 
need access to more fully developed metrics. In particular the user effort associated with the 
various mechanisms they are considering is a requirement if a systematic decision making 
process is to put in place. 
 
Such metrics must be built on valid empirical data – it can be described as a security version 
of the keystroke-level model in HCI [16], which comes with a catalogue of execution times 
for different interaction tasks, based on how practised a user is. Building such a database 
will require a huge data set, the collection of which is outside the scope of a single PhD 
thesis. Nevertheless it was useful to carry out data collection as part of this research in order 
to demonstrate the types of data that are relevant to problems addressed, and the associated 
methods of collection. The completion of this goal is the primary aim of this chapter. Data 
collection also serves the secondary purpose of contributing to wider data set necessary for 
supporting systematic decision making. Within the Trust Economics project, further data 
was collected on password habits and use [38, 39] and the data collected and presented here 
can be seen as a companion set to that. 
 
While the conclusions drawn from such data are to some degree generalisable it is worth 
noting that the specific nature of the primary task and the context of use effect the impact 
that a particular policy or mechanism has on the user. Therefore larger organisations would 
gain more accurate measurements of impact by building their own specific data sets using 
the kinds of techniques discussed in this section. 
 
These studies conducted to collect a set of example data focused on one security mechanism: 
passwords. Passwords are still in widely used, and there is no sign of this changing in the 
near future. This makes them a useful mechanism to target, because results will be relevant 
to security decision-makers in companies – a focus of this project. Additionally, passwords 
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have attributes, such as length and characters used to compose them, which can be directly 
controlled by the experimenter through the instructions issued to participants during the 
recruitment phase of the study. As discussed in Section 3.1 the ability to control variables is 
advantageous when wishing to assess task performance. Password entry is also an atomic 
security task that is generalisable, at least for non-disabled users on standard keyboards. 
This makes passwords a relatively simple focus of empirical experimentation. 
 
In comparison to the other chapters of this thesis the work reported in this chapter focuses 
on a specific problem – the relationship between password length and complexity and the 
effort required to use that password. As such, a more focused research question is required: 
 
Research Question 5: Does password length or password complexity have a greater effect 
on the user effort associated with remembering and entering a password? 
 
This question can be seen to underpin research questions 3 and 4, focusing on a specific 
aspect of those questions. In the same way this chapter underpins Chapter 4 and the 
Compliance Budget by investigating the impact of a single security policy decision. As was 
expressed in Section 4.8 in order to function as an operational tool to support decision 
making the Compliance Budget must be grounded with empirical data. The Compliance 
Budget states that user effort should be spent as efficiently as possible and here we can look 
at that approach in practise. 
 
The security delivered by a password is linked to its length and complexity, against certain 
kinds of attacks (clearly a phishing attack, for example, is effective regardless of how long or 
complex the password is). Security policies have different length and complexity 
requirements. A policy that requires long but simple passwords may deliver equivalent 
security to a policy that mandates short but complex passwords. However, the two policies, 
given the nature of human memory, will place differing effort burdens on users. As was 
discussed in section 4.7 effective compliance management using the Compliance Budget 
model involves avoiding placing unnecessary burdens on the user. In order to know which 
policy should be selected it is necessary to determine whether password length or 
complexity burdens users more. The following sections will present methods of data 
collection, and an empirical data set, which will allow a security manager to effectively and 
systematically make that decision. 
 
5.1 Data collection methods 
 
An experimenter faces a set of decisions when considering the collection of empirical data. 
At one end of the spectrum, laboratory experiments offer precise control over the 
environment the experiment takes place in, and the stimuli and tasks presented to the 
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participants. This ensures that, as the conditions under which the data are collected are 
controlled, when a condition is varied by the experimenter and difference in the results will 
be a product of this variation. At the other end of his continuum, conducting experiments in 
real-world environments allows data to be gathered that most closely matches the day to 
day lived experience of the subjects. However, as not all the conditions of environment are 
under the control of the experimenter any differences observed in the results cannot always 
be assigned to the variations in the experimental conditions. Both approaches have 
drawbacks; laboratory experiments lack real-world validity and field studies will almost 
certainly involve dealing with confounding variables. Laboratory experiments also have a 
tendency to overestimate the performance of those that take part in them, because 
distractions available in the real world do not affect participants. For security experiments, 
there is also the question of experimental design: if the experiment only investigates 
participant performance with the security task, the data gathered might over-estimate 
performance because security is very rarely a primary task for those undertaking the 
activities it demands (as discussed in Sections 2.2 and 4.4). Data collected in real-world 
environments does not have this limitation – the participants will be involved in their 
normal routine, and the tasks studied should be afforded a similar level of priority to 
security tasks when they are routinely encountered. However, data collection under such 
conditions has many challenges: the experimenter has no control over environmental 
factors, and may not be able to capture all the factors and distractions that affect 
participants’ performance. 
 
With this in mind I set out to gather data in such a way as to minimise these limitations. In 
order to do this rather than focusing on a single avenue of data collection a mixed approach 
was taken. The purpose of these experiments was not to collect a single unified data set but 
to develop and refine techniques that could be used and extended as part of the Trust 
Economics project for wider data gathering efforts. The following sections describe the two 
experimental methods and the results gained. 
 
5.2 Laboratory password entry experiments 
 
The first set of empirical data gathered as part of this thesis was motivated by the need for 
supporting data on human effort to underpin the Compliance Budget. The Compliance 
Budget states that, faced with security tasks, users make an implicit cost/benefit decision. A 
key factor in this decision making is how close they are to their Compliance Threshold, the 
point at which their available effort for tasks outside their primary goals is exhausted. 
Pushing users over this threshold has strong negative consequences for the organisation 
because users who are over the threshold are less likely to comply, so it is in decision-
maker’s interest to avoid doing so. We need to be able to quantify the effort users have to 
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expend on security measures. This quantification will naturally be subjective; a measure of 
how the user views the task relative to other activities they may have to undertake and 
contextualised by the situation in which the task takes place. An objective measure of the 
effort involved is not useful in this context as objective information of this kind is not 
factored in to an individual user’s decision-making process. Deriving a measure of absolute 
user effort in any context, let along information security, is a task sufficiently complex and 
challenging as to be rendered impractical. This is in a large part due to the lack of viable 
methods for directly measuring individual effort in any way other than purely physical 
terms (such as the work done in Joules). However, effort of the kind we are concerned with, 
although it relies on self-evaluation and is therefore no means objective, can be measured 
with sufficient accuracy through careful use of the appropriate techniques – such as 
carefully documented laboratory-based experiments. These measurements can be taken as a 
reasonably reliable basis for predictions of user performance and reactions. A relative notion 
of effort is an achievable goal and one that still facilitates the improvement of security 
decision making. For example, it allows the comparison of two different policies with a view 
to identifying which places the higher burden on the user. 
 
The aim of the studies conducted was to obtain on how altering a password policy affects a 
user operating under that policy. The following stages would be needed to address this 
issue: 
 
1. Identify variables that affect the effort required to use passwords 
2. Determine from this list which variables can be controlled by policy 
3. Select those variables that can be realistically and systematically manipulated for the 
study 
4. Ascertain how user performance varies as the variables change 
 
The outcomes of these stages are addressed in the sections below. 
 
5.2.1 Experimental Design 
 
5.2.1.1 Password-related effort 
 
Passwords are in widespread and continual use in modern society and are found in both 
commercial and social environments. Anyone using a computer today is most likely to have 
to interact with multiple services that require a password to use with relative frequency. 
Florencio and Herley [22] report that users have an average of 25 password-controlled 
accounts, with password re-use being common. This implies that the number of passwords a 
user has increases the difficulty of use, leading to password re-use when multiple accounts 
are present. This then is one factor relating to password effort. 
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In addition the composition and structure of the password will affect its memorability, with 
more complex passwords being harder to recall. Thus to number of passwords in use we can 
add the following factors to the list of those affecting password-related effort: 
 
- Password length 
- Complexity of composition 
- Meaningfulness 
 
Complexity of composition here refers to the number of different character sets from which the 
password had to be drawn; the most complex passwords have to contain at least one from 
all sets (lower case letters, upper case letters, numbers and symbols). The vast majority of 
passwords are still entered via a keyboard, though with the rise of tablets and smartphones, 
the number of users who have to enter them via soft keyboards is increasing – and on soft 
keyboards, complex passwords require even more effort than on traditional ones. This 
highlights why different measurements are required for different combinations of users, 
tasks, systems and contexts – the use of a soft keyboard creates a different perceptual-motor 
task compared to standard keyboard entry, and this must be recognised experimentally. 
 
Meaningfulness here refers to the degree to which the password is contains information that 
carries meaning for the user, and is thus easier to recall. Most users find it easier to recall 
passwords with meaningful content [61], though whether a password is meaningful is 
subjective, since some users have strategies for password generation that create meaningful 
passwords without using visible known words. For instance, a user may take a memorable 
quote or phrase, and take the first (or second, or last etc.) letter of each word as the 
password. For example, ‘we who are about to die salute you’ (the widely accepted, although 
historically questionable, phrase spoken by Roman gladiators) becomes ‘wwaatdsy’. While 
this may appear the product of a nonsensical, or even random, process to an observer 
unfamiliar with the method of its construction, it retains a high level of meaning for its 
creator. Obviously using very well-known phrases for this method will yield weaker 
passwords as they can be derived in the same way by someone building up a dictionary of 
such constructions for use in an attack. A machine-generated password of randomly 
assigned characters would exist at one end of this spectrum while a straightforward 
dictionary word would mark an opposing point. Passphrases as described above would 
occupy some middle point. 
 
Frequency of use also affects memorability [61, 76, 82]: a password that is used often will be 
encoded in long-term memory leading to automatic rather than conscious recall. As 
automatic recall is easier than conscious recall (with muscle memory also playing a part 
when entering passwords) a password that is used frequently will require less effort to use 
successfully than one that is used infrequently. This concept also links to how long a 
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password is in use: one that has been in use for some time and has been retrieved regularly 
will require less effort than one that has been in use for a short period of time. Thus, a new 
password will require more effort until it has become familiar enough to be accessed with 
automatic recall. From this I also hypothesise that changing a password more frequently will 
increase user effort as the password in use will spend less time in the automatic recall stage 
and more time in the newer learning stage. 
 
The factors that contribute to password effort, as distilled from the literature [61, 76] are: 
 
1. Number of passwords in use by the user 
2. Password length 
3. Complexity of construction 
4. Randomness of Construction 
5. Level of user input in generation 
6. Frequency with which passwords are used 
7. The duration for which passwords are kept in use 
 
Of these, Factor 1 cannot be set as a matter of policy in absolute terms, although a security 
manager can control the number of passwords used within an organisation – for example by 
choosing between a single sign on approach or having one password for each service. As 
this study aims to provide data to support security decision-making, this factor is less 
relevant than the others, which can be set through a security policy. Additionally, this factor 
cannot be practically controlled for in a laboratory environment. While it would be possible 
to pre-test participants, ask them how many passwords they have, and from this filter them 
down based on the requirements of the study I considered this to be likely to overly limit the 
amount of participants available. As subject recruitment can be challenging (and potentially 
expensive if remuneration is offered for taking part in the pre-test) I did not consider this 
approach to be feasible for this study. 
 
Factors 2 – 5 can all be controlled for in a laboratory-based study and a subset of these will 
form the basis of the variables used in the experimental conditions. Factor 6 will require a 
longer term study using a different methodology – we will return to this in section 4.2. 
Factor 7 could be controlled for in a very long term study but this is outside the scope and 
resources of this thesis and so will not be considered. The factors that will be used in the 
study are: 
 
1. Password length 
2. Complexity of construction 
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5.2.1.2 Experimental conditions 
 
With a key goal of the study being to be able to compare the impact of password policies it 
was decided to ask participants to generate and register two different passwords with the 
experimenter, each one conforming to a different policy. They were also asked not to re-use 
one of their existing passwords. The policies were chosen in consultation with the industrial 
partners of the Trust Economics project who wished to compare two policies that were in 
use at the time with a view to ascertaining which was the more difficult for the workforce to 
use. The two policies were: 
Policy 1: 
 
Users must choose passwords that are at least six (6) characters in length and contain at least 
three (3) of the following categories: 
 
- Upper case letters (A, B, C, . Z) 
- Lower case letters (a, b, c, . z) 
- Numbers (0, 1, 2, . 9) 
- Non-alphanumeric. The following non-alphanumeric characters are safe across all platforms: 
- ! (exclamation point), + (plus), ; (semi-colon), - (minus), % (per cent),  
- : (colon), $ (dollar) 
 
Policy 2: 
 
Password constructed MUST consist of the following characteristics: 
 
1. Minimum length of 8 characters 
2. Chosen from any acceptable character sets available on the target system 
3. Includes at least one alphabetic and one numeric character 
 
The wording of the policies was taken directly from the policies in use in the industrial 
partner organisations. Policy 1 requires a shorter but more complex password, whereas 
Policy 2 requires a longer but simpler selection. Performance and effort ratings would be 
gathered for both policies and compared. 
 
5.2.1.3 Data collection tools 
 
Two pieces of software were used during the study to assist in the gathering of performance 
and effort data. In order to gather accurate performance data I decided to use a piece of 
modified key logger software developed by Roy Maxion at Carnegie Mellon University. The 
Maxion Text Prompter (MTP) (as used in [46]) is a locally installed logging program that 
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stores precise keystroke information including accurate timings of when a key is activated 
and released. A series of prompts, the display of which is modified through a configuration 
file, are shown on screen and the user is required to enter the correct text string in order to 
progress. Using this software allowed me to assess performance in terms of the time taken to 
enter the passwords correctly and the number and type of errors made. 
 
The MTP configuration files allowed close control over both what is displayed on the screen 
for the participants and the conditions under which the user can progress to the next screen. 
This can vary from a requirement to enter the prompted text exactly or to allow any text 
string as the correct answer. This allows MTP to be used to store subject data such as their 
name as well as for distraction tasks such as general knowledge questions where a correct 
answer is not a necessary part of the experiment. An example configuration file can be found 
in Appendix A. 
 
Effort data was gathered through the NASA Task Load Index (TLX) [52]. This is a subjective 
workload assessment that derives an overall workload score based on a weighted average of 
ratings on six subscales: Mental Demands, Physical Demands, Temporal Demands, Own 
Performance, Effort and Frustration. The definitions given in Table 1 below were used 
during the experiment and were given to the subjects on a references sheet: 
 
A software version of the TLX procedure was downloaded and locally installed for use 
during the study. The TLX scoring systems is based on two separate tasks, a ratings tasks and 
a weights task. This terminology is taken from the NASA TLX documentation and was used 
here in the same fashion, despite being arguably somewhat counterintuitive. This is because 
the descriptions of some of the factors do not seem to apply to the process of entering a 
password. The description for physical effort, “How much physical activity was required (e.g., 
pushing, pulling, turning, controlling, activating, etc.)?” is one example. The weights task is 
presented to the participants first: participants are asked to evaluate the contribution of each 
of the above factors (mental load etc.) to the workload of the task. They are presented with 
pairwise comparisons of the six scales, and asked to select the pair that contributes most to 
the workload of the task. This is repeated for each of the 15 possible comparisons of the 
scales. A score between 0 (not relevant) and 5 (most relevant) is then awarded to each factor 
representing a tally of how many times they were selected during the pairwise comparisons. 
The ratings task is conducted second: participants are asked to assign numerical ratings to 
each scale that reflect the magnitude of that factor in the task. Participants are presented 
with scale graduated into 20 equal intervals and marked ‘high’ and ‘low’ at the two end 
points. Responses are marked on the scales by the participants at the point they feel 
represents the magnitude of the task. 
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Title Endpoints Descriptions 
   
MENTAL DEMAND Low/High How much mental and perceptual activity 
was required (e.g., thinking, deciding, 
calculating, remembering, looking, 
searching, etc.)? Was the task easy or 
demanding, simple or complex, exacting 
or forgiving? 
 
PHYSICAL  
DEMAND 
Low/High How much physical activity was required 
(e.g., pushing, pulling, turning, 
controlling, activating, etc.)? Was the task 
easy or demanding, slow or brisk, slack or 
strenuous, restful or laborious? 
 
TEMPORAL  
DEMAND 
Low/High How much time pressure did you feel due 
to the rate or pace at which the tasks or 
task elements occurred? Was the pace 
slow and leisurely or rapid and frantic? 
 
EFFORT Low/High How hard did you have to work (mentally 
and physically) to accomplish your level 
of performance? 
 
PERFORMANCE Good/Poor How successful do you think you were in 
accomplishing the goals of the task set by 
the experimenter (or yourself)? How 
satisfied were you with your performance 
in accomplishing these goals? 
 
FRUSTRATION  
LEVEL 
Low/High How insecure, discouraged, irritated, 
stressed and annoyed versus secure, 
gratified, content, relaxed and complacent 
did you feel during the task? 
 
Table 1: Definitions of the subscales used in the NASA TLX Weights task 
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The overall workload is computed by multiplying each rating by the weight given to that 
factor by the participant. The sum of the weighted ratings for each task is divided by the 
sum of the weights (15) to deliver a single final score for workload. 
 
The TLX task was included as both a distraction task from the primary password entry 
tasks, and to measure how participants perceived the effort involved in using each 
password policy. The task was used without modification, as developed by the authors and 
presented in [28, 29] (With hindsight, this was a mistake, as will be discussed in Section 5.3). 
 
5.2.1.4 Experimental procedure 
 
In total, 21 participants successfully completed the experiment. Once they had registered 
two passwords that conformed to the policies in Section 4.1.1.2 participants were invited to 
attend a laboratory session in which they would use the registered passwords through 
interaction with the MTP software. They were asked to ensure they could recall the 
passwords without memory aids before they attended the session. This section of the study 
involved 7 phases. These were as follows: 
 
1. Repeated entry of the policy 1 password: In order to familiarise the subjects with this 
password they were asked to enter the policy 1 password correctly 10 times. 
Incorrect entry attempts were logged by the MTP software but did not count toward 
the total. Once 10 successful entries had been achieved they subjects were moved on 
to the next phase. 
 
2. Repeated entry of the policy 2 password: This phase functioned in the same way as 
phase 1 except with the second password. The order in which the subjects were 
presented with these tasks was varied systematically through the study so half the 
subjects were asked for password 1 then 2, and half for password 2 then 1. 
 
3. General knowledge distraction task: Here subjects were asked to alternately enter the 
two passwords, with a general knowledge question presented after each password 
entry. An accurate password entry was required to move on to the question but it 
was not required to correctly answer the general knowledge question to proceed. The 
general knowledge questions were multiple choice and were taken from a Guardian 
newspaper article that gave the questions asked in a game of ‘Who Wants to be a 
Millionaire’. There were 10 questions in total so each password was entered 5 times. 
 
4. Policy 1 password entry followed by NASA TLX task: Subjects were asked to enter 
their policy 1 password then the MTP software was minimised and subjects were 
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shown the TLX software. They then entered their effort ratings for this password by 
answering comparative questions posed by the TLX system. 
 
5. Policy 2 password entry followed by NASA TLX task: This phase followed the same 
procedure as Phase 4 except for the second password. Again the order in which 
participants were presented with these tasks was systematically varied between 
subjects. 
 
6. Repeated entry of the policy 1 password: Mirroring phase 1 subjects were again 
asked to correctly enter their policy 1 password correctly 10 times. Whereas the 
phase 1 was seen as a familiarisation task this phase was intended to be a recall task 
that would more closely mirror the performance with a password that was already in 
regular use by the user. 
 
7. Repeated entry of the policy 2 password. Identical to Phase 6 except with the second 
password. As before the order was systematically varied between subjects. 
 
In all cases the MTP logged the timings and content of the keystrokes used by the 
participants. For each keystroke a ‘make’ event is recorded when the key is pressed and a 
‘break’ event when it is released. Where a key is held down multiple sequential ‘make’ 
events are recorded. 
 
5.2.2 Experimental results 
 
5.2.2.1 Timings 
 
The time taken to enter each password was determined by calculating the difference 
between the timestamp for the ‘make’ event for the first character and the ‘break’ event for 
the last character in the entered string. Incorrect password strings were included in the 
timing data. Due to the varying length of the passwords chosen by the participants, it would 
be meaningless to compare the total time to enter each password. Therefore the total entry 
time was divided by the number of characters to generate a per-character entry time. 
Although typing speeds varied greatly between participants I assumed that typing speed 
was constant within each participant’s data and therefore typing speed would not affect the 
overall results. The following table is a summary of the timing data (all figures to 2 d.p.): 
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 Policy 1 character entry time (s) Policy 2 character entry times (s) 
Repetition Task 1 0.76 0.76 
Distraction Task 0.75 0.75 
Repetition Task 2 0.54 0.52 
 
Table 2: Per-character entry time data 
 
The data clearly shows that there is no appreciable difference in entry times, despite the 
differing requirements of the password policies. It is worth noting here that - although the 
policies had different composition criteria - many participants ended up selecting passwords 
according to a pre-existing generation scheme (following a favourite quote or film title for 
example), meaning that 25 out of the 42 enrolled passwords would have satisfied both 
policies, being both 8 characters and containing 3 different character types. This would also 
contribute to the similarities in timing for the two policies. 
 
5.2.2.2 Errors and false attempt rates 
 
When entering passwords there are two forms of mistake that are recorded by the MTP 
software: 
 
Errors: I define an error as an instance of the participant using the delete or backspace 
key in order to attempt to correct a mistake in the typing. The frequency of such 
events is determined by counting the ‘make’ events for the backspace and delete keys 
in the log files. Successful login attempts can therefore still contain errors as the 
backspace key is used to remove typographical mistakes before correct characters are 
entered. 
 
False Attempt: I define this as an instance of the participant pressing the enter key 
with an incorrect string in the field thereby attempting to submit a password and 
failing. False attempts can contain errors where the correction attempt was 
unsuccessful. 
 
The mean frequency for such mistakes was calculated for each policy and task; the results 
are show in Figures 8 and 9 below: 
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Figure 8: Errors and False Attempts for Policy 1 
 
In both graphs, the patterns of errors are closely related. This implies that although errors 
are being recorded (i.e. participants are attempting to correcting typing mistakes) this 
process does not result in the elimination of incorrect strings being submitted. The exception 
to this is the repetition task for both Policy 1 and 2, both of which show relatively high error 
rates (and in the case of Policy 1 even an increase in errors compared to the distraction task) 
but almost 0 false attempts, implying that the correction process was successful in this task. 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Errors and False Attempts for Policy 2 
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The difference in shape of these graphs indicates that while the per-character entry times for 
the policies were almost identical, the errors they generate are not. This shows that there is a 
difference in usability between the two policies. While initial error and false attempt rates 
are similar the effect of practise and distraction varied between the policies. By the end of 
the second repetition task both policies had achieved almost 0 false attempts this was at the 
cost of more errors for Policy 2. As this policy required longer (but potentially simpler) 
passwords this result implies that increasing the required length of the password creates 
more user errors than adding to the complexity requirement. This is especially noticeable 
with respect to the distraction task which for Policy 2 showed an increase in both error and 
false attempt rates after the first repetition task. Despite having a higher complexity 
requirement Policy 1 showed a drop in false attempt rate with practise, even during the 
distraction task. These results indicate that longer passwords receive less benefit from 
practise and are more vulnerable to errors caused by distraction. 
 
However, as noted in Subsection 5.2.2.1 there was a tendency among participants to over-
fulfil the policy requirements. This adds some confusion to the results and conclusions 
outlined above and deserves further attention. Due to this over-fulfilling the results do not 
indicate what the performance would be if participants followed the policy instructions to 
the letter. While it would have been possible to take greater control of the password 
enrolment process, for example by checking the enrolled passwords and rejecting those that 
over-fulfilled and asking the participant to generate a new password, I decided that it would 
be more interesting to take the opportunity to gather data on password creation. The results 
clearly illustrate that users do not follow password policies to the letter, but instead try to 
comply in a fashion that is workable to them. 
 
Although we asked participants not to reuse passwords that were already in use there was 
nothing to stop them registering passwords that followed the same generation scheme that 
they already employed. Anecdotally, participants reported that the greatest difficulty in 
enrolling a password came from situations in which the policy they were trying to follow 
did not allow them to follow their usual generation scheme, some of which were quite 
creative. One participant registered the password ‘TB’s(x_x)Br’, created from ‘Tim Burton’s 
The Corpse Bride’. Here the use of simple ascii art to represent the corpse creates a 
memorable, and strong password. While our policies allowed such creations the subject in 
question reported that not all policies do, and encountering one such always required extra 
effort. 
 
So how does over-fulfilment affect our analysis? The two policies required either 6 or 8 
characters and 2 or 3 different character sets to be used. In order to consider whether or not a 
password over-fulfils a policy it is necessary to characterise the passwords using the 
following criteria: 
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 Short: The password is less than 8 characters in length 
 Long: The password is 8 or more characters in length 
 Simple: The password uses 2 different characters sets 
 Complex: The password uses 3 or more different character sets 
 
From this list of criteria we can create three categories of passwords: 
 
Short/Complex: A password that fulfils, but does not exceed the requirements for 
Policy 1. The lack of 8 characters makes it ineligible for Policy 2. 
Long/Simple: A password that fulfils, but does not exceed the requirements for Policy 
2. The lack of complexity makes it ineligible for Policy 1. 
Long/Complex: A password that over-fulfils both Policy 1 and 2, satisfying both the 
complexity requirement of Policy 1 and the 8 character requirement of Policy 2. 
 
A Short/Simple password would not satisfy the requirement for either policy and so has not 
been included in the list. Examples of each of these password categories were found in the 
data set. The table below shows the distribution of passwords across the two policies. 
 
Policy/Password 
Category 
Short/Complex Long/Simple Long/Complex 
Policy 1 10 N/A 11 
Policy 2 N/A 6 15 
 
Table 3: Distribution of password categories by policy 
 
As can be seen in Table 3, 26 out of the 42 passwords, or 62%, were Long/Complex and 
therefore over-fulfilled both policies. That the majority of participants decided to over-fulfil 
suggests that password policy may not be the driving force behind the participant’s 
password creation process. This is supported anecdotally by conversations conducted after 
the experiment with the participants. Several participants reported that they had a scheme 
or method for creating new passwords (often based on famous people or meaningful 
phrases) and policies that prevented them using their personal methods were the ones they 
found hardest to use. 
 
Policy 2 was more over-fulfilled, with 71% of passwords being Long/Complex, compared to 
52% for Policy 1. This implies that participants were more reluctant to add length than they 
were to add complexity. We can also analyse the results graphically. 
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Figure 10: Errors and False Attempts for Short/Complex passwords 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Errors and False Attempts for Long/Simple passwords 
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Figure 12: Errors and False Attempts for Long/Complex passwords 
 
The relatively low number of data points for the Short/Complex and Long/Simple categories 
(10 and 6 respectively) gives a low confidence in the conclusions drawn from these graphs. 
In particular a single participant in the Long/Simple condition was responsible for 70% of the 
errors on the distraction task. It is worth noting, however, that all three password conditions 
ended up with similar frequencies of errors and false attempts by the end of Repetition task 
2. In support of the previously drawn conclusions the Short/Complex condition was 
generating fewer errors, and comparable numbers of false attempts, than either of the longer 
conditions. This adds weight to the conclusion that adding length reduces performance 
more significantly than adding complexity. However, further experimentation and analysis 
with larger numbers of participants would be required to draw any firmer conclusion. 
 
5.3 Server-based authentication experiments 
 
To investigate Factor 6 – how password performance changes with frequency of use – a 
different approach was needed; one that did not require participants to visit a laboratory. In 
order to gather data relevant to actual password applications, a much longer time frame 
would be required than a laboratory session was capable of offering. To ask participants to 
return to the laboratory multiple times over a period of weeks would have been impractical 
in terms of both the logistics for both the experimenter and the participant and the budget 
required to remunerate participants on this basis. Additionally, I wanted to move away from 
the artificial nature of laboratory experiments. While such studies allow the experimenter to 
tightly control the environment in which the study takes place they do have drawbacks that 
mean that performance results gained under such conditions should be treated with caution, 
as discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. Foremost among these is that the environmental 
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conditions in which the study takes place are markedly different from the norm, lacking the 
distractions that characterise a normal working environment, such as the demands of 
colleagues, email, telephones and the requirement to complete a primary production task. 
 
To gain data that is both sufficiently objective and gathered under real-world conditions I 
conducted a semi-controlled field trial. In order to investigate how password performance 
changes with frequency of use, I needed record repeated password performance over time. I 
also wanted the participants in these experiments to be able to perform the tasks in their 
normal working context, and for performance data to be directly recorded, rather than 
subjectively through user diaries (See Section 3.2). The solution to these problems was 
developed as part of an MSc student project in which I was involved in an advisory role. The 
result of the project was a piece of software entitled the Authentication Performance 
Evaluation Tool (APET). 
 
5.3.1 The APET software 
 
Full credit for development of this tool goes to Alexandros Trepeklis, a former M.Sc. student 
at UCL), who worked under my supervision, and to a requirements specification and 
conceptual design drawn up by me. 
 
APET is a web-based system that allows authentication experiments to be set up and 
managed remotely. Participants can enrol and take part in authentication trials over any 
Internet connection. The tool is split into two major components, the core system and the 
authentication plugins. 
 
5.3.1.1 The Core 
 
At the heart of APET is an experiment management system tied to a database of 
participants. A researcher can log into the management side of the software and set up an 
experiment. At this stage they can specify its duration, the authentication mechanism 
involved in the experiment (from the current set of plugins), the attributes they wish to log 
(from a selection specified by the authentication plugin, see below) and the participant 
groups they wish to be associated with the experiment. New participants can be added at 
this stage, by submitting their email addresses through a CSV file. Alternatively, the 
database of previous participants can be searched and filtered by a variety of criteria - such 
as age and gender - or by more experiment-specific criteria - such as which studies of 
authentication mechanisms they have previously participated in. Multiple groups can be 
assigned to each experiment. This allows different conditions to be applied to the same 
mechanism, without having to create large numbers of experiments. 
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Once an experiment is active, the researcher can email the participants of their experiments. 
Drop-down menus allow the experiment and participant group to be selected and an 
(editable) message is then sent to the specified group containing a link to the APET system. 
It is via this link that the participants themselves interact with APET. Using any web 
browser from any location, they can follow the link to a page that will ask them for their 
email address. Once they have confirmed their address (and thus that they are taking part in 
the correct experiment) they will be shown a screen containing whichever authentication 
mechanism is being tested. Their performance is then logged to a data file that the 
experimenter can download at the end of the experiment. The participant’s interaction with 
APET is largely controlled by the authentication plugin. 
 
5.3.1.2 Authentication Plugin 
 
Each authentication mechanism used in APET needs to have its own plugin. This allows the 
system to be continually expanded as new technologies are developed without necessarily 
rewriting the core code. The plugin controls what the participants see when the follow the 
link emailed to them. For example, the password plugin can be configured to allow or 
disallow password resets, reminders or any other feature the experimenter wishes. 
Additionally, the plugin specifies which logging options the experimenter has. The logging 
options can be added or removed during the set up phase. The function of the 
authentication mechanism cannot be modified at this time and so to change the functionality 
of the authentication procedure a new plugin would need to be created. Typical logging 
options are such attributes as the number of attempts the participant took to successfully 
authenticate, whether they requested a reset or reminder, and the time and date of the 
authentication attempt. Any attribute can be logged assuming it has been coded into the 
plugin. 
 
5.3.2 Experimental design 
 
Using the APET software with a password plugin allowed me to design an experiment in 
which participants could enrol a password and login to the server when asked from any 
remote location when prompted by an email from the APET system. This removed the 
requirement for participants to attend laboratory sessions and returned the process to its 
more accurate status as a secondary task. Details of their login session were then recorded 
by APET removing the potential inaccuracies resulting from user reporting of data. 
 
15 participants were recruited for the study. The group included both males and females in 
the age range 25-50, with a variety of occupations such as administrator, web developer and 
graphic designer. To demonstrate the fully remote nature of the experimental process two of 
the participants were located in America. I never met any of the participants face-to-face – 
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the entire process of recruitment and task completion was conducted via APET. This study 
was split into three phases – an initial enrolment task followed by two experimental 
sessions, the first of two weeks and the second of one. These sessions were separated by a six 
week gap. The participants were paid £20 for each successfully completed session. 
 
In the enrolment phase the participants were sent a set of instructions (which can be found 
in full in Appendix B) and asked to generate a password that conformed to the following 
simple policy: 
 
- Be at least 6 characters in length. 
- Contain at least 3 of the following categories 
 Upper case letters (A, B, C, . Z) 
 Lower case letters (a, b, c, . z) 
 Numbers (0, 1, 2, . 9) 
 Non-alphanumeric characters (! + ; - % etc.) 
 
This policy is identical to the first policy used in the laboratory experiment. As part of the 
enrolment phase participants also had to successfully complete the login task to ensure that 
they had correctly entered and remembered their password. This data was not used in the 
final analysis. 
 
In the first phase of the experiment participants were send an email once a day every 
working day (Monday to Friday) asking them to login to APET. The daily timing of the 
email varied through the two weeks but always took place within normal working hours to 
ensure that the participants were engaged in their primary task. This was to avoid any sense 
of routine or expectation forming in the minds of the participants regarding they would next 
have to login. Email distribution was under the manual control of the experimenter (as 
opposed to being an automated part of the APET system) so the precise timing of the emails 
can be managed as needed. 
 
During the second phase the participants were sent emails asking them to login three times a 
week (Monday, Wednesday and Friday). The purpose of this second phase was to examine 
the recall rate of a password that was previously well embedded but that hadn’t been used 
for a relatively long period of time. Additionally, I wanted to see if the reduced frequency of 
use affected recall success rate. 
 
In each case the number of attempts taken to successfully log in and the number of 
password resets requested were logged to form the data set for the experiment. For reasons 
of privacy and security the passwords used by the participants were not recorded. 
 
109 
 
 
5.3.3 Server study phase 1 results 
 
One participant made no attempt to recall their password and simply reset their password 
on each of the 10 days of the experiment. This constituted a form of sanctioned non-
compliance, in that participants were told in their instructions that “If you cannot remember 
your password there is an option to reset it. Doing so is perfectly fine and should not be considered 
negative in anyway“.  The intent of this part of the instructions was that participants should 
not feel that being unable to recall was a failure. It was far more preferable for them to 
complete the task using a reset than to disengage from the task altogether. However, I did 
not anticipate that a participant would use the reset option instead of recall completely. 
 
There was no sanction associated this form of non-compliance with the task. Participants 
were incentivised to log-in each day, not to successfully recall their password. The only 
other form of non-compliance available to participants was to not make an attempt to 
authenticate at all. However, participants were only remunerated if they participated in all 
the sessions, making this option unproductive. It was not possible for participants to enrol 
with a password that did not fulfil the policy correctly as the passwords were monitored by 
the experimenter before the sessions started. 
 
The participant that only used resets created an interesting set of data for discussion. 
However I decided not to include them in the numerical analysis, as the data set is uniform – 
the participant contributed a single reset each day. Additionally, the experiment was 
designed to test user performance with passwords, including the recall phase, and so this 
participant does not provide relevant data for that aspect of the study. For these reasons I 
removed the participant from the data set for the following analysis. This participant again 
illustrates that users will interpret the rules in a way that works for them, and not 
necessarily as the policy author intended. 
 
The remaining 16 participants all appeared to make genuine attempts to complete the task, 
although not all participants responded on all of the 10 days. This information is show in 
Table 4.  
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Days responded Number of participants 
10 11 
9 2 
8 1 
7 1 
6 1 
 
Table 4: Server study participant response rates 
 
The mean number of attempts used each day to successfully log in is shown in the Figure 13. 
Excluding the participant the used the reset function instead of recall only 1 password reset 
was requested during the 10 days of Phase 1 of this experiment. This reset was requested on 
the first day of the experiment after the participant had attempted to login 9 times. This is 
the cause of the higher average on Day 1. In all other cases once the password was 
successfully enrolled most participants successfully logged in on their first attempt. In 9 out 
of the 159 recorded login events the participant took 2 attempts to log in. 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Server study Phase 1 log in attempts 
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5.3.4 Server Study Phase 2 results 
 
In this phase again one participant (the same as in Phase 1) simply used the reset function 
rather than recall in order to complete the task. Their results are not included in the 
summary. In this phase all participants bar one responded on all three days. The chart below 
shows the mean number of attempts required to successfully log in on each day. 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Server study Phase 2 log in attempts 
 
Again the first day of use had a higher value for attempts required. In this phase, however, 
this was the result of more than one participant using several attempts to log in. One 
participant made 6 attempts then reset their password. Three other participants used 2, 3 
and 4 attempts to login successfully without resetting. 
 
The most notable difference between the phases was the use of resets to replace recall. 
Excluding the participant that used the reset exclusively through both phases there were 7 
resets requested in Phase 2 spread across the three days, with a varying number of attempts 
made before each reset. The information relating to resets is summarised in Table 5. 
 
It is interesting to note that relatively few login attempts are made before each reset and that 
there the number of attempts used before reset decreased as the experimental phase 
progressed. 
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1 6 
1 2 
2 3 
2 1 
3 2 
3 2 
3 1 
 
Table 5: Server study phase 2 password reset data. 
 
5.4 Discussion 
 
As stated previously in Section 3.6 the approach taken throughout this thesis is to combine 
different sources of information to form a coherent whole. As such, it is through considering 
the results of the laboratory and server studies together that a better understanding of how 
password composition affects user experience can be gained. The motivation behind 
collecting such data is to provide grounded empirical data for decision makers and 
modellers working in the field of information security. 
 
The results of the password entry study showed that per-character typing speed was 
constant across different policies and password compositions. This means that password 
composition has no meaningful effect on entry time and that the length of the password will 
be the main contributing factor to the basic mechanical process of entry. However, while the 
per-character entry times showed that physical effort associated with passwords increases 
linearly with length, and be unaffected by composition, the usability of the password overall 
is affected by both frequency of use and composition. The password entry study also 
showed that longer passwords produce more typing errors. This results in an increased need 
for participants to correct their entry using the ‘backspace’ key in order to achieve the same 
level of successful login attempts. This increases the effort required by the participants. 
 
In addition, 62% of participants in this study over-fulfilled the requirements of the policies, 
choosing to use passwords that were both 8 characters or longer and contained characters 
from 3 or more character sets. Working on the assumption that users will not deliberately 
choose a password that is difficult to use, this implies that user effort is linked to more than 
just the raw characteristics of password composition. In this case it was anecdotally reported 
by several participants that they used a personal algorithm for memorable password 
composition. Situations in which they were unable to use this method, for example where a 
policy places both a maximum and minimum length on passwords, were reported to be the 
most difficult to use. It would require a study focused on composition, rather than 
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performance use to explore this behaviour in more detail, but it is worth nothing that users 
do not necessarily minimally fulfil password policy requirements. This highlights that the 
situation is more complicated than simply saying short passwords are easier to use than 
long passwords. 
 
During this study data was also gathered using the NASA TLX system. Unfortunately many 
of the participants felt that the definitions of the subscales did not really apply to the task in 
hand. This led to uncertainty when it came to assigning scores. Additionally, the 
participants were confused as to whether they were supposed to be rating the task with 
respect to the other password or against a more general idea of what a difficult task was in 
terms of the subscale in question. This made the TLX task a useful distraction tool as the 
participants were clearly not focused on password recall while they were engaged in it, but 
negates the usefulness of the data gathered for assessing task load. As such, it has not been 
included in this analysis. 
 
The server study, which used Policy 1 and required only a password length of 6 characters, 
demonstrated that when used daily passwords are usually entered successfully on the first 
or second attempts. This agrees with the results of the laboratory study that showed that 
attempting to enter a false password happens with a frequency of between 0 and 1 per 10 
successful entries. The exception to this was the performance of the Policy 2 passwords 
during the distraction task which peaked at 2 failure attempts per 6 successful entries. 
However, the server study also showed us that as frequency of use decreased, the use of 
resets increased, and that resets were requested after only 1 or 2 entry attempts. These 
results imply a pattern of user behaviour in which they will attempt to correct known errors 
in their password entry manually before submitting the password but that they will expend 
only a small amount of time and effort on repeated attempts if their first entry is not 
accurate. Instead of trying multiple times to successfully recall and enter their password 
they will simply reset it. The trigger point for password resets is therefore low in terms of 
user effort. 
 
One participant used the reset function, rather than attempting to recall the password. They 
reset their password for each session and simply entered the new one. While this participant 
did not provide data on password performance they do highlight a relevant point, with 
respect to password use. Where systems allow a reset, the cost of a reset may be lower than 
recall. This is more likely to be the case with systems that are used infrequently as the recall 
effort is higher. If an organisation is experiencing high levels of password resets, when 
compared to recall and entry, this may be a reason. An alternative form of authentication 
may be preferable in such cases as password resets carry a risk of interception or abuse by 
malicious parties. 
 
114 
 
 
To put this discussion in the context of decision making, the information drawn from the 
experiments outlined in Chapter 5 can be used to inform password policy creation. It is 
important to know the context of use for the password, in particular how often it is likely to 
be used. For passwords that are used only a few times a week, or less, password policies that 
require 8 characters or more are likely to generate sufficient errors (and therefore user effort 
in terms of correction and failed entries) to push users towards resetting instead of recall, 
given their low tolerance for failure. Such a policy would therefore require more investment 
in IT support services to manage the increased volume of reset requests, or the utilisation of 
self-service resets which transfers the effort back to the users creating knock on effects 
elsewhere, as described by the Compliance Budget (Section 4.5). Resets also offer attackers 
increased opportunities for password capture and interception. In terms of increasing user 
effort, the results of the laboratory study imply that length has a greater impact on error rate 
than complexity and so where increased security is required, mandating more complex 
passwords will produce fewer errors than longer passwords. Passwords that are used daily, 
or more often, are less prone to this affect as the frequency of use compensates for the 
difficulty of successful entry and password resets are much less common.  
 
This knowledge allows decision makers to decide if they wish to spend their resources on IT 
support infrastructure to cope with reset requests or on other forms of protection for assets 
that may be left vulnerable by shorter but more usable passwords. While this trade-off has 
been known to exist for many years data such as this allows the trade-off to be managed in a 
much more systematic fashion, with the likely impact (in terms of errors and resets) of 
changing password policy anticipated with greater success and fidelity. This type of 
information is critical if the understanding provided by the Compliance Budget (see Sections 
4.7 and 4.8 for an outline of the advantages of security management through the Compliance 
Budget) is to be leveraged into a systematic decision making framework. The Compliance 
Budget tells us that improving security design to be more understanding of the user effort 
associated with security controls is one of the four primary methods for improving the 
likelihood of positive compliance decisions. In order to do this effectively the manner in 
which various controls impact the user must be studied and understood. Chapter 5 provides 
initial answers to the question of password composition and therefore functions as a sub-
component of the Compliance Budget. Where the Compliance Budget outlines a model of 
user decision making with respect to compliance, Chapter 5 offers the information required 
to use that model to resolve a specific security management question. 
 
The two studies offer an example of the data collection that needs to be carried out to inform 
decision making, and create a comprehensive understanding of this area. The two policies 
that were compared traded off increasing the length of the password by 2 characters with 
the requirement to have one less character type in the composition and the results and 
discussion are based on this single trade-off. In order to support a wider range of decision 
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making a series of studies that systematically varies password length and composition 
under laboratory conditions to assess error rates is needed. These studies would need to be 
then mirrored through live server studies in order understand how use patterns affect the 
results. As more data is added to the data set so to can a broader range of decision be 
supported. These studies offer an early contribution to this area and demonstrate both the 
usefulness of such results and the need for further work.  
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6. System design 
 
The review of the existing literature (see Section 2.2 and 2.4.4) has revealed that it is a factor 
that is often neglected, or its costs not fully represented, in the field of information security. 
This thesis has suggested ways in which the human factor can be more fully represented, 
through the Compliance Budget model of user decision making, the details of which can be 
found in Section 4.5. The Compliance Budget provided the motivation for the empirical 
studies conducted and reported on in Chapter 5. The data gathered by these studies 
demonstrates types of data that must be collected in order for security managers to use the 
model as a tool for supporting decision making. However, the human factor is just one of 
many factors that security managers must consider. The purpose of the Compliance Budget 
is not to promote human factors as the single most important part of security, but rather to 
highlight their importance so they will be considered equally alongside technical 
mechanisms. It is also necessary to develop methods that allow this process of equal 
consideration to take place. 
 
This section will address Research Question 3, which asks “How can we include the human 
factor in a systematic approach to security decision making?” Just as the Compliance Budget 
motivated the need for data gathering to support it, it provides the motivation to explore 
this question as well. It is necessary to recall at this stage that all the research in this thesis 
takes a utility-based approach to security decision making. This approach seeks to examine 
the trade-offs that exist behind all forms of decision making and provide security managers 
with the information required to make more systematic decisions. The Compliance Budget 
achieves this with respect to ensuring that user effort is spent as efficiently as possible on 
security tasks. However, this is only one facet of security decision making. Taking an 
approach to security management that focused primarily on human factors would produce 
results as far from optimal as those that marginalised it. What is required is a balanced 
approach where the human factor is included alongside other, more technical, factors to 
achieve the desired aims of the organisation as a whole. Without this process of inclusion the 
Compliance Budget cannot serve the goal of a systematic approach to decision making. 
There is a gap in the current state of the art, in that technical approaches do not incorporate 
an accurate understanding of human behaviour (where one is included at all), and HCI 
approaches focus too much on the usability of a system in isolation, ignoring the operational 
context in which it takes place. This neglects the primary purpose of security, that being to 
protect the primary operations of the organisation such that maximum productivity can be 
achieved. 
 
The notion of the operational context is essential to a systematic approach to decision 
making. Compliance decisions of the sort addressed by the Compliance Budget do not take 
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place in isolation, nor are the issues raised during the interviews, and presented in Section 
4.3.1, purely theoretical. More traditional methods of simulation and analysis, such as 
systems modelling, are more than capable of representing the technical mechanisms that 
exist in this context. In order to address Research Question 3 a framework is required that 
allows decision makers, and indeed systems modellers, to take the Compliance Budget 
model and include it in such tools. It is the combination of these approaches that offers the 
potential for creating a systematic approach to security decision making, which is the over-
arching goal of this thesis. In pursuit of this goal I have developed a conceptual structure 
that allows for security objectives, human factors and technologies to be integrated in a 
framework. The key aim is to represent a security in its entirety so that the impacts security 
controls have on user behaviour, and vice versa, can be understood and explored. The intent 
is to formalise the understandings found in the Compliance Budget specifically, and in the 
utility-based approach to security in general, in a form that is accessible by security 
managers. If such decision makers are to make use of this information, and to take 
advantage of the insights in human factors that are now being produced, such a 
representation is essential. 
 
In addition, this framework pays close attention to the requirements of system modelling. 
Having identified the practical uses of such tools (in Sections 2.4.3 and 3.4) the framework is 
structured in such a way as to facilitate an easy export of the data contained therein to a 
systems modelling environment. As such, conscious effort is made to represent the aspects 
of the security system in terms of processes, resources and locations. The whole structure 
sits within the same economic view of security that underpins and motivates this thesis in its 
entirety. 
 
Where Chapter 5 provided a specific data set that allowed the Compliance Budget model to 
be used to solve a narrow question, the goal of this section is to provide a wider framework 
in which the Compliance Budget can be used to aid in understanding, and optimally 
managing, security at an organisational level. This sets the research presented here at a 
different level to the work in Sections 4 and 5, although still conceptually part of the same 
economically-motivated thinking, as show in Figure 15. 
 
118 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Conceptual map of the research 
 
6.1 Background and motivation 
 
As discussed in section 2.1 CIA, while providing a suitable framework for organising high 
level security objectives, lacks the range of concepts necessary for discussing a fuller 
implementation of information security. In particular, it does not lead to a systematic 
analysis of security requirements such as the level of confidentiality, availability or integrity 
required by a system. When taking an economic view of security we need to consider the 
trade-offs that are taking place, as security decisions are made by both organisations (as 
represented by their chief security managers) and the users of the system. These decisions 
can be at the management level, where policies are set, or at the individual level, where 
compliance decisions are made (as discussed throughout Section 4). In either case, the 
decision maker is trading-off between various options and projected outcomes and trying to 
maximise the organisation’s utility, with respect to its business process. In the current state 
of the art the knowledge required to make such decisions is split between the HCI and 
security communities. Additionally, in the case of the individual user, non-security 
incentives, such as maximising productivity, the need to strike an appropriate work/life 
balance and the fundamental limitations of human cognition, drive behaviours that are 
insecure (although often without malice). A security decision maker attempting to 
systematically make optimal decisions is hampered by the lack of unification among these 
sources of information. To support decisions that move security in this direction an 
economic analysis of the situation, that accounts for all the costs and benefits associated with 
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a policy or mechanism, is required. The standard method of expressing security goals, the 
CIA framework, is unsuitable for this level of analysis due to its incompleteness and the 
high conceptual level of its definitions. 
 
 Furthermore, the analysis of the interviews (see Section 4.2) conducted as part of the Trust 
Economics project showing that the role an individual occupies within an organisation 
reflects their attitudes toward security, for example, their Compliance Threshold, with 
leaders and managers seeing more clearly the corporate need for security (although not 
always willing to follow it themselves). It is clear that any structure that seeks to represent 
security goals and objectives must be able to do so at all levels, and for all roles, within an 
organisation, while recognising that these goals and objectives will differ between the levels. 
CIA is too unwieldy a conceptual framework to provide the granularity need to work at 
these different levels. A new approach is needed if the human factors knowledge is to be 
integrated into a systematic methodology. 
 
As was explained in Section 3.5, systems modelling can provide powerful tools that do allow 
such a systematic analysis. However, the strength of these models is dependent on the 
usefulness of the information used to tune them. Organisations already collect large 
quantities of data about their own activities that can be used for this purpose but it is not 
always organised or presented in such a way as to make this a natural process to follow. In 
addition, such models commonly abstract away from a notion of individual users and their 
behaviour. Any new approach suggested should also build on the principles of the 
economics of security discussed in Section 2.4. Thus an approach is needed which: 
 
- Makes use of existing information but does not require organisations to gather large 
amounts of new data 
- Organises this data in such a way as to allow a smooth transition into systems 
modelling 
- Captures the tensions and trade-offs present in the system expresses them in terms of 
utility 
- Allows a systematic analysis of the security system including the impact of human 
factors 
 
To meet these requirements an ontological framework is proposed which integrates the 
security managers’ preferences between investments to protect against confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability and the structure and dynamics of the system itself. The purpose 
of the ontological model is to represent security functionality in such a way that the model 
can be used as a tool to aid in both the design and subsequent audit of the security 
behaviour of an organization. It represents and expresses the security design and 
implementation choices of the organization in terms of a hierarchy of needs. It also aims to 
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reveal the tensions between the business and security processes, as well as the trade-offs that 
are taking place between the various security objectives of the organization. 
 
This approach is not intended to function as a stand-alone technique, but as part of a 
security ‘life cycle’; one link in a chain of technologies and processes that provide 
information security solutions. As methodologies such as HP’s Security Analytics package 
become commercially available there is a need for techniques such as the one outlined here 
to be developed to facilitate the connectivity of such unified approaches to information 
security. 
 
6.2 A running example 
 
In that it is useful to have a more concrete example with which to illustrate abstract concepts 
such as these, one will be provided. While this thesis is largely concerned with information 
security, the principles outlined here are applicable to security more generally and so an 
example has been chosen that relates to both informational and physical aspects of security – 
the management of an airport’s security process. 
 
This is obviously a large and complicated problem, and I have chosen to focus on the set of 
processes involved with checking passengers and their luggage for their acceptability to fly. 
In order to be allowed to board the plane a passenger, with luggage, must navigate from the 
concourse of an airport’s terminal building to a seat on an aircraft; that is, it is an access 
control process that is predicated on maintaining an integrity property of aircraft. This is 
achieved by maintaining that property for passengers and their baggage. This integrity 
property trades-off against other concerns, principally costs, incurred in providing security 
staff and equipment, and service availability. The passenger is subject to a range of security 
controls that are intended to ensure a certain integrity property—roughly, that certain 
dangerous or substances and objects are not present—of the aircraft. The manager of the 
security process has decided that, in order to access the aircraft, passengers must submit to 
the security process and must therefore sacrifice their confidentiality—the bags will be 
searched, there will be body searches. There are also non-trivial trade-offs between cost and 
availability, in that increasing investment in additional staff or scanning devices will reduce 
wait times at security checkpoints and improve the throughput of the system. The length of 
time a passenger must spend navigating the airport security procedures can be seen in this 
case as a measure of availability of access to the aircraft, with the extreme cases being 
unrestricted access to the plane on the one hand and security checks so lengthy and time 
consuming that passengers are unable to progress through them fast enough to make their 
scheduled departure time. These issues make airport security an interesting and relevant 
example that will be developed over the course of the following sections. In order to discuss 
121 
 
 
this, however, (and in keeping with the components required for systems modelling) a 
location map is needed. This is show below in Figure 16: 
 
Figure 16: Diagram showing the locations and associated connections and associated connections 
used in the Airport example 
6.3 The security architecture  
 
This thesis is not the first work to identify gaps in the CIA framework and other authors 
have commented on its inadequacies. As discussed previously in Section 2.1 attempts have 
been made to suggest additions to CIA in order to rectify its perceived weaknesses. 
However, in many cases these additions suffer from category errors (see Section 2.1.3) and 
confuse operational and declarative concepts. The architecture of the approach suggested 
here is designed in such a way as to address this issue directly. In particular it is split into 
two sections, one containing the declarative and the other the operational components of the 
system. These are referred to as the Framework Layer and the Instantiation Layer respectively. 
 
While the layers differ in terms of their internal components they share a commonality of 
structure across two key dimensions. ‘Vertically’ the framework is organised into a 
hierarchy of roles, with all relevant roles within the organisation being represented. 
Relevant in this case means roles that interact with the organisation’s security system. This 
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serves two purposes. First, it reflects the findings from the Compliance Budget interviews 
that an individual’s role within an organisation affects how they will interact with, and 
view, security systems. By creating a hierarchy of roles, within which security objectives and 
processes are represented, it becomes possible to differentiate the behaviour of the 
occupants of those rules with respect to the security mechanisms they encounter. More will 
be said on this topic in Section 6.3.2.2, which covers Actors. 
 
Second, and as the term ‘hierarchy’ suggests, it allows an ordering to take place. The roles 
here are ordered by their ability to influence the security architecture of the system. In other 
words, they are classified by the toolbox that is available to them for modifying security 
objects (that characterize security tasks, defined in section 6.3.1). For example, the top level 
of the model might represent the strategic decision-makers of the organisation, such as an 
airport’s security managers or their regulators, while the bottom level might represent an 
individual employee or user of the organisation, such as an airport’s check-in staff or a 
passenger navigating airport security. The roles represent the possible positions individuals 
can adopt in the hierarchy. They do not represent any entity themselves. They are instead 
populated by Actors, which are another component in system and are described below. The 
roles represented in our airport example may include the airport security manager, security 
guards manning the various checkpoints, airline staff involved in check-in (where some 
security questions are asked) and the passengers seeking to board the plane. This ordering is 
necessary in order to logically construct the components of the security system. This will be 
explained in full in Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2. 
 
This role structure is seen in each layer of the hierarchy but it is not the only area of 
commonality. Each hierarchy role or level is divided ‘horizontally’ into three sections 
representing the security dependencies, priorities and preferences of that level. The terms 
are defined as follows: 
 
- Dependencies (strong requirement): Externally enforced requirements that Actors 
populating the role must meet (all of) in order to function within the model. Actors 
occupying this role have no choice in whether or not (and possibly even how) to 
meet these requirements regardless of how resource inefficient they are. 
Dependencies will often be informed by the environment within which the hierarchy 
exists (such as the Department for Transport regulations regarding random liquid 
testing); 
- Priorities (weak requirement): Externally supplied tasks, as many as possible of 
which should be met by Actors in the associated role. Actors have some choice in 
which priorities to meet and how they are approached. In a limited resource 
environment, Actors can select the most resource efficient priorities and methods 
first. Priorities will often be informed by the role that the level represents (for 
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example while security guards have to search some items of hand luggage they will 
have some flexibility as to who and when is searched); 
- Preferences: Actor-generated tasks that the Actor has decided are worth achieving 
from its own perspective. These can be generated by the Actor’s inclusion in other 
hierarchies (passengers can for instance choose which security checkpoint they 
queue up for). 
 
The purpose of this horizontal structure is to allow the Actors that populate the system to 
allocate resources according to the needs of their role. It also allows the system to be checked 
for functionality. If all the dependencies of the system are not being fulfilled then the system 
can be said to be failing – it will be in breach of the rules and regulations that apply to its 
area of operation. This will make the system illegal, and potentially dangerous. Where 
priorities are not being met the system can be said to be failing its primary process. The core 
objectives, or processes that would give the organisation a market edge, that the system 
designers would wish it to possess are not being achieved. Failure to meet preferences does 
not imply system failure in the same way. However, the Compliance Budget would indicate 
that a user base that is being forced to work in a way that does not meet its requirements 
may well be introducing costs elsewhere. A failure to meet preferences should therefore 
prompt a manager to assess the behaviour and compliance of the system’s users more 
closely. 
 
The overall structure of the hierarchy can be seen in Figure 17 below. This clearly shows the 
role-based nature of the hierarchy and the shared structure between the Framework and 
Instantiation layers. The nature and composition of these layers will now be discussed in 
more detail. 
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Figure 17: Diagram showing the structure of the security hierarchy 
 
6.3.1 The Framework Layer 
 
The Framework Layer represents the underlying structure of the system. It is static (in the 
sense that the processes and resources which would be represented in a systems model are 
not found here) and declarative but informs the construction of the more operational 
1 
2 
3 
n 
 
Rôle Dependency Priority Dependency Priority Pref. 
Framework Layer Instantiation Layer 
… 
n+1 
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Instantiation Layer. A completed Framework Layer consists of a hierarchy of roles with 
dependencies and priorities assigned to them. As preferences are derived from Actors (see 
Section 6.3.2.2) they do not appear in this layer, as Actors are found only in the Instantiation 
Layer. The dependencies and priorities assigned to the roles will each have at least one 
Security Object (SO) associated with them. SOs are a unique component of the Framework 
Layer and represent the security tasks which, if completed, will satisfy the dependencies and 
priorities with which they are associated. 
 
For example, in the setting of the running example of airport security that that has been 
introduced, examples of SOs include the examining of checked luggage, the checking of 
hand luggage and passengers — to identify and so remove any prohibited contents — and 
the tracking of the relationship between passengers and checked luggage. These examples 
are developed below. 
 
SOs are unconstrained with respect to their location within the hierarchy. SOs can only exist 
in one hierarchy and never populate multiple hierarchies. This is a key difference between 
Actors and SOs. One of the aims of this formulation is to improve the communication 
between different stakeholders and eliminate the duplication caused by the failure to 
understand the connectedness of security concepts between levels. In practice, that means a 
typical SO will exist at multiple levels and multiple sections (dependency, priority) in the 
Framework. It will commonly be the case that an SO created at a higher level will transition 
through and connect (or create) priorities and dependencies lower in the framework. 
 
The Framework Layer is populated with dependencies, priorities, and security objects 
through an iterative process that requires design input from an expert source. The criteria 
under which security objects terminate, and by which the Framework Layer can be said to 
be complete, is the same for all frameworks created in this way. As indicated above, 
dependencies and priorities are externally generated. In practice, a hierarchy of roles will 
not encompass all possible contributors to the security system and will have been bounded 
at some sensible level. In the example, I have not represented any role higher than the 
airport security manager in the hierarchy. The creation and bounding of the hierarchy of 
roles is the first step in creating a Framework Layer. To populate a Framework Layer, it is 
necessary to determine the dependencies and/or priorities that the top role in the hierarchy 
will inherit from sources external to the hierarchy. At this stage, there exists a complete 
hierarchy of roles that is empty of dependencies and priorities except for the top layer. The 
next step is to assign security objects to these dependencies and priorities that will allow 
them to be fulfilled, as in Table 6. 
 
Role Dependencies Security Objects 
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Airport Security Manager Ensure no prohibited 
materials transit the airport 
Scan checked luggage 
Scan hand luggage and 
passengers 
Track relationship between 
passengers and checked 
luggage 
 
Table 6: An example of security object construction 
 
At this point the iterative process begins. The construction of a framework always proceeds 
from top to bottom. At each iteration the following are checked: 
 
- Are there any dependencies or priorities without an assigned SO? 
- Are there any un-terminated SOs? 
 
The construction of a SO terminates once it is possible to return a true or false value from its 
lowest point. If this is not possible, then the SO must be extended to the role below in the 
hierarchy, creating any necessary dependencies and priorities as it does so. The 
dependencies and priorities created will be informed by the role creating them; thus, as the 
SO descends through the hierarchy, it will become more detailed as the scope of the lowers 
is necessarily more limited. In the example above none of the security objects can return a 
value and thus need to be extended. Let us extend the ‘scan hand luggage’ SO. Table 7 
shows the result of two iterations, one would generate the dependency from the SO above, 
the second would find a dependency without an assigned SO and create one. 
 
Role Dependencies Security Objects 
Airport Security Manager Ensure no prohibited 
materials transit the airport 
Scan checked luggage 
Scan hand luggage and 
passengers 
Track relationship between 
passengers and checked 
luggage 
Airport Security Staff Examine all passengers and 
luggage passing through 
security checkpoint 
Identify contents of hand 
luggage and verify it is 
permitted 
 
Table 7: Output of iterated Security Object construction 
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Note, for example, that the SO ‘scan hand luggage and passengers’ corresponds to a tree 
(red/orange in Figure 17) in the Framework Layer. At this point the SO can return a Boolean 
(true/false that the contents of the bag are permitted) and will terminate. The framework is 
not yet complete, however, as there are still un-terminated SOs at the manager layer. 
Iterating in this fashion would also close those at a suitable point. The final step in a SO is 
always a compliance step, which indicates that at this level and below, the roles in the 
hierarchy simply comply with the SO and are not involved in its execution. This would add 
the following line (see Table 7 below) to the framework: 
 
Passenger Comply with Security Object  
 
Table 8: ‘Compliance step’ line 
 
Once the framework is complete, under the criteria outlined above, the SOs will form a 
Boolean forest with the leaves connecting each dependency and priority in the framework. 
At this point the construction of the instantiation layer can begin. 
 
The construction of the SOs can be likened to Schneier’s attack trees [62]. Both SOss and 
attacks trees use a formal, methodical approach to describe a system. However, where attack 
trees describe, as the name suggests, the goals, and routes to that goal, based on their 
capabilities, of an attacker, SOs describe the security goals of an organisation. SOs are, in 
some sense, ‘defense trees’. It may be possible, although not considered in detail in this 
thesis, to assess the security of a system my overlaying attack trees and the contents of the 
Framework and Instantiation Layers. Indeed if sufficient information about the threat 
environment was known then attack trees could be used to inform the construction of the 
SOs (and corresponding Security Components, for more on which see Section 6.3.2.1). 
 
It is, however, worth noting the critical differences between attack trees and SOs. The 
Framework and Instantiation Layers separate the declarative and operational components of 
a system such that planning can take place more effectively. This separation also allows 
managers to ensure that the implementation they have chosen is actually fulfilling their 
objectives; it is providing security in the manner they require. Attackers are only required to 
plan a single successful attack. Defensively, security managers must provide protection 
against a range of attacks. In order for a system to be effective these objectives must work 
together in order to share advantages where possible, and certainly not contradict them. As 
such the hierarchy outlined here allows managers to view the whole system and ensure that 
the various security goals are being met simultaneously. Schneier’s commentary on attack 
trees is however useful and many of the same lessons are relevant. The knowledge captured 
here is reusable (an important point when the scale of the task is considered) and both 
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require an iterative approach that becomes more effective as more refined information is 
added to the system. 
 
6.3.2 The Instantiation Layer 
 
Where the framework layer is static and declarative, the instantiation layer is dynamic and 
operational. Two new parts of the architecture are added during instantiation, Security 
Components (SC) and Actors. Actors will be discussed in more detail below; for now it is 
sufficient to know that they occupy roles and insert preferences into the hierarchy of roles at 
the Instantiation Layer.  
 
6.3.2.1 Security Components 
 
SCs combine together to form the operational counterparts of security objects. The 
instantiation layer is built in the same way as the framework layer. Again, an iterative 
process is adopted with certain termination criteria. The key difference here is that this layer 
is built bottom up. SCs lay out the processes and resources needed to perform the Boolean 
checks specified in corresponding SOs. SCs start at the final ‘compliance’ layer of the SO. 
Once the processes and resources required at this level are put in place a check is carried out 
to see if they are sufficient to complete the SO. If yes, then the SC terminates. If not then the 
procedure is repeated for the role above and additional processes and resources are added 
as needed. Again, this process repeats until all SCs are closed. At this point, the Instantiation 
layer is complete. A little more formally, corresponding to the slightly more formal view of 
SOs sketched above, I will describe how SCs are combined to instantiate SOs as follows:  
 
- SCs are combined according to the and/or forest determined by the SO that they 
instantiate; 
- Each SC implements a checking process that applies to Actors at the level below; 
- SCs return Boolean values that instantiate internal nodes of the corresponding SO. 
 
Working through our example again let us start at the passenger level and work upward 
until we have sufficient processes and resources in place to return a Boolean for the 
statement ‘the passengers possessions and luggage are permitted’. The finished security 
component in this case would be as in Table 9. 
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Role Dependencies Security Objects 
Airport Security Manager Ensure no prohibited 
materials transit the airport 
Provide resources (X-ray 
machine, metal detector, 
wands) 
Provide data on prohibited 
materials for X-ray 
comparison 
Airport Security Staff Examine all passengers and 
luggage passing through 
security checkpoint 
Monitor X-ray machine and 
inspect results for prohibited 
items 
Hand-search suspect 
luggage 
Hand-scan suspicious 
passengers 
Passenger Comply with Security Object Place luggage on scanner 
Walk through detector 
 
Table 9: A completed example of a Security Object 
 
In Figure 17, the SCs correspond to the green/yellow nodes in the Instantiation Layer 
Note that whereas the SO terminated in a ‘compliance’ level the SC terminates at a 
‘provision’ level when it reaches a role that can sufficiently provide the resources required to 
execute the SC without recourse to a higher role. 
 
6.3.2.2 Actors 
 
The final components of the Instantiation Layer (and the model) are Actors. Actors exist 
independently from any single security hierarchy. They represent entities that transition 
between hierarchies, this being the key difference between Actors and SOs. They can interact 
with any and all hierarchies present, simultaneously if necessary. Actors exist solely as a 
collection of tags corresponding to their attributes. Attributes such as an Actor’s nationality, 
employer, age, and physical characteristics may all be included as an attribute tag. When an 
Actor interacts with a hierarchy and seeks to populate one of its roles, the hierarchy 
examines the Actors tags, some or all of which may be unreadable to the hierarchy. Our 
airport hierarchy, for example, will not be able to read tags relating to other hierarchies such 
as the security clearances assigned to the Actor by the organisation that employs it. 
Additionally, there may be tags assigned to the Actor that the actor does not know about. 
An example of such a tag would be one placed by a government agency to indicate the Actor 
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is on a terrorist watch list. The tags a hierarchy can see are stored as part of the role data of 
the hierarchy. 
 
Having inspected the tags it can see, the hierarchy assigns the Actor to a role based on the 
information gathered.  The Actor then inhabits that role for the duration of its lifecycle in 
that system. The Actor inherits the relevant dependencies and priorities of the role. The 
Actor brings its own preferences into the hierarchy. These preferences are used to generate 
Preference Grids which are covered in Section 6.3.2.3. Some Actors have no preferences. Such 
Actors represent items such as inanimate objects (e.g., a passenger’s bags in the airport 
example) or data stores (e.g., a baggage handling label in the airport example) that can be 
passed between hierarchies (the departure and destination airports will have separate 
security systems and this will be considered separate hierarchies) but have no intentions of 
their own. 
 
The Actor is now a full part of the hierarchy and can interact with its associated SCs, 
updating its dependencies, priorities, and preferences as necessary. The associated 
Preference Grids will determine how the Actor interacts with the processes and resources of 
the hierarchy. While the structure of each Actor in the hierarchy is the same it is the 
Preference Grids that determine the Actor’s behaviour. In this way we can differentiate 
between an Actor representing a legitimate passenger, and one representing a terrorist. 
While they appear largely identical to the hierarchy they will have very difference 
Preference Grids, which will lead them to undertake very different behaviour as they move 
through the airport. 
 
The status of the Actor may be changed by the hierarchy, and tags added or removed as a 
result. For example, a hierarchy designed to check the citizenship of an unknown Actor may 
return tags, which it did not previously possess, identifying it as a national, or an illegal 
alien. The introduction of Actors adds a third dimension to the hierarchy. Multiple Actors 
can exist in any one layer of the hierarchy (and, typically, the lower levels will have more 
Actors assigned to them). This also means SOs can span multiple Actors as well as multiple 
levels. To understand the governing mechanisms that inform the behaviour of Actors it is 
necessary to recall certain key points from the hierarchy conceptualisation. 
 
First, that the lowest level in the hierarchy of roles is occupied by Zero Preference Actors 
(ZPAs). This level is essentially a (possibly extensive) list of the ZPAs allowed within, or 
understood by, the security hierarchy. In the case of the airport example this list would, for 
example, include 
 
 
- Hand luggage 
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- Checked luggage, 
- Passport, 
- Ticket/booking documentation, 
- Minor offensive items (such as liquids over the amount allowed in hand luggage), 
- Major offensive items (such as weapons and narcotics). 
 
Second, that the hierarchy of roles is ordered by the level of control each role has over the 
security system. This means that roles further up the hierarchy have authority over the 
lower levels. 
 
Considering the question of how to model Actors, from a systems modelling perspective, the 
following is a useful guide: 
 
- A model that is written from the point of view of a given Actor (e.g., passenger’s 
view of his or her passage through the airport) would normally treat that Actor as a 
process. 
- Other Actors (e.g., the airport security staff, as part of a model written from the point 
of view of a passenger) would normally be treated as resources — to be used by the 
subject, or processes called by the subject, in order to navigate the system. 
-  
6.3.2.3 Preference Grids 
 
Within the hierarchy, then, Actors will often have cause to engage and interact with one 
another. Both to motivate and to mediate such interactions and determine their outcomes, it 
is necessary to represent within the system a notion of the intentions of the various Actors. 
This is achieved by using Preference Grids. As well as their tag clouds Actors have a set of 
Grids that relate to themselves and all Actors in the layers of the hierarchy below their own, 
including ZPAs. These Grids are tables containing a set of Preference Values representing 
the intentions of that Actor toward the other dynamic components of the security hierarchy. 
This allows Actors, for example passengers in the airport, to be constructed similarly 
regardless of their intentions. A family going on holiday and a terrorist will have the same 
structure as Actor. Their intentions, however, as represented by their preference grids, will 
be very different. Grids are location-dependent as the preferences of the Actors toward each 
other will vary as they move through the system. Referring to the airport location map in 
Figure 16, it is clear that a passenger will react very differently to a security guard 
attempting to search their bag at the check-in desk as opposed to the security checkpoint. 
This location map will be used as the basis for discussing the relationship between Actors 
and locations in the following section. Grids are, evidently, close related to utility, and I will 
return to this point in Section 6.3.2.4. 
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The Grids assign weightings to ‘C, I, A’, expressed as a value between -1 and 1. CIA is being 
used here as a conveniently accessible example. It is likely, and may be necessary, that in the 
specific context that other hierarchies are built in other classifications will be used, with finer 
granularity and more direct relevance to the context. The CIA dimension can be extended as 
necessary with other components, such as actions. Each Grid—for example, one expressing 
the intentions of a passenger toward hand luggage—is in fact a family of Grids representing 
the intentions of the passenger toward all instantiations of ‘hand luggage’ they have 
interacted with in the current state of the system. Where the Actor has an existing preference 
toward the Actor or ZPA in question these values will be used to populate the Grid. 
However, as not all interactions can be predicted in advance (and indeed to do so would 
bloat the information content of the Actor’s tag cloud significantly) interactions can occur in 
which the Actor has no preference to draw upon. In such cases, a ‘neutral’ Grid will be 
generated from information contained in the Framework Layer. Neutral in this case does not 
mean containing values of 0 but containing values aligned with the goals of the security 
hierarchy rather than the individual Actor. In this sense, where the Actor has no preferences 
of its own, it inherits the preferences of the system. 
 
Although it will be necessary to generate many of these Grids in a typical instantiation of the 
system, they are computationally light to handle and thus incur little overhead. These Grids, 
and the attitudes they represent, form the intention map for each actor. Do they want 
explosives to be in the passenger lounge or not? How concerned are they with the 
confidentiality of the contents of their luggage? As Actors can also have preferences 
regarding actors lower down the hierarchy and not just ZPAs interactions are allowed 
between groups of intentioned actors as well. For example, security guards may detain or 
search passengers according to their preferences. This allows the intentions of passengers, 
smugglers, terrorists and security personnel to be captured with equally fidelity using the 
same approach. The system can remain agnostic of the goals of each Actor and does not 
require special mechanisms to deal with ‘enemy’ Actors. This allows different types of actor 
to be created very easily by configuring their tag clouds to contain different preferences 
regarding the components of the system. 
 
The inclusion of Preference Grids in this system as a method of representing the goal state 
and intentions of Actors allows user behaviour and choices to be modelled alongside other 
more technical considerations. This begins to offer up an answer to Research Question 3. 
How this works in practise will now be looked at in a little more detail. 
 
To illustrate the flexibility of the Grid system let us pick up our running airport example and 
compare the Preference Grids of a passenger attempting to smuggle a disassembled ceramic 
firearm onto a plane and the airport staff present at the various locations the passenger 
passes through. Although a full system would require many more Actors and ZPAs to be 
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covered by the Grids for simplicity and space we will focus on the passenger and his hand 
luggage only. Additionally, we will assume that once the weapon is airside a security breach 
has occurred so the relevant locations for this example are the check-in desk, security 
checkpoint and passport control. It must also be noted that the values given here are a static 
snapshot of a dynamic system. As the Compliance Budget tells us, perceived costs are more 
important than some objective ‘real’ value. This means that the preferences expressed in the 
grids will vary, as the environment and status of the Actor changes. 
 
At check-in, the passenger will not tolerate anyone examining his or her bag, and the check-
in staff will have no interest in it at that stage, so their grids will be aligned. Moreover, the 
check-in staff, being concerned with the business processes associated with the airport, will 
actively want the passenger to be there. At this stage both parties are interested in the 
availability of the passenger and neither intend for the integrity or confidentiality of the bag 
to be breached. The Grids associated with check-in are shown below in Tables 10 and 11. 
The first column shows the factors to which the preference values are being assigned, in this 
case CIA. The column headings left to right show the members of the hierarchy of roles 
about which the Actor in question has preferences. ZPAs, being the lowest level of the 
hierarchy, will therefore be in the rightmost columns of a Grid. It is important to understand 
that the Preference Values contained in the Grid represent those of an Actor about the 
entities contained in the Grid column headings. Thus the first grid below shows us the 
preferences of the passenger in our example towards the CIA state of himself and his hand 
luggage while located at the check-in desk. 
 
 
 Passenger Hand Luggage 
C 0.8 1 
I 1 1 
A 1 1 
 
Table 10: Passenger Grid at Check-in location 
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 Staff Passenger Hand Luggage 
C 1 0.8 1 
I 1 1 1 
A 1 1 1 
 
Table 11: Check-in Staff Grid at Check-in location 
 
The Grids for the passenger, x-ray operator, and bag searcher are as follows: 
 
 Passenger Hand Luggage 
C 0.5 0.9 
I 1 1 
A 1 1 
 
Table 12: Passenger Grid at Security Checkpoint location 
 
 Staff Passenger Hand Luggage 
C 1 0 0.6 
I 1 0 0.6 
A 1 -1 1 
 
Table 13: X-ray Operator Grid at Security Checkpoint location 
 
 Staff Passenger Hand Luggage 
C 1 0 0.4 
I 1 1 0 
A 1 1 1 
 
Table 14: Bag Searcher Grid at Security Checkpoint location 
 
The lowered scoring for the passenger’s preference toward his own confidentiality implies 
that he is willing to be searched during the process. His preferences for his bag are in 
alignment with the requirement of the x-ray operator, as discussed in the preceding 
paragraph, but conflicts with the bag searcher who wishes to reduce the confidentiality of 
his bag below the level he is comfortable with. The neutral weightings of the bag searcher 
and x-ray operator indicate that while they are not actively seeking to take items from the 
bag they have no interest in preserving its contents either. Their actions in this regard will be 
dictated by other factors, such as the legality of its contents. It is also interesting to note that 
the Grids allow us to express less directly relevant security concerns such as the x-ray 
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operator not wishing to have passengers in or around the machine as shown by the negative 
weighting for passenger availability.  
 
The Grids can be used in this way to express a wide variety of behaviours simulating many 
types of Actor at the same level in the hierarchy. Intra-Grid interactions also reveal 
behavioural preferences. For example, if a passenger has higher integrity than availability at 
check-in it means he is unwilling to remove items from his bag (if it is overweight for 
example) even it if means they will not be allowed to check in. Preference Grids also have a 
key role early stage in systems models. The preferences expressed in the Grids are directly 
analogous to preferences for certain processes to be executed or resources allocated. By 
supplying these requests for resources and processes, Actors provide the dynamic force that 
drives the system model forward, and are usually as processes, though occasionally it is 
convenient to treat them as resources. 
 
6.3.2.4 Utility revisited 
 
The utility functions associated with economic approaches to information security, such as 
those described in Sections 2.4.3 can often be quite complex mathematical constructions, and 
it may not always, for a given system, be possible to formulate them. Indeed, it may not be 
necessary. Additionally, such mathematical expression is outside the scope of this thesis. A 
consideration of how such functions might be developed in this context can still be useful, 
even if they are represented in a highly simplified form. In the setting of the airport 
example, Preference Values can be seen as a crude representation of utility, encapsulating 
both weighting and deviation from target. For example, in the situations discussed above, 
we have: 
 
U(C,I,A) = PC + PI + PA 
 
Here, each of PC, PI , PA is a Preference Value drawn from a Grid. Each of these values 
represents an expectation of an outcome. This can be compared to the actual outcome that 
occurs, and so a deviation from target is determined. Moreover, the size of the initial value 
can be interpreted as a crude measure of the weighting assigned by the Actor. A measure of 
an Actor’s utility can be calculated using Preference Grids. By comparing the outcome of 
any action with the initial intention of the Actor, as expressed in its Grids, a value for how 
well the Actor’s preferences have been met can be found. These values will be weighted by 
how strongly the Actor preferred the course of action in question. 
 
These utility values will also serve as a measure of the friction between the primary process 
of the system (as represented by the intentions of the populating Actors) and the security 
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process. This illustrates one possible use for this approach; when used as a tool of analysis 
for an existing system this methodology serves as a warning system that is capable of 
identifying points of tension between various systems. Any actors with consistently low 
utility will likely be unable to complete goals they value within the current constraints of the 
system. Early identification of such individuals will allow the security manager to 
potentially address the incipient problem before it becomes endemic, or begins to 
undermine the security system, as users start to adopt insecure behaviours or other 
workarounds in an attempt to realise their goals. 
 
For other types of Actors in the system, such as Smugglers and Terrorists, utility can still be 
calculated in the same way, except this time the resultants will measure how effective their 
organizations are at defeating airport security; their intentions (and therefore their measured 
utility) will be best served by circumventing the security measures with their contraband 
intact. This can be seen in our running example. Let us consider two scenarios, one in which 
the ceramic gun is successfully smuggled on to the plane and one in which he is caught at 
the security checkpoint. We can use the utility equation listed above to calculate the 
smuggler’s utility over time as he moves through the airport. 
 
First we need to construct outcomes for each location in each scenario. In our first scenario 
our Actor successfully passes through passport control with the gun undetected. The 
outcomes at each location are as follows: 
 
Check-in – Smuggler successfully checks in, answering the few questions the check-in 
staff present, and his hand luggage is not searched. 
Security checkpoint – The smuggler is not searched and his hand luggage is only x-
rayed and the ceramic weapon is not discovered. 
Passport control – The smuggler and his luggage are subjected to only routine checks 
and make it through successfully. 
 
At check in the Actor answers fewer questions than he is prepared to and so gains a positive 
deviation from his target confidentiality, otherwise he meets his targets for that area, giving 
us: 
 
 
 
 
 
U(Check-In, smuggler) = 0.8(0.9 – 0.8) + 1(1 – 1) ) + 1(1 – 1) 
 
    = 0.08 
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U(Check-in, luggage)  = 1(1 – 1) + 1(1 – 1) ) + 1(1 – 1) 
 
    = 0 
As the Actor’s total utility is a combination of his preferences regarding both himself and his 
hand luggage we take the mean to determine this value. This is the simplest way of 
calculating utility, and in practise a more sophisticated weighted system will likely be 
prefereable. 
 
U(Check-in, combined) = (0.08 + 0) / 2 
 
    = 0.04 
 
At the security station again the smuggler was prepared to be personally searched but was 
not asked to so he gains a positive utility gain for exceeding his confidentiality target. His 
luggage also meets its targets in this area. So for the security checkpoint: 
 
U(Checkpoint, smuggler) = 0.5(1 – 0.5) + 1(1 – 1) + 1(1 – 1) 
 
    = 0.25 
 
U(Checkpoint, luggage) = 0.6(0.6 – 0.6) + 1(1 – 1) ) + 1(1 – 1) 
 
    = 0 
 
U(Checkpoint, combined) = (0.25 + 0) / 2 
 
    = 0.125 
 
So we can see that the smuggler in this scenario maintains a positive utility throughout as he 
is searched less than he is prepared to be personally and the integrity and confidentiality of 
his bag remains intact. A scenario in which the ceramic weapon is detected would yield a 
negative utility as the smuggler’s preference for the confidentiality of his bag would not 
have been met. 
 
 
6.4 Relating the hierarchy to systems modelling and existing data 
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The relevance of systems modelling in the field of information security was discussed in 
Section 2.4.3, particularly its use in creating executable models of complex systems that can 
be used for simulation and predictive analysis. One of my aims when I formulated this 
approach was that it should not rely overly on the collection of new information but should 
make better use of existing knowledge. One of the ways in which this can be achieved is to 
place this knowledge in a form that makes it more readily available for use in the 
construction of the systems model. The structure and organisation of the hierarchical 
system, outlined throughout this chapter, has been created with this objective explicitly in 
mind. The components of the hierarchy have been intentionally designed to mirror those 
necessary for systems modelling. 
 
At the highest level the hierarchy is split into two primary sections, the Framework Layer and 
the Instantiation Layer. This division places declarative concepts and components in the 
Framework Layer and operative concepts and components in the Instantiation Layer. As 
systems modelling aims to create an executable model this is immediately useful as the 
relevant parts of the system (from a modeller’s perspective) will be found in the operative 
Instantiation Layer. This separation prefigures decisions that must be made when creating a 
systems model with regards to where to bound the model and where to abstract away detail. 
All of the components of the Instantiation Layer, being both functional and dynamic, should 
be found in a systems model in some form. The most common forms of components in the 
Framework Layer are Security Components and Actors. Returning to our encapsulation of 
the components of a systems model, that of process, resource, location and environment, let us 
consider how these relate to the components found in the Instantiation Layer. Examples will 
be drawn from our running example of Airport Security. 
 
Locations can be said to exist outside of the Instantiation Layer as the locations relevant to 
the model are applicable to all areas of consideration. Locations influence both processes 
and resources, and indeed resources are directly tied to locations. As such, a map of the 
relevant locations and the connections between them (directed or otherwise) must be 
considered as one of the first stages of planning. The locations used in the Airport Security 
example are shown in Figure 16. Security Components make direct reference to these 
locations as part of their definitions; the specification of each Security Component contains a 
list of the locations it present or functional at. 
 
Security Components define the activities that occur in order to deliver security operations, 
and the equipment and personnel required by these activities. As such, they represent both 
processes and resources. For example, in order to successfully scan hand luggage three 
security components are needed, one process and two resources, and one additional 
resource (in this case a zero preference actor). The first Security Component would be the 
scanning procedure itself, parameterised with relevant information such as tolerances and 
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lists of contraband. This would look for two resource Security Objects, a security staff 
member and an X-ray machine. Finally it would need the luggage itself. When these are all 
present the scanning process can execute. In our example security equipment such as 
boarding card scanners and metal detectors would be resources whereas the procedures put 
in place by the security policy (represented in the Framework Layer) would be modelled as 
processes. 
 
Actors are also present in the Instantiation Layer. As mentioned above some of these will be 
zero preference actors, objects that transition between hierarchies such as luggage or 
boarding cards. The rest will be the human elements of the system, either users or managers 
of it. Like Security Components Actors can be characterised as either processes or resources, 
and this distinction will often be made by the perspective the model is built from. Typically 
the Actor (or group of Actors) from which the perspective of the model is take from will be 
treated as processes and the other members of the system will be resources. 
 
Such conceptualisations allow the Instantiation Layer to function as a list of the Processes 
and Resources that a systems model needs to represent in order to represent the system 
effectively. In the creation of the Security Objects and Actors many decisions that prefigure 
those a modeller would need to make will have already been taken and so the Security 
Object specifications also function as a starting point for the design of the model. 
 
This establishes how the structures of the Instantiation Layer both prefigure the decision 
making processes necessary for system modelling and also sets up convenient ways of 
passing data from one to the other but does not address how existing data can be easily 
imported into the Framework and Instantiation layer. The easy re-use of existing 
information is one of the key goals of this conceptualisation. Additionally, the system as 
outlined so far is likely to be to be relatively opaque to a pragmatic security manager. What 
is needed then is a template represented in an environment with which a security manager 
and his staff are likely to be familiar with. 
 
The three key parts of this methodology are the Framework Layer, the Instantiation Layer, 
and the system model. Each informs the structure and population of the others. As 
described above structurally, the instantiation Layer is organized in such a fashion that it 
facilitates the exporting of data to the system model. As it is this layer that details the 
Security Components used to achieve the aims of the Security Objects, it is also the natural 
place in which to draw in existing system-specific knowledge. One possible approach would 
be to use an existing and widely used ontology language to create a template for the 
structure of the Instantiation Layer. This also as the advantage of standardizing this stage of 
the process, and provides a syntactic interface to security managers. I have chosen to use the 
Web Ontology Language (known informally as OWL) [75] here as an example, as it is open 
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source, and as such likely familiar to security managers or their staff. I will describe here 
how an OWL template, represented using the open source editor Protégé [67], can be used to 
describes a particular ontology for our Airport Security example. It is also just a small 
abstraction to see that this process illustrates a general form of such ontologies. 
 
Such OWL templates retain the structure of the Framework and Instantiation Layers with 
classes for each role and category in the hierarchy. The notions of process, resource, location, 
and environment are also fully retained. By utilizing this structure, a fully populated OWL 
template of the Instantiation Layer functions as a map for the implementation stage of the 
system modelling process. Comparison between the system model and the OWL template 
will then act as a completeness/redundancy test. 
 
Figure 18 illustrates several key areas of the OWL template. The upper left panel shows the 
structure of the OWL classes used to represent the hierarchy. This reflects the structure of 
the Instantiation Layer and holds all of the key concepts of the hierarchy. The lower left 
frame shows a sample of the relationships used to link entities in the ontology. These allow 
the creation of constructs within the ontology that are analogous to the Security Objects and 
Security Components of the Instantiation Layer. To the right of the figure are the members 
of the ‘hierarchyCategory’ class. These are an example of the individual entities that can be 
linked by relationships. 
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Figure 18: Protégé screen shot showing the structure of the OWL classes used to represent the 
hierarchy 
 
Figure 19 illustrates in more detail one of the individual Security Components of the 
ontology. This component ‘checkHandLuggage2DSC’ is a member of the 
‘checkHandLuggage’ Security Object, relates to Role 2 in the hierarchy (securityStaff), is a 
dependency, and operates at the security checkpoint location. This information is contained 
in the label of the Security Component and also in its associated properties. These can be 
seen in the right-hand panel of this figure and are made explicit through the use of the 
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previously defined relationships. Additional information that is relevant to the Security 
Component, such as its objectives, may be listed here. 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Protégé screenshot showing the details of a security component 
 
The creation of a full OWL representation of the target security system (beyond the scope of 
this thesis) is a type of task with which security managers or their staff are likely to be 
familiar and so fulfils the needs of providing an environment into which existing data can 
imported. By structuring it in accordance with this template, the information becomes 
available for export to the system model. 
 
This hierarchical approach to representing security objectives and information has therefore 
been designed from the ground up to support as smooth a flow of data from existing sources 
through to a systems model. This has been achieved by structuring its content in line with 
the requirements of this process. 
143 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Information security researchers and practitioners have traditionally looked to improve 
security by adding more technical controls - such as encryption and firewalls - and stricter 
policies – e.g. by requiring stronger passwords. This approach does not take into account the 
fact that security is a socio-technical system: it involves humans who have their own goals, 
and limitations. These users cannot overcome their inherent limitations, and will not comply 
with mechanisms that prevent them achieving their goals. While the discipline of HCI has 
produced substantive knowledge on limitations, and methods for goal-oriented design, this 
is currently not presented in a way is accessible to security decision-makers. Tools to 
support decision making – such as systems modelling and utility-based analysis – have been 
produced by researchers in economics of security, but the human element is currently not 
represented in these tools. Thus, there exists a gap in the state of the art: users are not 
included in security-related costing and the economic models to support security decision-
making are not grounded in empirical data. The Compliance Budget, detailed in Section 4, 
makes the case for the need to include a user perspective in security decision making. 
Chapter 5 outlines empirical data collection methodologies capable of gathering data 
suitable for use in real-world models and Chapter 6 shows how the resulting data can be 
best structured to support a systematic decision-making framework. The work presented in 
these sections addresses the four research questions presented as the motivation for this 
thesis. These questions were: 
 
Question 1: What can we learn from economic theory that will move us toward solving the 
problems found in information security? 
 
Question 2: What promotes insecure behaviours among the users of IT systems and how can 
these behaviours be managed and minimised? 
 
Question 3: How can we maximise information security when the human factor is taken into 
account? 
 
Question 4: How can we include the human factor in a systematic approach to security 
decision making? 
 
The research presented in this thesis combined knowledge from economics, HCI and 
security. This approach was taken to tackle the challenges presented by these questions. This 
has resulted in a linked series of solutions which, taken together, outline a structured 
approach to information security decision making. Each research question will now be 
looked at individually. An assessment will be made as to how well it was answered by this 
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research and conclusions drawn at the end of each section. A summarisation of the research 
including a discussion of open questions and projected future work will be given at the end 
of the section. 
 
7.1 What can we learn from economic theory that will move us toward solving the 
problems found in information security? 
 
The review of basic economic theory in Section 2.3 identified several useful tools and 
approaches that can be applied to the field of information security. Microeconomic concepts 
- such as preference and indifference, utility and cost/benefit analysis [9, 12] - provide useful 
frameworks for understanding the decision making processes in rational actors. These 
theories feed forward into the construction of both theoretical models such as the 
Compliance Budget and into the construction of systems models. In the case of the former 
they allow us to offer an explanation for the observed behaviour of individuals when 
presented with security decisions. Cost/benefit analysis tells us that a decision making entity 
will weigh up all factors relevant to the decision and execute the option that maximises their 
utility. This pushed me to consider as many relevant factors as possible from the decision 
maker’s perspective when performing such an analysis. It proved necessary to draw non-
security factors into the system to allow a proper costing under such conditions to be made. 
Such decisions should also not be considered in isolation. All micro-economic decisions take 
place inside a macro-economic framework which reflects the outcome of previous decisions. 
While an investigation and understanding of this wider context is far outside the scope of 
this work it is necessary to recognise that it exists and that security decisions are not made in 
isolation. In fact some of the costs and benefits factored in to the decision are the results of 
previous decisions (as represented either by internal structures or the environment in which 
the decision is made). 
 
For example, the effort previously expended on security compliance by an individual is a 
factor when future compliance decisions are taken. Observed reasons for this include a 
cumulative frustration with additional security tasks when such tasks have previously been 
undertaken. One instance of this is automated virus scanning. In one organisations 
participants in the interviews analysed (see Section 4.3) reported that “different IT groups all 
want to scan these machines”, leading to unhappiness in the workforce due to the repetition of 
the task. The fact that the repetition of the same task leads to increased frustration indicates 
that members of a workforce or employee population are aware of prior security tasks when 
considering the burden a current task places upon them. 
 
Additionally, the timing of such tasks has an impact on their perceived cost and level of 
intrusion. Due to the additional load placed on computing resources by this process, 
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primary work tasks can be significantly slowed or disrupted – “when [the virus scanner] is 
turned on, our program takes an extra 20 minutes to build and test”. If the timing of this process is 
not under the control of the individual, then they cannot effectively organise their work to 
mitigate the loss of computing resources. If the scan then causes delays to the individual’s 
primary task, as shown in the quote, the perceived cost of the task will increase. However, if 
they had the possibility of selecting the timing of the scan, they would re-organise their 
work and “go for a coffee”, resuming their productive task once the maintenance task was 
completed. Obviously security decision making cannot be completely left to the users. In 
this example some users would simply postpone the task indefinitely. A compromise 
solution in which users have the flexibility, within a given time window, to schedule the 
task optimally with respect to their workflow would yield the maximum overall utility. 
Alternatively the system could automatically start the process once it detects the user is 
absent. Additionally, there may be other factors that the users are unaware of that will 
influence the organisations preferred patch timing as the next paragraph will show. 
 
Macroeconomic concepts are not directly represented in the cost/benefit analysis undertaken 
by a user faced with a security compliance decision, but often influence the environment in 
which the decisions are made. One reason for virus scans and patching processes being run 
during working hours as opposed to overnight (as my initially seem more logical) maybe 
that the organisation is attempting to reduce energy expenditure. This indirectly creates a 
cost for the individual as the disruptive tasks are then present in their working day, but this 
decision to trade-off costs between the user and the organisation is not consciously made. 
 
Economic theory therefore offers us boundaries and context alongside the tools it makes 
available to us. We can abstract away factors considered that can be considered 
macroeconomic and focus on the microeconomic inputs to the decision making process. 
Economics [9, 12] also informs us that the more accurately we represent the costs and 
benefits impacting a decision the more useful our result will be [13]. Factors such as timing 
of tasks (mentioned above) and productivity loss - which are not necessarily traditional 
security considerations but are of concern to the employees being asked to comply with 
security tasks - then become relevant when considering the effective deployment of security 
systems within an organisation. As discussed by Pallas [56] this approach treats security as a 
public good (in the economic sense) the production of which is centrally controlled and paid 
for by members of the organisation, irrespective of the cost of production for the individual 
being higher than the benefit gained. Pallas also points out that information security is 
delivered at least in part by formal or informal rules, the enforcement of which require the 
co-operation of the user population. This too introduces additional costs associated with the 
inefficient deployment of measures as a user ‘paying’ to support an inefficiently 
implemented centralised system of security is less likely to co-operate in the enforcement of 
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the formal and informal rules. This concept of user effort is central to the Compliance 
Budget (Section 4) and is discussed further below in Section 7.2. 
 
7.1.1 Cost / Benefit Analysis 
 
A cost/benefit analysis (CBA) is simply a method of rationally making an economic decision. 
The process involves assessing the total costs and benefits inherent in one or more courses of 
action and deciding which to pursue. The greater the number of relevant factors (those that 
impact the costs and benefits directly) that are included in to the decision, the more accurate 
the final decision will be. Framing decisions in this manner is a useful way of both 
understanding existing decision-making behaviour and predicting future outcomes [16]. 
Working from an assumption that decision making entities are, at least to some extent, 
rational, this approach provides a tool to identify the factors that have an impact on a 
decision. If when analysing a set of factors we predict a certain outcome, for example that 
users will comply with a security mechanism 80% of the time, but we observe only a 60% 
compliance rate in the real world, then we must conclude that, given our earlier assumption, 
the list of contributing factors is incomplete. We now know that we must re-analyse the 
situation to identify further relevant factors, or refine the weightings that are given to the 
existing list of factors. 
 
User behaviour has often been described in information security as irrational but using 
techniques such as this highlighted that there may be other mechanisms at work, and 
encouraged me to look beyond the usual explanations for factors that were influencing 
behaviour. Additionally, once a decision making process is framed in this way, and 
grounded in a satisfactory set of inputs, it can be used to predict future actions. The impact 
of changing the elements affecting the decision is one such powerful use to which this tool 
can be put. 
 
7.1.2 Utility 
 
Utility is a key concept drawn from the field of economics [9]. Utility in economics is a 
measure of how satisfied an entity is with its purchasing decisions. An entity therefore seeks 
to maximise its utility through its choices. When considering this in the context of security 
two interesting concepts are revealed. 
 
When considering a subjective concept such as utility the perspective we choose to take is of 
significance. I will discuss utility from two perspectives – that of an individual within the 
organisation and of the organisation itself. 
 
7.1.2.1 Individual Utility 
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As revealed in the interviews that underpin the Compliance Budget (found in Section 4), an 
individual’s utility, as considered by the individual themselves, is not focused on security 
(excepting the limited number of situations in which that individual’s primary task is also 
security-related). While in an ideal world (from a security practitioner’s point of view) 
individuals engaged in a cost/benefit analysis would be assigning said costs and benefits 
from the perspective of optimising the security outcome, the majority of the employees in an 
organisation will derive their utility more directly from their primary task, be this financial 
trading or technology research. When we think of an individual trying to maximising their 
utility we must do so in terms of this primary task not security. 
 
Where security supports or does not directly conflict with this task, then an individual can 
increase or maintain their utility level while undertaking security tasks. However, where the 
security task comes into conflict with the production task, compliance with the security task 
can be said to reduce the individual’s utility. It is in these instances that the difference in 
perspective between individuals and organisations can most clearly be seen. While in some 
sense both desire the organisation to be as successful as possible, the short-term goals of the 
individual may conflict with the operational and security policies of the organisation. When 
wishing to understand, predict or manipulate the behaviour of individuals in order to 
encourage a higher level of compliance with security policy it is necessary to work from 
their perspective. Utility gives us the tools to do this as the decisions made by the individual 
will be made in service of the goal of maximising utility not security. This is akin to an 
economic entity making purchasing decisions with its resources in order to gain the 
maximum satisfaction from the goods purchased. This process is one of trade-offs and 
balances where the expected outcomes of decisions are weighed against each other. When 
constructing a utility equation for an individual we may consider the following areas: 
 
1. Level of productivity. 
2. Level of security compliance. 
3. Time spent on secondary tasks. 
 
Taking the perspective of an individual user, their goal is to maximise their productivity 
while maintaining their level of compliance such that it is at the minimum level required to 
avoid sanctions (or termination). They also wish to minimise the time spent on secondary 
tasks. If a policy change requires more time to be spent on secondary tasks, then the 
individual has to either reduce their level of compliance or reduce their productivity to 
maintain their utility. 
 
7.1.2.2 Organisational Utility 
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When considering an organisation’s utility it is a flawed to think of ‘security’ as a separate 
concept. There are very few organisations for which security is their primary objective. 
Security then is one component of the utility equation but increasing security does not 
always increase utility. In that an organisation’s security procedures are dependent on the 
co-operation of its members, and those members as we have seen above are factoring in 
more than simply security factors when making compliance decisions, we must also take in 
to account more than just a measure of ‘how secure is the organisation’ when determining 
its utility. Extending this thought further, we can imagine a restrictive security system that is 
sufficiently burdensome that it places heavy costs, both financial and temporal, on the 
organisation it supports. These costs are borne, at least in part, by the individuals that 
comprise the organisation’s workforce. Such costs, especially time-related ones, negatively 
affect the productivity of those individuals, thus reducing the organisations profitability. 
Unless the protection granted by the security system (in terms of threats mitigated) increases 
faster than the impact of its deployment a point will be reached where the security system 
costs more to run than it saves through its mitigation. Diminishing returns and investment 
policies makes this point a virtual inevitability. 
 
Here is where the perspective of organisational utility becomes interesting. If we take a 
purely security-centric view, then we are not terribly concerned when we reach this point – 
security does after all continue to rise, although at a slower rate with respect to resources 
invested. However, if we take an overall measure of organisational utility then this point is 
of critical concern. From that perspective our utility equation would report that our optimal 
strategy would be to reduce the impact of the security system, allowing the workforce to be 
more productive. This reduction could come through a decrease in the amount of security 
deployed, an increase in the efficiency of the existing systems or through some other 
approach. 
 
This can be illustrated through the use of a simple example. Consider an organisation that 
wishes to strengthen its security policy. It decides to do this by increasing the minimum 
length of the password required to access its internal network. This password is used by all 
employees when signing on to a computer. While increasing the minimum password length 
will provide additional security with respect to some attacks it also has other impacts. In 
particular it increases the cognitive resources required to successfully remember and use the 
password. This increase means that individuals using the system will suffer failures in recall 
and entry more often. These failure events require a password reset to rectify. Resets are 
handled by the IT Helpdesk which must be provisioned appropriately to handle the 
expected volume of reset requests. In this small example we can see that changing the 
password policy in this way has potential impacts on three primary areas: 
 
- B: The frequency of password-related breaches 
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- P: User productivity (a locked-out user cannot be productive). 
- R: The resources required by the IT Helpdesk. 
 
From this we can construct a simple organisational utility (U) equation: 
 
U = P - B – R 
 
Utility is maximised when productivity is high and breaches and resources spent are low. 
Returning to our proposed change in password policy, increasing the password length 
reduces breaches, a desired outcome. However, it also decreases productivity and increases 
the resources required by the helpdesk. Taking this viewpoint we can now say that the 
change should only go ahead if the cost of breaches is reduced by more than the losses 
incurred to productivity and helpdesk resources. 
 
In a standard utility equation these variables are also affected by weighting functions that 
affect the relative significance of the factors in play. Our example equation should therefore 
be more correctly written as: 
 
U1= w1P – w2B – w3R 
 
These weighting functions change the nature of the outcome and allow us to represent a 
range of organisational types. A very security-conscious organisation would have a strong 
weighting for w2 so the negative impact of breaches on utility would be magnified. This 
would promote more resources to be spent on breach mitigation in order to increase utility. 
On organisation with a strong weighting for w1 on the other hand would be very business 
focused and react badly to any loss of productivity. 
 
Quantifying these changes is a vast challenge that is beyond the scope of this thesis but I 
have sought to illustrate here the benefits of taking an economic approach to security. 
Without it we would consider any gain to security to be worthwhile (within some 
reasonable budget constraints), failing to perceive the wider impacts and implications of our 
policy implementations. 
 
7.1.3 Research question 1: Concluding remarks 
 
The research question asked ‘What can we learn from economic theory?’ The discipline of 
Economics of Information Security is a relatively new field that utilises well-established 
theories from economics to tackle security-related problems. 
 
150 
 
 
Economics provide security managers with established techniques for methodically and 
systematically considering all possible costs and benefits associated with a course of action. 
This can be particular effective when applied to human factors in security, an area previously 
not well understood by the security community. 
 
Economics offers the security community tools for placing security problems in a rational 
framework that aids in optimising security decision making. By taking an interdisciplinary 
approach, it becomes possible to adopt a more scientific methodology to security, where 
before there has been an over reliance on the intuition and experience of high-level security 
managers and a following of established ‘best practise’. How these economic tools can be 
incorporated into a security framework that includes human behaviour will be discussed in 
the following sections. 
 
7.2 What promotes insecure behaviours among the users of IT systems and how 
can these behaviours be managed and minimised? 
 
The security community’s understanding of the role of the user in security has changed over 
time. From thinking of them as a hindrance to the effective deployment of security, attitudes 
have shifted to seeing them as an integral part of the security system – that effective security 
cannot be achieved without the co-operation of the population it seeks to secure. Schneier 
[63] said that “security is only as strong as the weakest link in its chain.” Many security experts 
(both the research and security communities) have seized upon this quote and consider 
users to be that weakest link, regular citing Schneier to support their view. Instances of users 
adopting insecure behaviour – that is behaviour that does not support or undermines the 
security process – are well documented. From writing passwords on post-it notes to 
tailgating through security doors and barriers, it appears that users are often being 
deliberately insecure. Yet while some individuals do delight in in breaking rules, they are in 
a minority. Most people wish to feel safe and to conform to the normal rules of society, and 
most employees want their organisation to prosper, so they can remain gainfully employed. 
So why are such behaviours so common? Understanding why individuals are indulging in 
these negative actions is the first step in a chain that leads to what should be the prime goal 
of security practitioners - a co-operative workforce. By understanding the motivations 
behind non-compliant actions we can introduce changes into the system (which here refers 
to the total system including the internal states of the individuals) that counteract these 
motivations and lead to the reduction or elimination of these behaviours. 
 
In the past such behaviours have been dismissed as the irrational actions of uneducated and 
unmotivated people. However, the research presented in this thesis was undertaken from 
the standpoint that, on the whole, individuals act largely rationally, albeit using incomplete 
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and subjective viewpoints on which to base their decisions. As such, I looked for underlying 
reasons for these behaviours. The data set that was used for this was a set of interviews 
undertaken at a technology research company and a financial institution. What became 
apparent from an analysis of these interviews is that (excepting the perverse few mention 
above): 
 
Individuals adopt insecure behaviours not because they want to but because they feel they 
have to. 
 
This understanding then pushed me to look more closely at the factors that influenced these 
decisions. This core idea was then built into the theory of The Compliance Budget. 
 
7.2.1 An economic re-framing 
 
As we saw in Section 7.1, the discipline of economics offers us several valuable tools for 
framing models relating to behaviour and decision making such as utility and cost/benefit 
analysis. We can use these models to help answer the question of why users are adopting 
insecure behaviours. When asked during the interviews about complying with existing or 
new security policies participants mentioned several factors that would encourage them to 
comply or not to comply. The choice to not comply is a key form of insecure behaviour that 
will form the focus of this discussion. I decided to frame the decision to comply or not 
comply in terms of a cost/benefit analysis conducted internally by the individual in question. 
As discussed above in Section 7.1.2.1, the goal of such decision making is to maximise the 
individual’s utility. As such, the factors that influence the decision and are weighed up in 
the cost/benefit analysis will be quantified subjectively from the individual’s perspective. 
However, while this framing is a useful way of examining the question it does not provide 
the answers we seek. Returning to our initial assumptions that users on the whole wish to be 
secure, and often have a vested interest in doing so, it seems more likely that they would 
decide to comply and that instances of non-compliant behaviour should be substantially 
rarer. The factors that contribute to such a decision were outlined in Figure 6. 
 
A comparison of these factors would imply that while in some edge cases where security can 
be seen to be actively obstructing an important business transaction it would be rational to 
not comply with security in more minor or everyday situations the opposite would appear 
to be true. So far then this approach is not sufficient to explain the day-to-day issues of 
insecure behaviour such as writing passwords on post-it notes and tailgating through 
security barriers. There are two key factors missing that significantly influence decision-
making processes. These will be examined in the following sections. 
 
7.2.2 Primary task and context as factors 
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While security is regarded by many individuals to be important in an abstract sense, this 
does not necessarily translate into a motivation to behave securely in day-to-day compliance 
decisions. Where more direct motivators for behaviour exist, such as salary and task 
pressure from managers, security can and does take a back seat. The prime reason for this is 
that for the majority of individuals security is not the primary task for which they are 
financially (or otherwise) rewarded. When an individual seeks to maximise their personal 
utility they are not looking to make the organisation as secure as possible. Instead their 
utility is based on personal factors such as the successful execution of their primary task and 
earning money to provide for themselves and their family. While security may be a 
component of these it is not an explicit goal and this secondary status has a substantial 
impact on how it is perceived and acted upon as we shall now see. 
 
7.2.2.1 Primary Task and Risk 
 
Referring back to our economic framing of compliance decisions in Section 7.2.1, this 
substantially changes the weighting given to the factors involved. Those relating to the 
primary tasks and systems (the business task in our running example) will be considered to 
be more significant than those relating to secondary tasks, which for the majority of people 
include security. Figure 6 showed the various factors that an individual considers when 
faced with a compliance decision. These are summarised below, with an indication of 
whether they apply to the primary or secondary task, or are a general cost or benefit. 
 
 Costs:  - Physical load (general) 
   - Cognitive load (general) 
   - Missed opportunities (primary) 
   - Embarrassment (primary) 
   - Less availability (primary) 
   - Hassle factor (primary) 
 
 Benefits: - Protection from responsibility (general) 
- Protection from sanctions (general) 
- Increased security (secondary) 
   - Protection from liability (secondary) 
 
The majority of the costs associated with compliance are linked to the primary task – worries 
about missing opportunities or of having to take time out from being productive to complete 
the security task. Conversely, factors linked to the security process – such as being safer or 
reducing liability in the case of a breach – fall on the benefit side. This skews the cost/benefit 
analysis toward non-compliance for individuals for whom security is a secondary task 
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because the costs, being associated with the primary task, carry more weight than the 
benefits. Individuals pursuing goal-driven behaviour relegate secondary tasks to the status 
of distractions. This is compounded by the benefits of the primary task being concrete, 
expected and likely to happen in the short term. The benefits of the security task are diffuse 
and long term. Individuals of this kind will include most office workers, and other 
organisational and corporate employees. 
 
Other factors also come in to play to push the imbalance further in this direction. A user’s 
risk appetite will also affect their behaviour. The relevance of Adams’ work on risk [2] 
became apparent as I considered the implications of the Compliance Budget. Adams 
expresses an individual’s approach to risk through a model he calls the risk thermostat, 
shown in Figure 20. Like a mechanical thermostat this mental mechanism regulates 
behaviour by balancing a propensity to take risks with the perceived danger of those risks. 
Adams also tells us that there are three types of risks: 
 
1. Directly perceptible risks e.g. crossing a busy road 
2. Risks perceptible through science e.g. infectious diseases 
3. Virtual risks (those risks that science has no firm consensus on) e.g. Global warming 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Adam’s risk thermostat 
 
The way we respond to risk varies depending on which category it is in. We manage directly 
perceptible risks intuitively and personally, overriding the judgement of experts in the risk 
with our own beliefs. However, for risks that are only perceptible through science we rely 
on institutional risk management. As security is not a directly perceptible risk (except for 
those that are unfortunate enough to suffer the consequences of a successful attack directly – 
again a minority) the employees of the organisation in our example will look to the 
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organisation itself to protect them from such risks. However, the weakness of this scientific 
risk management is that relies on an objective measurement of the safety and danger 
associated with the risk and a rational response to these measurements by those exposed to 
the risk. Security is notoriously hard to measure because 1) successful security results in 
events not happening and 2) much of the threat environment is opaque at worst, and visible 
but highly fluid at best to security professionals. This arguably pushes security risks closer 
to being a virtual risk which, without the guiding influence of scientific consensus, is then 
managed solely by an individual’s beliefs about that risk. These factors make the effective 
transmission of security risks to individuals a very difficult task. 
 
Returning to the risk thermostat we see that perceptual filters operate on rewards and 
accidents alike. In the case of compliance decisions the rewards are magnified (better 
productivity, less time spent away from primary task) and the perception of accidents, or 
breaches, is reduced as security risks are not directly visible to the individual. In contrast, 
the personal risks, missed opportunities, lack of productivity and other primary-task-related 
issues are directly perceptible by the individual, and so will be directly managed by their 
behaviour. This has the effect of increasing the individual’s propensity to take security risks 
while decreasing the perceived danger of them thus leading to a set of balancing behaviours 
that condones risk taking with respect to security – the adoption of insecure behaviour. 
 
So in our cost/benefit analysis we have a set of factors that are weighted toward making 
costs more prominent and undermining benefits. They do this: 
 
- By their association with a task of secondary importance. 
- By the application of perceptual filters that play down the dangers and make the 
benefits more attractive. 
 
As these benefits are largely found in the ‘costs’ side of the analysis this exacerbates the bias 
already found there. 
 
7.2.2.2 Contextual factors 
 
So far I have demonstrated how individuals approach compliance decisions and how, using 
this approach, insecure behaviours can arise from a more rational and plausible chain of 
reasoning from the individual. The significance of this is worth restating – perceiving users 
to be insecure for better reasons than ignorance, indifference or laziness fundamentally 
changes how security managers need to address security design and incentivise compliance. 
There is more to add to the picture however. Such decisions are not made in isolation. With 
any conceptual model it is necessary to bound the inputs at some reasonable point. 
Bounding our analysis at this point in the conceptualisation of the decision-making process 
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would introduce significant errors into our understanding of the likely behavioural 
outcomes of any security policy. The reason for this is that a cumulative effect takes place as 
security procedures (or indeed any secondary task) follow each other. Time variations also 
take place and so the perceived burden of tasks varies based on when it is presented to the 
individual and which tasks have preceded it in the day. 
 
This is understandable intuitively – the burden of a task presented to an employee during a 
moment of free time during the early part of the day will seem relatively light. However, if 
that same task is presented at the end of the day, when they are trying to finalise their 
primary workload so they can leave for home, the burden will feel much higher. Likewise, if 
they have already been presented with a series of tasks during the day and more keep 
arriving. This effect was reported in our interviews (in Section 4.2), in particular with respect 
to the timing of automated patching. Participants reported feeling very frustrated if patching 
took place when they logged in at the start of the day and were trying to begin their 
production tasks. They stated that if they could select the timing of the task manually, and 
set it running, for example, while they ate lunch, the frustration they felt with the patching 
process would be significantly reduced. 
 
For some the logical next question would be ‘Why should security managers care so much about 
how frustrating such tasks are when they are necessary?’ Indeed, one security manager with 
whom these concepts were discussed stated that if production tasks were delayed by 
security events then employees would ‘come in to work 15 minutes earlier and leave 15 minutes 
later.’ [59] This type of attitude - that security is important and so can demand whatever 
amount of time and effort it consider necessary –is the start of the road to non-compliance. 
In the patching example above, it is true that - due to the automated nature of the process - 
participants had no choice but to let it run. However, there are situations where individuals 
do have a choice, to either comply or use a lower-effort but less secure workaround. The 
additional frustration caused by the poorly-timed patching process will make future 
compliance less likely to yield a positive outcome. 
 
To take this in to account in our economic framing, we need to add in a ‘hassle factor’ to the 
costs of complying that accounts for the subjective burden perceived by individuals as a 
result of the timing of the task and the costs of other secondary tasks the individual has 
already performed. This ‘hassle factor’ adds further weight to the costs of compliance 
without adding any counterbalancing incentives to the benefits. With this our cost/benefit 
model is conceptually complete. While there may be specific factors unique to each decision 
or situation to consider all the core concepts required to answer our research question have 
been developed. 
 
7.2.3 Research question 2: Concluding remarks 
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Our research question asked ‘What promotes insecure behaviours among users?’ and this can 
now be answered using the model developed above based on the economic tools outlined in 
Section 7.1. 
 
Insecure behaviours are adopted by individuals in order to ensure a positive outcome on their 
own cost/benefit analysis when faced with a compliance decision. 
 
The key insight here is that the decisions are made using a rational process but based on 
subjective, assumptions and perspectives. This addresses the criticism levelled at the rational 
actors on which most economic theories are based – that humans are not rational thinkers. 
What this research has attempted to show is that a version of rational processes such as 
cost/benefit analysis and utility calculations are taking place but they are often based on 
flawed information or from a limited and highly subjective perspective. 
 
This insight relates directly to Kerckhoffs’ principles [45] discussed in Section 1.1. Kerckhoffs 
understood that secure communications depended on the system being usable and three of 
his six principles reflect that. These principles are repeated below as a reminder: 
 
Principle 3: It must be easy to communicate and remember the keys without requiring written 
notes, it must also be easy to change or modify the keys with different participants; 
 
Principle 5: The system must be portable, and its use must not require more than one person; 
 
Principle 6: Finally, regarding the circumstances in which such system is applied, it must be 
easy to use and must neither require stress of mind nor the knowledge of a long series of rules. 
 
Principles 3 and 6 reflect the need for a low cognitive load in the system. Principle 3 in fact 
hints at the result of an excessive cognitive load – that written notes will be required. This 
practise is often reported as a consequence of overly restrictive password policies [1, 38]. 
Principle 3 also expresses the need for responsiveness and agility within the system. 
Principle 5 relates to physical load and Principle 6 again expresses the requirement for an 
appropriate level of cognitive load. These costs are also reported as relevant today by 
participants in the Compliance Budget. 
 
However, these principles have been neglected in security’s recent history, likely due to the 
fact that the impacts of low usability on system security have never been well understood by 
the security community as a whole. This lack of understanding of the costs associated with 
low usability means that the incentives that are needed to drive the planning of usable 
security are absent. Work such as this thesis that explicitly shows the detrimental impacts of 
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neglecting usability on the security of a system provide a motivation for security planners 
and decision makers to return to Kerckhoffs’ principles of usability and ensure they are 
followed. 
 
7.3 How can we maximise information security when the human factor is taken 
into account? 
 
The sections above have given us a useful set of tools and models with which to understand 
why individuals adopt insecure behaviours. The next question I wanted to address was how 
this information could be used to improve information security practice. Such models and 
theories are of no practical use if their insights do not offer up new approaches to security 
design. A strength of the above model is that it is based on a set of rational thought 
processes and has recognisable factors that feed in to the decision making process. This lead 
me to develop a more structured model that placed the decision making model in context 
and looked at how security managers could use the knowledge to maximise the effective 
security of their systems. This model was the Compliance Budget [11]. Rather than seeing it 
as an intractable or opaque problem the Compliance Budget treats compliance decision 
making as an understandable process based on rational principles as described above. 
Additionally, it recognises that the effort individuals are prepared to expend on compliance 
and overcoming the ‘hassle factor’ associated with it is finite. The implication of this is that 
user effort can and should be managed carefully as part of security planning and not 
squandered by inefficient implementations. 
 
7.3.1 The Compliance Threshold 
 
Understanding that individuals have a limited amount of effort to spend on secondary tasks 
is one of the key steps in understanding how to maximise security while taking human 
factors into account. The interview participants showed a range of reactions when asked 
how they would respond to the introduction of a new security measure, with some being 
considerably more impatient with security than others. From this it can be inferred that 
there is individual variation in where this threshold lies. Common factors became apparent 
that can and do influence this threshold. Loyalty to the organisation, technical ability, 
personal security culture and awareness of the threat environment all contributed to raising 
the threshold when high and reducing it when low. This gives security managers some 
approaches to maximising the Compliance Threshold of the individuals in their system. 
 
Maximising security then means ensuring that where possible individuals are not being 
asked to work beyond their Compliance Threshold so as to minimise the pressure to seek 
workarounds to security tasks. Additionally, the organisation should seek to increase the 
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Compliance Thresholds of their employees where possible. Some thoughts on methods of 
achieving this will be discussed in a later section. 
 
7.3.2 Rate of spending 
 
It would be a mistake, however, to think that the onus is on the individual alone – that 
maximising security involves only pushing employees to work as close to their Compliance 
Threshold as possible with their Threshold set as high as possible. Individuals are pushed 
toward their Compliance Threshold by the effort required to complete secondary tasks. 
Maximising security therefore also involves ensuring that such tasks are implemented as 
efficiently as possible. Remember that user effort should be considered to be a resource that 
is consumed like any other. With this resource security managers are in essence purchasing 
security tasks. With tasks that push individuals over their Compliance Threshold being less 
likely to be completed effectively it is important to consider which tasks the users are asked 
to undertake. 
 
In the case of financial resources, it is immediately obvious that spending money on over-
priced goods is not an efficient way of conducting business. The analogy holds in this case, 
with inefficient tasks being analogous to the over-priced goods – the manager is paying 
more than he needs to in order to get the task done. In the same way that buying a series of 
over-priced goods is a poor use of financial resources asking users to complete overly-
burdensome tasks is not a good use of their effort. There is a direct pressure on security 
managers looking to maximise security then to streamline tasks as much as possible with the 
primary business process of their organisation. Reducing the per-task effort means that for a 
given Compliance Threshold more tasks can be asked of the individual before that threshold 
is crossed. A second route to maximising security when taking into account human 
behaviour is therefore to reduce the rate at which user effort is spent. 
 
7.3.3 The Operating Point 
 
When seeking to maximise security through the Compliance Budget theory a somewhat 
counterintuitive result comes to light. The negative impact of adding in security measures 
once individuals are at or past their Compliance Threshold means that a point is reached 
where it is functionally counterproductive to do so. This creates a disconnect between the 
planned security, as set out in the policy, and the effective security of the system as it 
operates. Increasing required password strength is a good example to illustrate this point. 
For certain kinds of cracking attacks, increased password length and character variety add 
strength to the password, increasing security. A password such as ‘Ar5PwdIJC4tEx!’ 
provides good protection against such threats. However, such passwords are substantially 
harder to remember and input than ones created under a more lenient policy e.g. Jaunty89. 
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While in theory a policy that mandates the use of passwords such as ‘Ar5PwdIJC4tEx!’ 
provides better security the practise will rarely reflect that. Faced with the high cognitive 
burden of recall associated with such a password, the majority of users will use a memory 
aids in order to cope [1, 38, 39]. This memory aid, if the security manager is fortunate, will 
involve a discrete reminder system. However, passwords written on post-it notes attached 
to monitors, on whiteboards, kept in a desk drawer or under the keyboard are all often 
reported solutions. The reality, then, is not a strong password that prevents cracking attacks, 
but a systemic weakness where passwords can be freely harvested from the physical 
environment. The effective security of the system is lower than the planned security. This 
problem has been known to exist since at least 1999 (when Adams and Sasse published their 
work) yet little has been done to mitigate it. This may have been because the issue was seen 
to be intrinsic and unavoidable to the inclusion of users in a system – regardless of how the 
system was design these behaviours would still be seen. The Compliance Threshold offers a 
way forward; a method for managers to understand the impact of security processes and 
plan security in such a way as to find a more optimal balance between security and 
insecurity (or indeed any balance at all). By indicating that this limit exists, and that prior to 
this limit compliance is substantially more likely, the Compliance Budget makes it desirable 
to plan to operate at or under the Compliance Threshold rather than dismissing the problem 
us an unsolvable issue with users in general. 
 
The negative outcomes described above are the result of pushing users of the system to 
operate at an unsustainable level of effort causing them to, quite rationally, adopt insecure 
behaviours in order to cope. The costs to the organisation go beyond just those inflicted on 
the individual users. When there are multiple security events in the system that create 
enough pressure to push individuals into using workarounds a culture of non-compliance 
can be created that will propagate over time. New employees joining the organisation will 
arrive and adopt the practises in common use that will include endemic use of security 
shortcuts and workarounds. This is analogous to Reason’s argument for why repeated 
accidents occur in the workplace [60]. He states the existence of opportunities for accidents 
to occur is insufficient to explain my accidents recur. Reason explains that the driving force 
that accounts for this difference is the safety culture, and that this force is the result of the 
“unsatisfactory resolution of the inevitable conflict that exists (at least in the short-term) between the 
goals of safety and production.” It is clear that ‘safety’ can be replaced with ‘security’ and the 
same sentiment be expressed. In this way an otherwise well planned security policy that 
doesn’t take user effort into account can result in an insecure operational environment. 
 
Following the inferences of the Compliance Budget would instead lead to a 
recommendation to identify the ‘Operating Point’- this being the point at which users are 
spending their available effort on security but are not routinely being pushed over their 
Compliance Threshold into areas that encourage insecure behaviours. Counter-intuitively 
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this will at times involve reducing the demands of the security policy. Let us return to our 
example of the passwords outlined above. While allowing something as trivial as Jaunty89 is 
not advisable stepping back from a policy that mandates ‘Ar5PwdIJC4tEx!’ almost certainly 
is. Studies such as those conducted in Chapter 5 are key to approaching such decisions. 
Through analysing performance data with various password policies we can identify 
policies that decrease performance and increase the number of resets. It is these policies that 
will place the highest burden on users and thereby carry the highest risk of promoting 
insecure behaviour and workarounds. 
 
By reducing the policy to a level that places a manageable cognitive load on the system’s 
users the motivation to use insecure workarounds is substantially reduced, leading to a 
higher level of compliance and a more secure environment, with passwords not stored 
physically in the workspace. So although our policy on paper looks weaker our operating 
environment is actually strengthened. 
 
7.3.4 Data-gathering support 
 
Although this thesis has theoretically identified this Operating Point as the ideal point at 
which security policies should be balanced, the functional identification and implementation 
of these ideas will still require a great deal more work. Significant challenges are present in 
the understanding of how different mechanisms and policy variations burden users and 
how best to mitigate these burdens. This work does not claim to have the answers for such 
questions, simply to present a new way of looking at the problem of non-compliance and the 
issues of human factors in security. 
 
However, one need that this research has started to address is the requirement for models 
such as the Compliance Budget grounded in relevant empirical data. Without such data, it is 
impossible to systematically fine-tune a security policy. Instead, any adjustments rely on the 
intuition and experience of security professionals alone. While such knowledge is not 
necessarily ineffective, it can be made more reliable by having valid data to work from. Such 
data is also necessary to unpin systems modelling work, which will be discussed in a later 
section. 
 
Laboratory experiments can introduce biases into the conclusions drawn from their data 
simply because they do not take place in a realistic working environment. While in the 
laboratory the experiment becomes the participant’s primary task. As has been discussed 
many times already in this thesis the nature of the task is critical to how it is weighed up in 
an individual’s mind and thus the effort they devote to it. As security is almost always a 
secondary task laboratory experiments that focus on security technologies are rarely suitable 
for gathering the sort of data required to support theories such as the Compliance Budget. 
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The key advantage of laboratory studies, however, is that they take place in a controlled 
environment that can minimise the amount of external factors coming in to play, as 
discussed in Section 3.1. Gathering data from real environments comes with a host of 
problems including gaining access to such populations. In order to meet these challenges I 
developed a remote data gathering method utilising proprietary software developed at 
UCL. APET is a server-based experimentation system that allows participants to login over 
the internet from any location to complete a flexible range of tasks. This method offers a 
compromise solution to the problem of collecting realistic data. Each experiment is 
controlled by a software module within APET and so can be manipulated to create a 
systematic progression of experimental variables. This retains some of the pros of using 
laboratory-based experiment. However, as the participants login from their normal working 
environment to take part in the experiments the realism of the experiment being a secondary 
task is at least partly preserved and a more natural set of data is gathered. With 
experimental systems such as APET over time a database of information can be built up that 
will be sufficient to ground the Compliance Budget and related models in a valid empirical 
data set. This will allow them to become much more powerful tools for decision making 
support and prediction. 
 
7.3.5 Research question 3: Concluding remarks 
 
Our research question asked ‘How can we maximise security when human behaviour is taken into 
account?’ by developing the economic framing of compliance decisions into a more 
comprehensive and contextualised model this question can be answered. 
 
We can maximise security when human behaviour is taken in to account by minimising the 
friction between security and the primary business process and by managing user effort as if 
it were a finite resource that needed budgeting like any other.  
 
Through seeking to extend the Compliance Thresholds of the individual users of the 
systems, and by slowing down the rate at which user effort is expended, security managers 
can aim to execute their policy at a functionally optimal Operating Point. At this point, the 
maximum number of security tasks are completed but individuals are not routinely pushed 
past their Compliance Threshold into a space where they are forced (according to their own 
internal cost/benefit analysis) into using insecure coping strategies to deal with the 
cognitive, physical and temporal burdens placed upon them by the security system. 
 
7.4 How can we include the human factor in a systematic approach to security 
decision making? 
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In answering the previous research questions I have shown the importance of considering 
the human factor when implementing a security system. The requirement to correctly factor 
human behaviour into the decision-making process, and the recent advances in techniques 
and methods associated with this concept, can be seen as a new paradigm in security. 
However, this is not to say it deserves special attention above and beyond other existing 
factors. It is important to highlight it at this stage of security research because to date it has 
been relatively neglected due to the apparent intractability of the problem. This highlighting 
should not lead to a focus on human factors at the exclusion of all others. The final research 
question of this thesis asks ‘How can we include the human factor in a systematic approach to 
security decision making?’ The focus on this section will be on looking at methods that allow 
human behaviour to be factored alongside technical considerations as an equivalently 
relevant part of a security system. 
 
7.4.1 Systems Modelling 
 
Systems modelling is a powerful technique for analysis and prediction that is becoming 
increasingly widely used in the field of Information Security. Services such as HP’s Security 
Analytics seek to adopt a more scientific approach to Information Security and systems 
modelling forms a key part of their approach. In essence systems modelling creates an 
executable representation of a system that runs as a simulation of the real thing. The 
accuracy of a systems model is dependent on two things – how closely it represents reality 
and the quality of the data used to train and tune the model. With respect to the first point, a 
line has to be drawn somewhere. A model that fully represents all the variables present in 
the real system is indistinguishable from it. It is also unrealistic to consider that such a 
system may be built. Instead significant assumptions and abstractions are usually made 
when developing such a model in order to create the model, carefully chosen so as to 
preserve its usefulness. The data that is used to train the model should also be carefully 
gathered so as to be as realistic as possible. As the predictive and analytical power of the 
model is dependent on the accuracy of this data this is a crucial point to consider. It has been 
common in the past to abstract away human behaviour when constructing such models for 
three main reasons, two related to the points raised above. Firstly - and most fundamentally 
- until recently the importance of human factors in achieving effective security was not 
recognised by the research community. Secondly, the mechanisms of human behaviour have 
not been well understood by the security community and so representing it realistically 
within a model was not an option for security practitioners. Thirdly there has been a lack of 
available realistic data to allow any models that tried to incorporate a notion of human 
behaviour to be effectively tuned. As discussed above data from laboratory-based 
experiments contains biases that can make it unsuitable for real-world prediction. 
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As this thesis has demonstrated, not including a representation of human behaviour is not a 
viable decision if security operations are to be effectively maximised. This means that, if 
systems modelling is to be used as part of the toolset of security management, the issues 
above must be addressed. This thesis has taken the first steps to do just that. An 
understanding of the importance of human factors in security is one of the prime motivators 
for my research in this area. Additionally, through the Compliance Budget, a mechanism 
underpinning human behaviour with respect to at least one aspect of security has been 
identified and expressed as a theoretical model. This opens the door for such mechanisms to 
be represented in systems modelling approaches. Finally, the use of APET and other 
experimental techniques to gather more realistic real-world data contributes valuably to the 
pool of data that can be used to tune such models. 
 
Yet, while the previous stages of research in some sense facilitate the use of human factors in 
systems modelling, they do not offer an integrated solution. I wanted to develop a 
conceptual structure that was capable of representing human factors alongside technical 
measures in a seamless fashion. The goal for this system was to allow a systematic approach 
to be taken to security decision-making so that security managers were less reliant on 
intuition and experience and could draw upon a more scientific methodology when 
approaching security policy and design. 
 
7.4.2 Structured Systems Economics 
 
The primary components of systems models are processes, resources, locations and 
environment. This organisational structure allows the model to be effectively and rigorously 
defined. By contrast the organisation of security objectives and mechanisms is often ad-hoc 
or follows standardised guidelines. Added to this there is a lack of rigour within the security 
community when it comes to expressing the requirements of a security system. This is best 
illustrated through an examination of what are seen to be the common goals of security – 
confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA). It has been recognised by more than one 
security professional that while CIA represents a good basis for stating security needs and 
requirements there are gaps that it conceptually fails to address. In seeking to add to CIA 
most authors pay little heed to whether they are adding declarative or operational concepts; 
that is to say they do not differentiate between the desired properties of the system and the 
mechanisms used to create those properties. This sees ‘authentication’ listed alongside 
‘confidentiality’ when the use of authentication is something that creates confidentiality. 
 
I wanted to look at creating a systematic approach to security that addressed these issues as 
well as incorporating a notion of human factors. The result was Structured Systems 
Economics (SSE). This is a methodology for the organisation of security objectives and 
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information in such a way that the creation of a systems model from this data was not only 
facilitated but was the logical next step. 
 
7.4.2.1 System Structure 
 
SSE addresses the problems with CIA outlined above by intentionally separating the 
structure into two layers – the Framework Layer and the Operational Layer. The Framework 
Layer is declarative and expresses the desired security requirements of the system whereas 
the Operational Layer describes the processes and resources required to fulfil those 
requirements. The components of the Operational Layer are deliberately expressed as 
processes and resources so as to prefigure the creation of a systems model. In this way the 
description of the system also forms a blueprint for the necessary elements of the system 
model. 
 
The population of the Operational Layer follows logically from the requirements expressed 
in the Framework Layer. Each requirement declared in the Framework Layer is addressed 
by one or more components in the Operational Layer. Components are added iteratively to 
the Operational Layer until all the requirements are met at which point population of the 
layer ceases. 
 
This methodology ensures that the minimum of security is used to satisfy the system’s 
requirements. However, SSE as described so far does not satisfy our research question in 
terms of incorporating human factors in a systematic fashion. The description of the system 
so far is a static one. It can be seen as the theoretical version of the system but it cannot tell 
us how the system will operate in a real-world situation. The solution was to incorporate a 
dynamic component in the form of Actors. 
 
7.4.2.2 Actors 
 
The structure of the SSE framework is separated horizontally as discussed above into 
declarative and operational layers. The vertical structure is defined by the roles available 
within the organisation the system represents, sorted hierarchically by their ability to 
influence the system. These roles are then populated by Actors, which can be seen simply as 
special processes that function along the lines of the Compliance Budget as described in 
Chapter 4. These Actors supply a dynamic function by attempting to complete the tasks 
associated with their roles in the organisation. As they interact with the security system 
following the economically-framed behavioural models described above they generate 
outcomes from which the overall utility of the system can be assessed. Again actors are 
listed as processes (although they may be seen as resources by Actors of a higher role) 
intentionally to frame them in a form usable by the systems model. 
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7.4.3 Decision support 
 
The primary objective of this thesis in a wider sense and the creation of SSE more 
specifically is to develop a methodology for supporting security decision making through a 
systematic and scientific process. SSE is a key part of this as it structures existing 
information about the security system into a form that supports prediction and simulation. 
This allows security decision makers to explore the likely effect of policy changes before 
they are implemented. When used in conjunction with a utility-based framing of the system 
security can be optimised with respect to the organisations overall needs and not just 
improved with respect to itself alone. With a notion of human behaviour represented in the 
system by Actors SSE offers a more integrated approach to security management. Human 
factors are neither overly focused on nor abstracted away so as to become detrimentally 
absent. As part of a cycle of operations that includes effective data gathering and systems 
modelling SSE offers valuable decision making support. 
 
The value of systems models in supporting decision making was demonstrated Baldwin et 
al. [24], working for HP Labs. Refining the models available by accurately representing 
human behaviour represents a valuable step forward in this area. 
 
7.4.4 Research question 4: Concluding remarks 
 
Research question 4 asked ‘How can we include the human factor in a systematic approach to 
security decision making?’ Systematic approaches, such as those based on systems models [13] 
in general do not include a valid notion of the individual users of the system. Where such 
notions are included they tend to be simplistic, as in [10]. This makes such models 
unsuitable for supporting decision making as the responses of the user will not realistically 
match those found in a real operational environment. The answer to research question 4 can 
therefore be summarised as: 
 
The human factor can be included in a systematic approach to security decision making by 
including a realistic notion of user behaviour in a framework that facilitates the use of 
predictive tools such a simulation through systems modelling. 
 
It is important to note that the representation of the user within the systems model must be 
sufficiently well developed and motivated as to generate realistic behaviours in response to 
the system’s parameters. Framing the decision making processes of the user as a rational 
economic process (albeit one based on subjective factors) as is done in the Compliance 
Budget (Section 4.5) is one step forward along this route. Such models have to be supported 
by empirical data to allow the model to be calibrated correctly. The security architecture 
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outlined in Section 6.3 combines empirical data with an understanding of user decision 
making within a framework that also naturally expresses technical controls. The result is a 
unified and systematic approach to security decision making. An initial prototype of this 
method was explored during my internship at HP Labs [8]. This method used the results of 
the empirical study conducted in [39] to tune a systems model developed using the methods 
in [13, 41]. This model was able to balance trade-offs between breaches, productivity and 
help-desk costs within a fictional organisation in order to optimise the investments and 
security policy of that organisation. 
 
7.5 Thesis summary and critical evaluation 
 
In answering the key research questions posed at the start of this research this thesis has 
developed an integrated and systematic methodology for approaching security decision 
making that takes a full account of the influence human behaviour has on security. By 
framing the problem in economic terms, the methodology includes a fuller picture of the 
costs and benefits associated with security. This enables better decisions to be made. The 
optimisation of these decisions crucially is with respect to the overall utility of the 
organisation and so avoids the trap of implementing security for security’s sake. Although 
there is substantial future work to be done in terms of populating the required data sets and 
understanding the specific issues associated with any one organisation the first steps toward 
a more effective system of security have been taken. The Compliance Budget and SSE 
combined with data gathered through the APET system form part of a security cycle that 
tackles some of the problems facing security managers today. 
 
While this programme of research has yielded successes in terms of answering the research 
questions it is also important in any work of this kind to recognise limitations, not least of all 
so they can inspire and motivate future work. The collection and presentation of empirical 
data to support the Compliance Budget has taken a back seat in favour of developing other 
areas of the approach, and this is certainly one such weakness. Due to this lack the 
Compliance Budget remains at this stage a theoretical model only that is not ready to be 
used by security practitioners as a tool to support decision making. 
 
Due to the necessity of developing a unified, multi-disciplinary approach to the problem 
much time has been spent on the presentation of the separate components of this approach. 
This has meant that the validation of the approach as a whole has remained outside of the 
scope of the work. This can certainly be raised as a criticism of the thesis and one that future 
work will address. 
 
7.6 Directions for future work 
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The research presented in this thesis makes the case for changing the way we think about 
information security management, and this opens up new directions for information 
security research. In the Trust Economics project, research was carried out in close 
collaboration with industry partners, and the problems addressed in this thesis address 
problems observed in organisations today. Implementing and validating in an operational 
context an approach to decision making informed by the model of user decision making 
expressed in the Compliance Budget (Section 4.5), supported by grounded data gathering 
methods (Section 5), is a key future activity. Demonstrating that a utility-based approach to 
security, which includes costs associated with human factors, can help to identify changes 
and interventions that measurably improve security and productivity – and if not, what 
other factors have an influence - would further the development of theories of information 
security management that are grounded in the real world, rather being disconnected from it. 
The development of such theories still requires further building blocks. 
 
The Compliance Budget describes compliance decision-making in terms of a cost/benefit 
analysis. Throughout this thesis, the importance of fully costing the impacts of a security 
policy or mechanisms has been stated. To move from being a theoretical model to a practical 
tool that can be used by decision makers, the Compliance Budget framework needs to be 
populated by a more complete range of factors than those shown in Figure 6. ‘Cognitive 
load’ can be broken down into factors such as recall, password generation, and interference 
(the effect of using multiple instances of the same information type – such as having to 
manage 25 or more passwords). As these factors are subjective this list can only be populated 
through discourse with the relevant users, although some likely candidates can be 
suggested, such as the impact of task interruption and the pressure of the business process. 
Additionally, the weighting and importance of, and the relationship between these factors, 
needs to be researched in more detail. As mentioned above pressure from the business 
process will affect the cost associated with missed opportunities and any delay or blocking 
of the primary task. The dependency of such costs on the business environment is one such 
relationship that future work may focus on. One approach would be to elicit a deliberately 
wide range of factors such as those mentioned above, but extended to include contextual 
factors like the type of organisation and personal factors based on an understanding of 
individual users’ subjective experience, through consultation with expert security 
researchers. Due to the high cost (in terms of both time and the resources needed for 
incentivisation) of approaching users directly this approach would likely be the most 
suitable. It leverages the existing knowledge of the research community to form a starting 
point for what will, due to the necessity of including feedback from multiple stakeholder 
perspectives, be an iterative process. This list could then be presented to users through a 
weighting and comparison task in order to rank the factors. Links to industry and public 
sector organisations are necessary in order to provide a working organisational environment 
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so that the results are grounded in an appropriate context. A year-long project involving 
government and industry partners that pursues this research direction is currently 
underway. This project aims to combine data gathered in the commercial organisations 
linked to the project with expertise from the security community to develop guidelines and 
recommendations for the more effective management of compliance. One of the goals of this 
project is to modify the NASA TLX system (described in Section 5.1.1.3) in to a Security TLX 
by replacing the factors used in the NASA TLX with those that are more relevant to security. 
As described in Section 5.3 the use of NASA TLX in a security context can lead to confusion 
among participants and this motivates the need to re-design it for future use. The factors 
used in the re-design will be determined by the research approach outlined above. This tool 
can then be used to measure effort associated with various tasks, allowing us to better 
understand the links between user effort and compliance. 
 
Models such as the Compliance Budget (found in Section 4.5), and the systems models 
suggested as an executable outcome of constructing the systems structure presented in 
Section 6.3, need valid empirical data to produce reliable predictions, as expressed by the 
principle of ‘garbage in, garbage out’ [49], discussed in Section 3.4. A key direction for future 
work is the continued development of methodologies for reliable and efficient data 
gathering to support security decision-making that fully accounts for human factors and the 
formulation of these models in particular. A cross-disciplinary approach that combines 
expertise in instrument design (e.g. from HCI) with security expertise is most likely to 
produce the required tools. This research direction should pursue two objectives in parallel: 
 
1. the collection of an empirical data set grounded in an operational context, and  
2. the development of a set of methodological instructions that can be exported from 
this research context to other researchers or interested parties to allow them to follow 
the same process without intervention from myself (or associated colleagues). 
 
The continuing goal of this research is to offer support to security decision makers. The 
usefulness of such an empirical data set has been outlined already. However, not all 
organisations will have the resources or expertise to manager their own data collection. The 
data gathering and analysis approaches contained in this thesis require them to be tailored 
to each organisational context in which they are implemented. For example, the SCs and SOs 
(see Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2.1) used to populate the security architecture discussed in Section 
6.3 must contain specific information about the system they are instantiating. The scale of 
this task, and thus the practicality of this method, has not been tested. The management 
effort required to map a large organisation and each of the SCs and SOs it would contain 
would necessarily be huge. The biggest barrier to this operation would be the time 
investment required to successfully achieve this goal. At minimum this would require a 
period of 6 months, and realistically could take several years. Obviously this would be 
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affected by the size of the organisation and the number of staff assigned to the project. It is 
not unknown for organisations to invest several years in rolling out new system architecture 
and I envisage that the mapping of the organisation into SCs and SOs would take place as 
part of a project of such a scale. The managers of an organisation wishing to pursue this 
approach would have to be prepared to commit to a long-term project that changes the way 
they approach security. It is not something that can be achieved in the short term. Until 
refinements to the method are implemented this will likely make it impractical in its current 
form for the majority of organisations. 
  
That said, the approach that is being suggested here represents something of a paradigm 
shift in how organisations approach security decisions making. While the investment will be 
large the benefits have the potential to exceed that. The challenge for researchers is to 
demonstrate the gains that can be achieved through smaller scale interventions first. It is not 
necessary for the principals to be applied organisation-wide in the initial case. The recent 
work of my research group has focused on exploring how to identify the compliance issues 
with specific mechanisms within organisations, such as access control, and how to optimally 
select interventions based on an analysis of the user population. 
 
If a meaningful change is to be effected within the security community then it is not enough 
for such tools to only be available to a single researcher (or research group). The approaches 
contained within this thesis need to be incorporated in to tools that can be used by those 
without specific human factors expertise, or developed into training and services that impart 
the relevant expertise in a concise fashion. Security practitioners would be the focus of such 
information dissemination, although researchers could also use the knowledge to direct 
future work or their own. 
 
A necessary first step in this direction would be to build up a database of instances of non-
compliance within an organisation, and gather data on the behaviour and attitudes of users 
that lead to these non-compliance events. One possible approach is to use semi-structured 
interviews to identify common areas of friction between the business and security processes, 
as well as the behaviours and strategies used by the users to cope with them. These 
situations can then be developed into a scenario-based survey using the psychometric 
design principles of integrity testing [24]. These principles allow tests to be created that make 
it difficult for participants to ‘game the system’ – that is try to record the answer they think 
the experimenter wants to hear, rather than what they honestly believe. This is particularly 
relevant when questioning participants about security as the fear of the consequences of 
admitting to insecure behaviour may drive them to falsehoods. Participants will be asked to 
rank the severity of the non-compliant behaviours presented (that do not include a ‘correct 
answer as the presence of such would undoubtedly bias the results) as well as the likelihood 
that they themselves would use those behaviours. 
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I recently conducted a study of this kind with an industry partner, as a post-doctoral 
researcher. The survey was formed of 10 scenarios that presented situations in which the 
business process and security policy came into conflict. 5 of the scenarios assessed behaviour 
and 5 looked at attitudes. For each behaviour scenario we created 4 possible non-compliant 
actions that would allow the actors in the survey to complete their business task at the 
expense of security. The scenario topics themselves were generated from two sources. The 
first was a set of 127 interviews conducted during an early study with the organisation’s 
employees in both the UK and the US. These interviews explored attitudes towards security 
and knowledge of the organisation’s security policy. Common issues were extracted and 
expanded into approximately half the scenarios. The others were developed through 
consultation with the organisation’s security personnel and focused on particular areas of 
concern the organisation had. The results of the survey allows us to identify ‘hotspots’ 
where options that were rated as severe were still commonly selected, indicating that non-
compliance was motivated not by a lack of knowledge but by other factors, such a lack of 
agility in the security process. Additionally, we were able to detect a cultural difference 
between the US and UK divisions of the organisation. Again the purpose was to provide 
security managers with the tools to identify key areas of insecurity and the information 
needed to implement an improved solution that takes in to account the human factor. In this 
case the survey results directly informed the content and targeting of an awareness and 
training campaign that is soon to be launched within the organisation. 
 
Any future work should retain the principle that a unified approach is needed to address 
information security problems. Framing such problems in the economic notion of utility 
serves the purpose of creating a unified environment in which the various strands of 
research can be pulled together. For example, Pallas [56] uses principles from the field of 
New Institutional Economics, such as transaction costs and the cost of information 
asymmetries, to frame his insights. An additional area of interest would therefore be to 
provide a utility-based system that would allow security managers to explore the potential 
impacts of their decisions through modelling and simulation. Parkin et al. [58] provides a 
prototype of how such a tool might be implemented in practise. The creation of a similar 
tool where in the executable portion is based on the structured system presented in Chapter 
6 remains an outstanding goal. The effectiveness of such approaches in changing the way 
security professionals think about and justify security decisions is being explored by work 
such as Baldwin et al. [24]. This study extends the results found in [13] and discussed in 
Section 3.5. They found that methods based on security economics changed the decision 
making process of security professionals, indicating the potential of future work in this area. 
171 
 
 
References 
 
1. A. Adams, M.A. Sasse. Users are not the enemy: Why users compromise security 
mechanisms and how to take remedial measures. Communications of the ACM, 42 (12), 
pp. 40-46 December 1999. 
2. J. Adams, 1995. Risk. Routledge, 1995. 
3. R. Anderson, 1994. Why cryptosystems fail. In: Communications of the ACM Vol. 37 
No. 11 pp. 32-40, 1994. 
4. R. Anderson, 2001. Why information security is hard – an economic perspective. In: 
17th annual proceedings of the Computer Security Applications Conference, 2001. 
5. R. Anderson, 2002. Unsettling parallels between security and the environment. In: 
Proceedings of the second Workshop on the Economics of Information Security. Berkley, 
USA 2002. 
6. R. Anderson, 2008. Security Engineering: A guide to building dependable distributed 
systems. Wiley Publishing Inc. ISBN 978-0-470-06852-6. 
7. R. Anderson, T. Moore. 2009. Information Security: Where computer science, 
economics and psychology meet. In: Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society, Vol. 
367, No. 1898, July 2009. 
8. S. Arnell, A. Beautement, P. Inglesant, B. Monahan, D. Pym and A. Sasse, 2011. 
Systematic decision making in security management modelling password use and 
support. HP Laboratories Technical report No. HPL-2011036, 2011. 
9. W. J. Baumol, A. S. Blinder, 2009. Economics; Principles & Policy. South-Western 
Cengage Learning. ISBN 978-032458206. 
10. A. Beautement, R. Coles, J. Griffin, C. Ioannidis, B. Monahan, D. Pym, A. Sasse, and 
M. Wonham, 2008. Modelling the Human and Technological Costs and Benefits of 
USB Memory Stick Security. In: M. Eric Johnson, editor, Managing Information Risk 
and the Economics of Security, pages 141–163. Springer, 2008. 
11. A. Beautement, M. A. Sasse and M. Wonham, 2008. The Compliance Budget: 
Managing security behaviour in organisations. In: Proceedings of the 2008 Workshop on 
New Security Paradigms. ACM, Lake Tahoe, California, US, 2008. 
12. D. Begg, 2008. Economics. McGraw-Hill Higher Education. ISBN 978-0077117870. 
13. Y. Beresnevichiene, D. Pym, and S. Shiu, 2010. Decision support for systems security 
investment. In: Network Operations and Management Symposium Workshops (NOMS 
Wksps), 2010 IEEE/IFIP, pp. 118 -125, 2010. 
14. M. Bishop, 2006. Computer Security: Art and Science. Addison-Wesley ISBN 0-201-
4409-7. 
15. S. Brostoff, M. A. Sasse. Are Passfaces™ more usable than passwords? A field trial 
investigation. In S. McDonald, Y. Waern & G. Cockton [Eds.]: People and Computers 
172 
 
 
XIV - Usability or Else! Proceedings of HCI 2000 (September 5th - 8th, Sunderland, UK), 
pp. 405-424. Springer, 2000. 
16. S.K. Card, T. P. Thomas and A. Newall, 1983. The Psychology of Human-Computer 
Interaction. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1983 ISBN 0-89859-243-7 
17. H. Cavusoglu, H. Cavusoglu, J. Zhang. Economics of Security Patch Management. In: 
The Fifth Annual Workshop on Economics and Information Security. Cambridge, UK 2006. 
18. Y. Chen, B. Boehm, L. Sheppard, 2007. Measuring security investment benefit for off 
the shelf software systems – A stakeholder value driven approach. In: The Sixth 
Annual Workshop on Economics and Information Security. Carnegie-Mellon, USA 2007. 
19. K. Everitt, T. Bragin, J. Fogarty and T. Kohno, 2009. A comprehensive study of 
frequency, interference, and training of multiple graphical passwords. In ACM 
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI), April 2009. 
20. F. Farahmand, S. Navathe, G. Sharp, P. Enslow, 2004. Evaluating Damages Caused 
by Information Systems Security Incidents. In: The Economics of Information Security, J. 
Camp and R. Lewis (eds.), Kluwer, 2004, pp. 85-94. 
21. I. Flechais, 2005. Designing secure and usable systems. Ph.D. University College 
London. 
22. D. Florencio and C. Herley, 2007. A large scale study of web password habits. In 
proceedings of the 16th international conference on the World Wide Web, 2007. 
23. D. Florencio and C. Herley, 2010. Where do security policies come from? The sixth 
Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security, 2010 
24. A. Furnham and J. Taylor, 2011. Bad apples: Identify, prevent and manage negative 
behaviour at work. Palgrave Macmillan, March 2011. ISBN-10: 0230584748 
25. L.A. Gordon and M.P. Loeb, 2002. The Economics of Information Security 
Investment. In: ACM Transactions on Information and Systems Security, 5(4):438–457, 
2002. 
26. L. A. Gordon, M. P. Loeb, 2004. The economics of information security investment. 
In: ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 5:438{457, November 2002. 
Reprinted in Economics of Information Security, 2004, Springer, Camp and Lewis, eds. 
27. L. A. Gordon, M. P. Loeb, 2006. Managing Cybersecurity resources: A cost-benefit 
analysis. Mcgraw-Hill. ISBN 978-0071452854. 
28. S. G. Hart, 2006. NASA-Task Load Index (NASA-TLX); 20 Years Later. Proceedings of 
the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 50th Annual Meeting, 904-908. Santa Monica: 
HFES, 2006. 
29. S. G. Hart and L. E. Staveland, 1998. Development of NASA-TLX (Task Load Index): 
Results of empirical and theoretical research. In P. A. Hancock and N. Meshkati (Eds.) 
Human Mental Workload. Amsterdam: North Holland Press, 1998. 
30. K. Hausken. Strategic Defence and Attack of Complex Networks. In The Sixth Annual 
Workshop on Economics and Information Security. Carnegie-Mellon, USA 2007.  
173 
 
 
31. B. von Helversen, G. H. E. Gendolla, P. Winkielman, R. E. Schmidt. Exploring the 
hardship of ease : subjective and objective effort in the ease-of-processing paradigm. 
Motivation and emotion, Vol. 32, H. 1. S. 1-10, 2008. 
32. M. G. Helander, T. K. Landauer and P. V. Prabhu. (eds.), 1997. Handbook of human-
computer interaction. Elsevier, 1997. 
33. H. S. B. Herath, T. C. Herath. Cyber-Insurance: Copula pricing framework and 
implications for risk management. In The Sixth Annual Workshop on Economics and 
Information Security, 2007. 
34. C. Herley, 2009. So long, and no thanks for the externalities: the rational rejection of 
security advice by users. In: Proceedings of the 2009 New Security Paradigms Workshop, 
2009. 
35. P. Honeyman, G. A. Schwartz and A van Assche, 2007. Interdependence of reliability 
and security. In: Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Workshop on Economics and Information 
Security. Carnegie-Mellon, USA 2007. 
36. HP Labs, 2001. Exploring Information Stewardship with the Cloud Ecosystem Model. 
[online] Available at <http://www.hpl.hp.com/news/2011/oct-
dec/Final_Report_collated.pdf> [Accessed 31st August 2012]. 
37. C. D. Huang, Q. Hu, R. S. Behara, 2006. Economics of information security 
investment in the case of simultaneous attacks. . In: The Fifth Annual Workshop on 
Economics and Information Security. Cambridge, UK 2006. 
38. P. Inglesant, M. A. Sasse, 2010. Studying Password Use in the Wild: Practical 
Problems and Possible Solutions. Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS) 
2010, July 14-16, 2010, Redmond, WA, USA, 2010. 
39. P. Ingelsant, M. A. Sasse, 2010. The true cost of unusable password policies: 
password use in the wild. In Proceedings of the 28th international conference on Human 
factors in computing systems. Atlanta, Georgia, USA: ACM, pp. 383-392, 2010. 
40. International Standards Office, 2005. ISO/IEC 27002 Risk Analysis. 
41. C. Ioannidis, D. Pym, and J. Williams, 2009. Information security trade-offs and 
optimal patching policies. Manuscript, 2009. 
42. M. E. Johnson, E. Goetz, 2006. Embedding information security risk management 
into the extended enterprise. IEEE Security and Privacy. June, 2006. 
43. M. E. Johnson and E. Goetz, 2007. Embedding Information Security into the 
Organisation. IEEE Security & Privacy May/June 2007 pp. 16 – 24, 2007. 
44. M. E. Johnson, S. Dynes, 2007. Inadvertent disclosure – Information leaks in the 
extended enterprise. In: The Sixth Annual Workshop on Economics and Information 
Security. Carnegie-Mellon, USA 2007. 
45. A. Kerckhoffs, 1883. La cryptographie militaire. Journal des Sciences Militaires, pp. 5-38, 
1883. 
46. K. S. Killourhy and R. A. Maxion, 2009. Comparing Anomaly-Detection Algorithms 
for Keystroke Dynamics. In: International Conference on Dependable Systems & Networks 
174 
 
 
(DSN-09), pp. 125-134, Estoril, Lisbon, Portugal, 29 June to 02 July 2009. IEEE 
Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos, California, 2009. 
47. V. Kumar, R. Telang, T. Mukhopadhyah, 2006. Enterprise information security: Who 
should manage it and how? In: The Fifth Annual Workshop on Economics and 
Information Security. Cambridge, UK 2006. 
48. V. Kumar, R. Telang, and T. Mukhopahhyay, 2007. Optimally securing 
interconnected information systems and assets. In: Proceedings of the Sixth Workshop 
on the Economics of Information Security, Carnegie Mellon, USA 2007. 
49. W. Lidwell, K. Holden and J. Butler, 2010. Universal principles of design: 125 ways to 
enhance usability, influence perception, increase appeal, make better design 
decisions and teach through design. Rockport Publishers, 1 Jan 2010. ISBN-10: 
1592535879 
50. Microsoft, 2012. Create strong passwords. [online] Available at 
<http://www.microsoft.com/en-gb/security/online-privacy/passwords-create.aspx> 
[Accessed 31st August 2012]. 
51. K. Mitnick, 2002. The Art of Deception: Controlling the Human Element of Security. Wiley 
Publishing Inc. ISBN 0-471-23712-4. 
52. NASA, 2012. NASA TLX: Task Load Index. [online] Available at 
<http://humansystems.arc.nasa.gov/groups/TLX/> [Accessed 31st August 2012]. 
53. New York Times, 2006. A Face is Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 4417749. [online] 
Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technology/09aol.html> [Accessed 
31st August 2012]. 
54. NIST, 1995. An Introduction to Computer Security: The NIST Handbook. [pdf] USA: 
NIST. Available at <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-12/handbook.pdf> 
55. D. A. Norman, 1983. Some Observations on Mental Models. In Gentner, D.A. & 
Stevents, A. A. [Eds.] Mental Models. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1983. 
56. F. Pallas, 2009. Information security inside organizations. Ph.D. Berlin University. 
[online] Available at 
<http://opus.kobv.de/tuberlin/volltexte/2009/2320/pdf/pallas_frank.pdf> [Accessed 
31st August 2012] 
57. D. Parker, 1992. Fighting Computer Crime: A New Framework for Protecting Information. 
Wiley Publishing Inc. ISBN 978-0471163787. 
58. S. Parkin, A. van Moorsel, P. Inglesant and M. A. Sasse, 2010. A stealth approach to 
usable security: Helping IT security managers to identify workable security 
solutions. Proceedings of the 2010 Workshop on New Security Paradigms. ACM Press, New 
York, US, pp. 33-49, 2010. 
59. Personal conversation with Robert Coles 
60. J. Reason, 1998. Achieving a safe culture: Theory and practice. Work and stress, vol 12 
(3), pp. 293 – 306, 1998. 
175 
 
 
61. M. A. Sasse, S.Brostoff, and D. Weirich, 2001. Transforming the "weakest link": A 
human-computer interaction approach to usable and effective security. BT Technology 
Journal, Vol 19 (3) pp. 122-131, July 2001. 
62. B. Schneier, 1999. Attack Trees. [online] Available at 
<http://www.schneier.com/paper-attacktrees-ddj-ft.html> [Accessed 31st August 
2012]  
63. B. Schneier, 2000. Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World, John Wiley 
& Sons, 2000. ISBN 0-471-25311-1 
64. B. Schneier, 2002. Computer Security: It’s the Economics, stupid. In: Proceedings of the 
First Workshop on the Economics of Information Security. Berkley, USA 2002. 
65. S. Sheng, L. Broderick, C. A. Koranda and J. J. Hyland, 2006. Why Johnny still can’t 
encrypt: Evaluating the usability of email encryption software. The second Symposium 
On Usable Privacy and Security, 2006. 
66. S. Sheng, B. Magnien, P. Kumaraguru, A. Acquisti, L. F. Cranor, J. Hong and E. 
Nunge, 2007. Anti-phishing Phil: The design and evaluation of a game that teaches 
people not to fall for phish. In: Proceedings of the third Symposium On Usable Privacy 
and Security, 2007. 
67. Stanford, 2012. Protégé. [online] Available at <http://protege.stanford.edu/> [Accessed 
31st August 2012]. 
68. G. Stoneburner, A. Goguen, A. Feringa. Risk management guide for information 
technology systems: Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology. NIST Special Publication 800-30 2002. UK: ISO. 
69. A. Strauss and J. Corbin, 1998. Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and 
procedures for developing grounded theory. Sage Publications inc. 2nd Edition, 1998. 
70. L. Sweeney, 2000. Uniqueness of Simple Demographics in the U.S. Population, 
LIDAPWP4. Pittsburgh, PA Carnegie Mellon University, Laboratory for International 
Data Privacy. 
71. Trust Economics, 2008. Trust Economics. [online] Available at 
<https://wiki.cs.ncl.ac.uk/trusteconomics/TrustEconomics> [Accessed 31st August 
2012]. 
72. T. Valentine. An evaluation of the Passfaces™ personal authentication system 
(Technical Report) London: Goldsmiths College University of London, 1998. 
73. T. Valentine. Memory for Passfaces™ after a long delay. (Technical Report) London: 
Goldsmiths College University of London, 1999. 
74. H. Varian, 2000. Managing online security risks. The New York Times, 1 June 2000. 
75. W3C, 2012. OWL 2 Web Ontology Language Document Overview. [online] Available at 
<http://www.w3.org/TR/owl2-overview/> [Accessed 31st August 2012]. 
76. D. Weirich, 2005. Persuasive password security. Ph.D. University College London, 2005. 
176 
 
 
77. D. Weirich, M. A. Sasse. Pretty Good Persuasion: A first step towards effective 
password security for the Real World. Proceedings of the New Security Paradigms 
Workshop 2001 (Sept. 10-13, Cloudcroft, NM), pp. 137-143. ACM Press, 2001. 
78. A. Whitten and J. D. Tyger, 1999. Why Johnny can’t encrypt: A usability evaluation 
of PGP 5.0. In: Proceedings of the 8th conference on USENIX Security Symposium, Volume 
8, 1999. 
79. Wikipedia, 2012. Availability. [online] Available at 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Availability> [Accessed 31st August 2012]. 
80. Wikipedia, 2012. Category mistake. [online] Available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_mistake> [Accessed 31st August 2012]. 
81. J. Willemson, 2006. On the Gordon & Loeb model for information security 
investment. In: The Fifth Annual Workshop on Economics and Information Security. 
Cambridge, UK 2006. 
82. M. Zviran and W. J. Haga, 1993. A comparison of password techniques for multilevel 
authentication mechanisms. The Computer Journal 36 (3), pp. 227-237, 1993. 
 
Background Reading 
 
1. R. Anderson and T. Moore. The economics of information security: A survey and 
open questions. Science, vol. 314, pp. 610-613, Oct. 2006. 
2. S. Chiasson, A. Forget, R. Biddle, P. C. Van Oorschot. Influencing Users Towards 
Better Passwords: Persuasive Cued Click-Points. Proceedings of HCI, 2008. 
3. M. Collinson, B. Monahan, and D. Pym. A logical and computational theory of 
located resource. Journal of Logic and Computation, 19(6):1207–1244, 2009. 
4. M. Collinson, B. Monahan, and D. Pym. Semantics for structured systems modelling 
and simulation. In Proc. Simutools 2010. ICST: ACM Digital Library and EU Digital 
Library, 2010. ISBN: 78-963-9799-87-5. 
5. R. De Neufville and A.R. Odoni. Airport systems: planning, design, and 
management. McGraw-Hill Professional, 2003. 
6. Peter Neumann. Computer-Related Risks. Addison-Wesley, 1995. 
7. S. Parkin, A. van Moorsel, P. Inglesant, M.A. Sasse. A Stealth Approach to Usable 
Security: Helping IT Security Managers to Identify Workable Security Solutions. 
NSPW 2010: Proceedings of the 2010 Workshop on New Security Paradigms. ACM Press, 
New York, US, pp. 33-49, 2010 
8. Schneier, Bruce. Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly about Security in an Uncertain 
World, Copernicus Books, 2003. ISBN 0-387-02620-7 
9. K. P. Yee. User Interaction Design for Secure Systems. In L. Faith Cranor & S. Garfinkel 
[Eds.]: Security and Usability: Designing secure systems that people can use 2005, pp 13-30. 
O'Reilly Books, 2005. 
177 
 
 
10. M. E. Zurko, R. T. Simon. User-Centred Security. New Security Paradigms Workshop, 
1997. 
11. M. Collinson, B. Monahan, D. Pym. Located Demos2k - Towards a Tool for 
Modelling Processes and Distributed Resources. HP Labs Technical Report No. HPL-
2008-76, 2008. 
  
178 
 
 
Appendix A: Sample configuration file for the Maxion Text Propmpter 
 
############################################################################ 
#                                     
#  UCL1 - May 09                             
#                                       
#  (MTP Configuration File)                         
#                                       
############################################################################ 
 
############################################################################ 
# Configuration 
############################################################################ 
 
# This UCL1 config file for MetriTextPrompter demonstrates 
# how you can set up a simple password experiment in MTP. 
 
# The name of the experiment 
[Set ExptName = UCL1_Experiment] 
[Set DataDirectory = Data] 
 
# Prompter window properties 
[Set AutoMaximize = True] 
#[Set windowwidth = 700] 
#[Set windowheight = 700] 
 
# Prompt and Box Font properties 
# "Prompt" refers to the label where MTP displays prompts to the participant. 
# "Box" refers to the box supplied by MTP for the participant to type in. 
# You can set the font face, size, bold/not bold, and font color for both 
# the Prompt and the Box. 
# The font is any valid font name on your Windows machine. 
# The size is in points. 
# The color is in hexadecimal BGR format (see above for details). 
 
[Set PromptFont = Arial] 
[Set PromptFontSize = 15] 
[Set PromptFontBold = true] 
[Set PromptFontColor = &h000000] 
 
[Set BoxFont = Arial] 
[Set BoxFontSize = 15] 
[Set BoxFontBold = true] 
[Set BoxFontColor = &H000000] 
 
# Each line that is not a command will be displayed to the participant,  
# and a single-line textbox is provided type into. 
 
############################################################################ 
# Start experiment 
############################################################################ 
 
## Begin by asking the subject to type their first and last name (to 
## confirm that there is no mixup between subjects.) 
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[Set ErrorCheck = None] 
[CheckNumChars 3] 
[Set CheckNumCharsErrorMsg = Please type your full first and last name.] 
 
Please type your first and last name. 
 
## Next, tell the subject what they have to do. 
 
[Message] 
TASK 1 _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
Please type in the policy 1 (minimum of 6 characters) password you chose. _ 
[br]_ 
If you try to enter an incorrect password you _ 
[br]_ 
will have to type the text from the beginning. _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
To complete this task you will need to enter the password correctly 10 times. _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
Please press the enter key to start typing. 
 
[Set ErrorCheck = WholeString] 
 
[Set HidePromptBoxText = True] 
 
[Set PromptFontColor = &hE8E8E8] 
 
G08ildA 
G08ildA 
G08ildA 
G08ildA 
G08ildA 
G08ildA 
G08ildA 
G08ildA 
G08ildA 
G08ildA 
 
[Set PromptFontColor = &h000000] 
 
[Message] 
 
TASK 2 _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
Please type in the policy 2 (minimum 8 characters) password you chose. _ 
[br]_ 
If you try to enter an incorrect password you _ 
[br]_ 
will have to type the text from the beginning. _ 
[br]_ 
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[br]_ 
To complete this task you will need to enter the password correctly 10 times. _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
Please press the enter key to start typing. 
 
[Set PromptFontColor = &hE8E8E8] 
 
T1h9e4o6xarh 
T1h9e4o6xarh 
T1h9e4o6xarh 
T1h9e4o6xarh 
T1h9e4o6xarh 
T1h9e4o6xarh 
T1h9e4o6xarh 
T1h9e4o6xarh 
T1h9e4o6xarh 
T1h9e4o6xarh 
 
[Set PromptFontColor = &h000000] 
 
[Message] 
TASK 3 _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
You will now be asked to alternately enter one _ 
[br]_ 
of the passwords you have just typed and answer _ 
[br]_ 
a series of general knowledge questions. 
 
[message] 
Now type your policy 1 password. _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
Please press the enter key to start typing. 
 
[Set ErrorCheck = WholeString] 
 
[Set PromptFontColor = &hE8E8E8] 
 
G08ildA 
 
[set ErrorCheck = None] 
 
[Set HidePromptBoxText = False] 
 
[Set PromptFontColor = &h000000] 
 
Complete this phrase. As sick as a.. _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
A. Penguin _ 
[br]_ 
B. Parrot _ 
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[br]_ 
C. Puffin _ 
[br]_ 
D. Partridge  
 
[message] 
Now type your policy 2 password. _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
Please press the enter key to start typing. 
 
[Set ErrorCheck = WholeString] 
 
[Set HidePromptBoxText = True] 
 
[Set PromptFontColor = &hE8E8E8] 
 
T1h9e4o6xarh 
 
[set ErrorCheck = None] 
 
[Set HidePromptBoxText = False] 
 
[Set PromptFontColor = &h000000] 
 
Which legal document states a person's wishes _ 
[br]_ 
regarding the disposal of their property after death? _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
A. Will _ 
[br]_ 
B. Shall _ 
[br]_ 
C. Would _ 
[br]_ 
D. Should  
 
[message] 
Now type your policy 1 password. _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
Please press the enter key to start typing. 
 
[Set ErrorCheck = WholeString] 
 
[Set HidePromptBoxText = True] 
 
[Set PromptFontColor = &hE8E8E8] 
 
G08ildA 
 
[set ErrorCheck = None] 
 
[Set HidePromptBoxText = False] 
182 
 
 
 
[Set PromptFontColor = &h000000] 
 
 
Complete the title of the James Bond film The Man With The Golden.. _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
A. Gun _ 
[br]_ 
B. Tooth _ 
[br]_ 
C. Delicious _ 
[br]_ 
D. Eagle  
 
[message] 
Now type your policy 2 password. _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
Please press the enter key to start typing. 
 
[Set ErrorCheck = WholeString] 
 
[Set HidePromptBoxText = True] 
 
[Set PromptFontColor = &hE8E8E8] 
 
T1h9e4o6xarh 
 
[set ErrorCheck = None] 
 
[Set HidePromptBoxText = False] 
 
[Set PromptFontColor = &h000000] 
 
In which sport do two teams pull at the opposite ends of a rope? _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
A. Ice hockey _ 
[br]_ 
B. Basketball _ 
[br]_ 
C. Tug of War _ 
[br]_ 
D. Polo  
 
[message] 
Now type your policy 1 password. _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
Please press the enter key to start typing. 
 
[Set ErrorCheck = WholeString] 
 
[Set HidePromptBoxText = True] 
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[Set PromptFontColor = &hE8E8E8] 
 
G08ildA 
 
[set ErrorCheck = None] 
 
[Set HidePromptBoxText = False] 
 
[Set PromptFontColor = &h000000] 
 
 
Where would a cowboy wear his chaps? _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
A. On his hands _ 
[br]_ 
B. On his arms _ 
[br]_ 
C. On his legs _ 
[br]_ 
D. On his head  
 
[message] 
Now type your policy 2 password. _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
Please press the enter key to start typing. 
 
[Set ErrorCheck = WholeString] 
 
[Set HidePromptBoxText = True] 
 
[Set PromptFontColor = &hE8E8E8] 
 
T1h9e4o6xarh 
 
[set ErrorCheck = None] 
 
[Set HidePromptBoxText = False] 
 
[Set PromptFontColor = &h000000] 
 
Sherpas and Gurkhas are native to which country? _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
A. Ecuador _ 
[br]_ 
B. Morocco _ 
[br]_ 
C. Nepal _ 
[br]_ 
D. Russia  
 
[message] 
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Now type your policy 1 password. _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
Please press the enter key to start typing. 
 
[Set ErrorCheck = WholeString] 
 
[Set HidePromptBoxText = True] 
 
[Set PromptFontColor = &hE8E8E8] 
 
G08ildA 
 
[set ErrorCheck = None] 
 
[Set HidePromptBoxText = False] 
 
[Set PromptFontColor = &h000000] 
 
Whose autobiography has the title 'A Long Walk To Freedom'? _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
A. Ranulph Fiennes _ 
[br]_ 
B. Nelson Mandela _ 
[br]_ 
C. Mikhail Gorbachev _ 
[br]_ 
D. Mother Teresa  
 
[message] 
Now type your policy 2 password. _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
Please press the enter key to start typing. 
 
[Set ErrorCheck = WholeString] 
 
[Set HidePromptBoxText = True] 
 
[Set PromptFontColor = &hE8E8E8] 
 
T1h9e4o6xarh 
 
[set ErrorCheck = None] 
 
[Set HidePromptBoxText = False] 
 
[Set PromptFontColor = &h000000] 
 
Complete this stage instruction in Shakespeare's The Winter's Tale: _ 
[br]_ 
"Exit, pursued by a .." _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
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A. Dog _ 
[br]_ 
B. Tiger _ 
[br]_ 
C. Bear _ 
[br]_ 
D. Clown  
 
[message] 
Now type your policy 1 password. _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
Please press the enter key to start typing. 
 
[Set ErrorCheck = WholeString] 
 
[Set HidePromptBoxText = True] 
 
[Set PromptFontColor = &hE8E8E8] 
 
G08ildA 
 
[set ErrorCheck = None] 
 
[Set HidePromptBoxText = False] 
 
[Set PromptFontColor = &h000000] 
 
 
The young of which creature is known as a squab? _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
A. Pigeon _ 
[br]_ 
B. Salmon _ 
[br]_ 
C. Octopus _ 
[br]_ 
D. Horse  
 
[message] 
Now type your policy 2 password. _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
Please press the enter key to start typing. 
 
[Set ErrorCheck = WholeString] 
 
[Set HidePromptBoxText = True] 
 
[Set PromptFontColor = &hE8E8E8] 
 
T1h9e4o6xarh 
 
[set ErrorCheck = None] 
186 
 
 
 
[Set HidePromptBoxText = False] 
 
[Set PromptFontColor = &h000000] 
 
Which of these zodiac signs is not represented by _ 
[br]_ 
an animal that grows horns? _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
A. Taurus _ 
[br]_ 
B. Capricorn _ 
[br]_ 
C. Ares _ 
[br]_ 
D. Aquarius  
 
[message] 
TASK 4 _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
You will now be asked to complete two tasks, a weights task and a ratings task. _ 
[br]_ 
Please ask the experimenter to start these for you. _ 
[br]_ 
When both tasks are complete please click the button below. 
 
[Message] 
TASK 5 _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
Please type in the policy 1 (minimum of 6 characters) password you chose. _ 
[br]_ 
If you try to enter an incorrect password you _ 
[br]_ 
will have to type the text from the beginning. _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
To complete this task you will need to enter the password correctly 10 times. _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
Please press the enter key to start typing. 
 
[Set ErrorCheck = WholeString] 
 
[Set HidePromptBoxText = True] 
 
[Set PromptFontColor = &hE8E8E8] 
 
G08ildA 
G08ildA 
G08ildA 
G08ildA 
G08ildA 
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G08ildA 
G08ildA 
G08ildA 
G08ildA 
G08ildA 
 
[Set ErrorCheck = None] 
 
[Set PromptFontColor = &h000000] 
 
[Message] 
 
TASK 6 _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
Please type in the policy 2 (minimum 8 characters) password you chose. _ 
[br]_ 
If you try to enter an incorrect password you _ 
[br]_ 
will have to type the text from the beginning. _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
To complete this task you will need to enter the password correctly 10 times. _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
Please press the enter key to start typing. 
 
[Set ErrorCheck = WholeString] 
 
[Set PromptFontColor = &hE8E8E8] 
 
T1h9e4o6xarh 
T1h9e4o6xarh 
T1h9e4o6xarh 
T1h9e4o6xarh 
T1h9e4o6xarh 
T1h9e4o6xarh 
T1h9e4o6xarh 
T1h9e4o6xarh 
T1h9e4o6xarh 
T1h9e4o6xarh 
 
[Set ErrorCheck = None] 
 
[Set PromptFontColor = &h000000] 
 
[message] 
The experiment is now over. _ 
[br]_ 
[br]_ 
Thank you for taking the time to participate. 
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Appendix B: Instructions for Server Study participants 
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in the HCS password server study. Please read the 
following instructions carefully. You will shortly receive an email from ‘APET Project; called 
‘APET Project Password Study’. The experiment server is called ‘APET Project’ so all 
communication during the study will come from this email. It is very important that your 
email is not pushing these messages into your junk folder. Please check carefully that this 
isn’t happening and adjust your filters appropriately if it is. 
 
The first email will contain a link to the server itself, as well as some relevant information. 
The first page you will see after following the link will ask you to enter your email address. 
Then you will be asked to register a username and password. Your password should 
conform to the following rules: 
 
- Be at least 6 characters in length. 
- Contain at least 3 of the following categories 
o Upper case letters (A, B, C, . Z) 
o Lower case letters (a, b, c, . z) 
o Numbers (0, 1, 2, . 9) 
o Non-alphanumeric characters (! + ; - % etc.) 
 
All passwords should be created for this study. Please do not re-use any passwords existing 
passwords you may already have. This is both to allow us to collect more accurate data and 
also for your security. Once you have registered you simple need to wait for further emails 
from ‘Apet Project’. Each one will contain a link to a login screen. Simply login using the 
details you registered. If you cannot remember your password there is an option to reset it. 
Doing so is perfectly fine and should not be considered negative in anyway. 
 
Some final points: 
 
- Please check your email regularly (at least once a day) between now and December 
the 18th 
- Please DO NOT write down your password and login details or use any other 
memory aids. If you can’t remember it just use the reset function. 
- You will be paid £20 at the end of the session. This will be in the form of an Amazon 
voucher which will be delivered by email. 
 
If you have any questions please feel free to ask. 
 
